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Preface
Since the beginning of the fifties, the ruling paradigm in the discipline of economics
has been that of a competitive general equilibrium. Associated dynamic analyses
have therefore been preoccupied with the stability of this equilibrium state,
corresponding simply to studies of comparative statics. The need to permeate the
boundaries of this paradigm in order to open up new pathways for genuine dynamic
analysis is now pressing.
The contributions contained in this volume spring from this very ambition. A
growing circle of economists have recently been inspired by two distinct but
complementary sources: (i) the pathbreaking work of Joseph Schumpeter, and (ii)
recent contributions to physics, chemistry and theoretical biology. It turns out that
problems which are firmly rooted in the economic discipline, such as innovation,
technological change, business cycles and economic development, contain many
clear parallels with phenomena from the natural sciences such as the slaving
principle, adiabatic elimination and self-organization. In such dynamic worlds,
adjustment processes and adaptive behaviour are modelled with the aid of the
mathematical theory of nonlinear dynamical systems. The dynamics is defined for a
much wider set of conditions or states than simply a set of competitive equilibria. A
common objective is to study and classify ways in which the qualitative properties of
each system change as the parameters describing the system vary.
The ongms of the present volume may be traced to comparative studies of spatial and
economic dynamics which were initiated at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 1982. Among other tasks, the international reference
group for these studies provided insights into the theoretical development of models
and methods suited for the dynamic analyses of economic change processes. Many of
the contributions contained herein have come from members of this reference group
who have been undertaking basic research into dynamic processes such as competi-
tion, economic development and spatial adjustments.
Most of the papers were presented during four special sessions held at the 5th
International Conference on Mathematical Modelling, on the campus of the
University of California in Berkeley, California from July 29-31, 1985. Three
additional chapters have been prepared by those authors who were invited to
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contribute to these sessions but could not attend. Thus the volume is as complete and
unified as possible.
The editorial work has been undertaken by the Centre for Regional Science Research
(CERUM) at the University of UmeA.* The work has been supported in other ways by
the Department of Economics at the same university as well as by llASA and the
University of Karlstad. In particular, Jenny Wundersitz (CERUM) coordinated all
editorial tasks and Ingrid Lindqvist (University of Karlstad) prepared and revised the
manuscript. For their perseverence and perceptive attention to detail, the editors are
sincerely grateful.
UmeA, February 1987
David Batten
John Casti
BOrje Johansson
• The work on this volume has been done within a project supported by Riksbankens
Jubileumsfond, grant 84/266: 1.
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Chapter 1
Economic Dynamics, Evolution and Structural
Adjustment
B.JOHANSSON, D. BATIEN and J.CASTI
From perspectives represented in this volume, contemporary economics may be
regarded as a mature discipline. It has brought the state of the art close to the
boundaries of the predominant paradigm. Breaking through these boundaries implies
a search for alternatives or at least some alterations to this paradigm. Many of the
contributions contained herein spring from such ambitions. The different chapters
consist of various attempts to permeate the boundaries or to open up new pathways
within the existing paradigm, and in several cases to break with the established
tradi tion.
On occasions, economic theory and modelling has adopted concepts and research
strategies from the natural sciences, in particular from classical physics. A growing
circle of economic theorists have recently been inspired by some other developments
within the natural sciences. In this volume one can certainly identify influences of
this kind. Approaches and concepts introduced in the models are inspired by recent
contributions to physics, chemistry and theoretical biology. Moreover, techniques
for rendering the analysis of dynamical systems more tractable have been imported
and adapted from the natural and engineering sciences. However, the problems so
addressed are firmly rooted in the economic discipline with a special focus on
technological change, business cycles, economic development and growth. The
pathbreaking work of Schumpeter is a mutual source of inspiration for many of the
authors. In this spirit the whole collection is concerned with the dynamic analysis of
market economies and competition in the marketplace.
21. MODELS OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
The two chapters on dynamics to be found in Samuelson's "Foundations of Economic
Analysis" (1946) reveal that the evolution of most theoretical ideas and principles
generally undergoes long incubation periods. Samuelson's explanations and
interpretations of comparative statics, stability of equilibria, cycles and parametriza-
tion of dynamic processes contain many parallels with phenomena such as the
slaving principle, adiabatic elimination, and self-organization (Haken, 1978; 1983).
However, his discussion concentrates primarily on two aspects of economic dynamics,
namely the stability of equilibria and business cycles. As such, Samuelson's
contribution has little to say about economic growth. which has basically been a post
war field of interest.
Walrasian equilibrium models - in the guise of general competitive analysis - gained
some momentum in the beginning of the 1950s. In retrospect one may recall a
comprehensive research programme focussed on the existence of competitive
equilibria, safeguarded by equilibrium prices. The associated dynamic analysis was
therefore preoccupied with the stability of such equilibria. A great deal of theoretical
effort was spent on the study of "artificial" price adjustment processes using the
method of Lyapunov (see, e.g., Arrow and Hahn, 1971). The term "artificial" is
justified here by the fact that the studies were not principally concerned with
adjustment processes themselves, but rather with the stability of the essentially static
notion of a competitive equilibrium. Indeed, the extent of any dynamic analysis was
generally constrained by the equilibrium notion of the research programme. It may
also be characterized as an underpinning for the static equilibrium analysis. As
emphasized in the early work of Samuelson (1946), a static market equilibrium is of
general interest only if it is stable. One might add that a competitive equilibrium will
have little importance if it is not structurally stable or generic. Metaphorically
speaking, if we repeat the market experiment under approximately the same
conditions we would like to obtain approximately the same results (compare Hirsch
and Smale, 1974).
Growth theory comprises the process of capital accumulation intertwined with
increases in production and consumption. The reconstruction of the world economy
after the Second World War provided stimuli for analyzing growth problems. Von
Neumann's German version of the influential "A Model of General Economic
3Equilibrium" (1945) initially appeared in 1937. This model and its successors (see, e.g.
Georgescu-Roegen, 1951; Koopmans, 1964; Morishima, 1969) describe a multi sectoral
economy using linear activity analysis. The resulting equilibrium solution depicts a
system in which outputs and inputs grow at the same proportional rate. In
comparison with related models of multi sectoral growth (e.g. Leontief et ai, 1953;
Johansen, 1960), the von Neumann framework represents the passage of time in the
form of ageing vintages of capital goods.
During the 1950s aggregate growth models were developed along several lines. The
neoclassical economic growth models, whose origins may be traced back to Ramsey
(1928), characterized the optimal rate of growth and saving in an economy. The
essentials of this growth theory are summarized by the following differential
equation
f(k(t)) c(t) + a. k(t) + dk/dt (1)
where all variables are measured per unit of labour, and where k denotes capital, f(k)
output, c consumption, a. k capital maintenance and dk/dt the net increase of capital
(compare e.g. Solow, 1956; Phelps, 1961). One side of this growth model relates to
control theory formulations. The other side takes the form of aggregate business
cycle models, such as multiplier- accelerator models. Cyclical behaviour generally
stems from nonlinearities affecting the investment process in an aggregate
difference/differential or integral equation. From the 1930s economists experimented
with this type of analysis using difference equations (see Kalecki, 1971). In a
majority of cases the difficulty of finding a solution was avoided by constraining the
final structure of the model to a manageable form. For example, much of the work
initiated in the 1950s escaped such difficulties by retreating to the area of linear
oscillators.
In the early contributions of Kalecki (1935) and Goodwin (1951) we find accelerator-
multiplier models of the mixed difference-differential type, including lags and
nonlinearities. The cited Goodwin model also contains a given rate of technological
progress. We note in particular that the system is inherently explosive. However,
structural characteristics such as nonlinearities, ceilings, and floors keep the cycle
within a given range of values. The latter property, which plays a significant role in
Hick's model (1950), is illustrated in Figure 1. In Section 4 we return to more recent
model formulations in which nonlinearities not only replace the floor and ceiling
4constructions but also introduce the possibility of bifurcations and chaotic
behaviour.
The contributions collected together in this volume focus on cyclic fluctuations and
technological development rather than on economic growth per se. These distinc-
tions can be readily appreciated if the notion of growth is taken to signify "more of
much the same", whereas the notion of development is taken to describe a highly
evolutionary process (see Batten, 1985). Indeed evolution and development are almost
the same word (Boulding, 1981).
log Y (Y = National income)
Figure I Illustration of floor and ceiling in Hick's model
Full capacity
output
Time
In this introductory chapter we do not intend to examine all existing models of
economic dynamics. Thus far we have mentioned some of the historical building
blocks used in the world of dynamic analysis. We have chosen to introduce those
particular features which are important to the collection of contributions in this
volume. In subsequent sections, we shall refer to several other approaches which are
also relevant. One example is the family of putty clay models in which machines of
different vintages have different technical characteristics, so that old vintages
gradually become economically obsolete (see, e.g., Solow, 1962; Bardhan, 1969 and
1973; Johansen, 1972). Models describing the choice of technique (Morishima, 1969),
technical progress and the diffusion of technical change (e.g. Arrow, 1962;
Mansfield, 1961; Hahn and Matthews, 1964; Stoneman and Ireland, 1983) are also
introduced. Microeconomic aspects are represented by market-simulation models
5based upon recursive programming and adaptive behavior (Day and Grove, 1975).
This group contains response mechanisms found in oligopoly models (Hosomatsu,
1969; Kirman, 1975) and considers the formation of expectations.
2. EVOLUTION, INNOVATION AND SYNERGISMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT
The processes of long term change described by the classical economists such as
Smith, Ricardo and Malthus appear in retrospect to rely solely on population increase
and capital accumulation as their main ingredients (Baumol, 1959). By way of
contrast, in the work by Marx technical change is given a more prominent place.
When we read Schumpeter, evolutionary aspects of economic development are
brought into the picture, led by concepts like innovation, industrial mutation and
creative destruction. The association between clustering of innovations and economic
cycles may be an important reason for the revived interest in Schumpeterian
theories during the 1970s and 1980s.
Schumpeter's notion of innovation refers to several aspects of novelty such as the
emergence of new needs and changing preferences as part of social learning
processes, the development of new products satisfying established consumer needs,
the use of new products and equipment in changing and improving production
processes, the adoption of new organizational strategies and the opening of new
markets. The foregoing collection of Schumpeterian ideas is represented in this
volume by the contributions of Andersson, Day, Batten and Akin (Chapters 2-5).
Inspired by such perspectives, several scholars have promoted an approach to the
modelling of eccmomic systems under the banner of "evolutionary economics". In
Nelson and Winter (1982), the term evolution refers to processes of long-term and
progressive change. They also stress that the concentration on long-term and
continuing elements in the economic process does not preclude that change may be
very rapid. A unifying concept along these lines is that economies develop or change
because they are "out of equilibrium". This idea is in keeping with the theory of
self-organizing systems (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977) and synergetics (Haken, 1983).
6An essential feature of self-organizing systems is that temporal and spatial patterns
evolve endogenously without being imposed on the system from outside. Of special
importance is the interaction of coupled subsystems as illustrated by the following
pair of differential equations
q= N(q) + vK(q,z) + f(t)
z = M(z) + vH(q,z) + get) (2)
where v may be regarded as a control parameter describing the strength of the
interaction, and where f(t) and get) represent driving forces. Self-organization may
be caused by (i) a change in the global impact of the surroundings as expressed by
f(t) and get), (ii) an increase in the number of components as expressed by a switch
from v = 0 to v > O. or (iii) a sudden change in control parameters when the system is
translated to a new state under new constraints.
Self-organizing systems are characterized by nonlinearities and their evolution
involves the loss of linear stability, and the onset of transitions and chaos. Aspects of
this type of behaviour are treated in this volume by Day (Chapter 3), Silverberg
(Chapter 6). Puu (Chapter 10), and Dendrinos and Sonis (Chapter 15).
Synergetics has been proposed by Haken (1983) as a general theory of the dynamic
behaviour of systems with particular characteristics. It deals with the cooperative
interaction of many subsystems thereby engendering macroscopic systems
behaviour of a self-organized nature, and therefore constitutes an important
background to many of the contributions in this volume. The focus is on critical
points where the system changes its macroscopic behaviour and may undergo
non-equilibrium phase transitions. including oscillations, spatial structures and
chaos. Among other things, this means that the sphere of interest is not merely
restricted to transitions between equilibria and equilibrium-like attractors as limit
cycles. The ambition is also to capture other transitions without a specific final form.
In Chapter 2, Andersson portrays creativity and the development of knowledge as a
synergetic process involving a search for essential nonlinearities in the evolution of
economic systems. On the macro level. synergies take the form of nonlinear
interactions between sectors producing knowledge. The system described by Anders-
son is built up using subsystems operating on different time scales. In the literature
on synergetics such dynamic processes are treated by means of the slaving principle.
7Consider the following prototype system in which the y-variable adjusts more
quickly than the x-variable:
X :: ax - xy
y:: -by + x2. (3)
When the coefficient a is positive and small, and b ~ a, we may use the following
approximation: dy/dt :::; 0 which yields y :: x2/b so that y is "slaved" by x. This
procedure represents one way of reducing the dimension of a complex system in
order to investigate its qualitative behaviour at critical points. In Andersson's case,
"creative explosions" may occur at such points.
In Chapter 3, Day presents a series of arguments which are strongly related to
synergetics. In his panorama the economy is a complex adapting system, adjusting in
disequilibrium on the basis of obedience, imitation, formation of habits, and
experimentation. Aggregate patterns which are brought into focus include waves of
productivity change and fluctuations in output, a succession of epochs of economic
organization and switches between technological regimes.
As the name suggests, there is a nexus between evolutionary economics and biology
as regards the genetic process of variation interacting with forces of individual
behaviour and environmental selection. In his outline of (M,R)-systems (Chapter 13),
Casti is explicit about such a heritage when suggesting the metaphor of a global
industry as a living multicelled organism. In his conceptual framework, the concepts
of metabolism, repair and replication are the building blocks in an analysis
emphasizing the functional rather than structural organization of an economy. Akin
makes a similar statement in Chapter 5 about biology affinity. He investigates and
develops a model due to Nelson and Winter (1982); it is a model of competitive growth
among firms in an industry and is claimed to be inspired by evolutionary biology. It
is not surprising then that mathematical techniques developed originally in
population genetics can be applied to solve the model of competition formulated by
Akin.
In Batten's fable for growth merchants (Chapter 4) many of the ideas appearing in
other chapters are interwoven. The story is formulated around the paradigm of self-
organization, thereby implying that the dynamics of qualitative change should be
endogenously determined. Following Schumpeterian lines, it is asserted that the
8process of industrial mutation revolutionizes the economic structure from within and
can usefully be interpreted as a process of creative destruction. In Table I, some of
the major components of the fable are summarized.
Table I Facets of economic development (see Chapter 4)
Catalyst of industrial
change
Generation of new
alternatives
Exit and entry triggers
Selection mechanisms
Time paths
Structural patterns
Knowledge creation and diffusion, R&D
Development of mutants or innovations in the form of
new production processes (techniques) and new products
Existing production units and products exit from the
market as profits decline; entry is stimulated by profit
opportunities
Evolution by competitive substitution. The best practice
techniques which are superior at a given point in time
are mUltiplied through imitation and inferior techniques
are eventually updated or phased out. New products with a
different attributes-price combination replace old ones
gradually as they are preferred by customers and the
output is increased through investments in production
capacity
Within the constraints imposed by the evolving size of
each market, every successful new variant penetrates its
chosen market and follows a logistic time path, thereby
creating successive waves of innovation - imitation each
time superior variants (techniques and products) are
introduced
At each point in time, techniques and products of
different rent vintage will coexist and form a particular
distribution of productivity, profit and capacity levels
over firms or production units. Each such distribution
will reflect in a transparent way the historical evolution
and the conditions for furture change in each market.
3. VINTAGES, SUBSTITUTION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Table 1 contains a description of structural patterns. Such a pattern may reflect the
distribution of technical vintages of machines or plants in an industrial sector. It
9may also reflect the distribution of productivity differences between such vintages.
Such a structural pattern can also describe how the share of total output or employ-
ment in the economy is divided between sectors. For a given type of structural
pattern, we may define sudden or gradual changes to the pattern as structural adjust-
ment. The term adjustment indicates that the simultaneous change of several
variables or subsystems arises out of interdependent responses or mutual adaptation.
In economics and related social sciences, structural patterns have been associated
with variables changing at a slow pace from a systems perspective. This means that
structure is a concept which depends on the aggregation level and the subsystem
under study. In particular, the study of structures has been occupied with the
examination of a set of variables xi and Yi = x/Lxi' ieI for which, during given time
periods,
(4)
where & is a small number. Hence, the research has focussed on system properties
which remain approximately invariant over time intervals which are long relative to
the chosen time scale. In many cases the variables Yi characterize a system and slave
other variables of the system. It is then self-evident that such a modelling strategy
must be complemented by an examination of how sudden changes in the Yj-variables
may be triggered.
Patterns of the type discussed here may refer to the distribution of economic
activities over locations or the spatial distribution of the price of an economic
resource, as discussed by Beckmann in Chapter 14. Alternatively, they may refer to
the distribution of profitability levels accruing to production units in an industry as
described by Johansson in Chapter 7. In the modelling of economic growth, there has
been a tradition of allocating substantial effort to "simple" structures like K/Q and
KIL, where for a sector or the complete economy K denotes capital, L labour, and Q
output. Special interest has been shown in technical change which leaves one or
several of these ratios unchanged over time. Such invariances are said to be neutral
vis-a-vis the technical change (compare, e.g., Saito, 1981).
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Several of the chapters in this volume analyse structural adjustments in the composi-
tion of product vintages and vintages of production techniques. The concept of a
vintage is (from certain perspectives) one of the most fundamental dynamic concepts
to have emerged from the body of economic thinking. Its potential importance relates
to the fact that it reflects a lag or delay structure and permits a direct comparison of
the relative speed of change and degree of obsolescence for quite diverse variables
pertaining to an economy. In addition, there are rich opportunities to relate vintage
information to empirically observable indicators.
To this point, the vintage concept has played a relatively minor role in economic
research. In the early 1960s a number of economists began to formulate growth
models in which capital equipment was characterized by its date of construction, in
the sense that the equipment embodies the best available technology (best practice
technique) of its date of construction. This implies that factor combinations (inputs to
the given production process) are variable before the investment takes place (ex
ante) and fixed once capital has actually been committed (ex post). This type of
analysis was pioneered by researchers such as Svennilson (1944), Johansen (1959),
Salter (1960), Solow (1960) and Phelps (1962).
In the above approach a sector may be portrayed as a distribution of production
capacities, each with a specific production technique reflecting its vintage. This is
illustrated schematically in Figure 2 where each vintage is represented by a vertical
line. The symbol x measures capacity, and a and b represent the amount of two
different inputs per unit capacity. Similarly, we may interpret the vertical lines as
sales volumes for different products belonging to a product group. In this case, the
axes a and b are used to measure the amount of two selected attributes per unit of each
product. These commodities will in general correspond to different vintages, some
commanding an increasing share of their market and others gradually losing their
market share.
If we define a sector as a set of establishments or production units, we may then
recognize that each unit consists of plant and equipment of different durability and
with different susceptibilities for replacement by a newer piece of equipment
(compare a factory building with a truck). Other changes in the organization may not
require extensive replacement of the capital structure. It is also true that every
production unit may change its product mix (goods and services) by modifying the
bundle of attributes of each product.
11
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Figure 2 Illustration of discrete vintage distributions
All the above changes alter the vintage structure of the production unit. and all
require resource commitments in the form of investments. Having reached these
conclusions, two important aspects of the associated dynamics may be noted. First. a
distinction may be made between physical depreciation and economic obsolescence.
The latter is an empirical observation in the form of a successively decreasing stream
of gross profits (quasirents). Competition from new plants or renewed plants using
more economically efficient plant or equipment is one of the main reasons for the
decline in the gross profits of older plants. New vintages take the form of new
production techniques and new products. Once an investment in a new vintage has
been made, it represents a sunk cost. Hence its ability to compete is constrained only
by current variable costs. On the other hand. the decision to introduce a new vintage
must be based on a calculation including both fixed and variable costs. In other
words, there is a significant asymmetry between the conditions for exit and entry of
vintages.
Our sketch of vintage renewal corresponds to the repair mechanism in Casti's
metabolism - repair system in Chapter 13. A production process of a given vintage is
identified as a metabolic "machine" composed of a production and a sales map. In this
system, the capacity to repair and innovate is represented by a repair map,
embodying the "genetic" capability to renew the metabolic process. In Chapter 6
Silverberg presents a simulation model of firm competitiveness based on embodied
12
technical progress in which the vintage replacement is not constrained to steady-
state development paths. In this world the average productivity of a sector is affected
both by scrapping old vintages and investing in new ones. During downswings in a
business cycle these two phenomena will be simultaneous, while upswings mainly
affect capacity increase. This is also emphasized in Chapter 7, where Johansson
describes the interaction between exit and entry of capacities of different vintages
on the one hand, and the development of demand and price formation on the other.
In Schumpeter's "Theory of Economic Development" (1934), a market with few and
modest innovations is assumed to converge towards perfect equilibrium, which may
be disrupted again as new and radical innovations enter. In this analysis, the
entrepreneurs are motivated by the possibility of gaining a temporary monopoly by
exploiting their innovation before their competitors. If successful, they receive a
premium for being first. The size of this extra profit depends on the length of the
delays in the response from competitors. These responses have the form of imitation
processes and the development of alternative innovations. It has been argued by Day
(1982) that the market only provides an innovation-promoting milieu if it
persistently stays out of perfect equilibrium. Although the model formulations vary,
in Chapters 4-7 we can recognize different versions of this idea. In particular,
innovations and imitations are assumed to reflect entrepreneurs' attempts to obtain
temporary monopoly-like profits. This image of markets adapting to "disequilibria" is
clearly related to the idea of synergetic, self-organizing systems.
Vintage and innovation theories have close linkes with product cycle theory as
presented by Dean (1950), Vernon (1966), Hirsch (1967) and Pasinetti (1981). This
theory attempts to explain both product development and process improvements. In
the perpetual race for temporary monopoly profits and attempts to safeguard
achieved market positions, standardization of both products and production
techniques gradually tends to change the input structure (or production function) of
a given type of commodity in a predictable way. In this type of model, the imitation
and exit of obsolete vintages gradually forces an expanding product innovation away
from an initial situation of dynamic competition towards price or cost competition of
the classical type. However, the introduction of new products (which may constitute
equipment for other processes) gives birth to further evolution. This phenomenon
can be modelled as a succession of substitution processes (Batten and Johansson, 1985)
in which new and modified products, services, sales and distribution systems replace
old ones. Some basic properties of substitution and diffusion processes of this kind are
13
examined by Sonis in Chapter 8.
Economic evolution in market economies brings several types of cyclical elements
into focus. One such phenomenon is repetitive switches between "dynamic competi-
tion" and "price competition". These dynamic patterns may be associated with
business cycle behaviour. An example is provided in Chapter 9 by Haag, Weidlich and
Mensch. The innovation and diffusion processes also possess fundamental spatial
dimensions as described by Blommestein and Nijkamp in Chapter 16.
4. PERIODIC AND CHAOTIC BEHAVIOUR
This introductory chapter aims to provide a conceptual framework for the
contributions in this volume. In the preceding sections we have paid attention to
nonlinearities, delay structures, instabilities and synergetic properties in general.
Among economists and other social scientists, the pertinent problems have been
investigated using dynamic models operating on both discrete and continuous
time-scales. Considerable attention has been paid to the fact that discrete-time models
move quite easily into a domain of chaotic behaviour as illustrated in May (1974 and
1976) and Day (1981). Just as with the continuous versions, the discrete-time models
are sensitive to the size of reaction parameters ("speed" of reaction). In addition,
these models are sensitive to the choice of periods and the chosen lag structure.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, meaningful discrete models
must be formulated on the basis of a careful selection of lag structures to accurately
represent the studied system. Otherwise they may too easily generate chaotic
behaviour which is not representative. Second, modellers and decision makers in the
economic system observe "reality" by means of periodically gathered statistics of
various forms. This latter observation may be important when formulating models in
continuous time. A related conclusion which has been stressed by Day is that when
macroeconomic information is only available over discrete time periods, and the
estimated model displays turbulence, then we cannot rely on econometric methods to
make predictions. This may be a useful starting-point for studies of "regularities" in
systems displaying chaotic behaviour.
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The classical business cycle models were formulated in a discrete time setting with
the help of a multiplier-accelerator principle. Here the multiplier component
describes how consumption is stimulated by the level of national income one period
back, and the accelerator component describes current induced investment as a
response to the change in consumption between the two most recent periods. This
type of model was examined by Samuelson in 1939. The stability and cyclic behaviour
of this family of models depends critically on the relative size between the two
parameters describing the multiplier and accelerator reactions. In an attempt to
develop a more realistic model, Hicks (1950) introduced more elaborate lags and
related investment to total demand rather than to consumption. He also added an
autonomous growth factor. Evaluating the parameters of his model against observed
statistics, Hicks was obliged to conclude that his model was explosive. For this reason,
he introduced a ceiling and a floor as depicted previously in Figure 1. These devices
may be thought of as non-linear elements establishing an upper and lower limit to
income and generating cycles of constant amplitudes around the growth term (in
relative terms).
An approach related to Hicks' contribution is found in Goodwin (1967). In this case a
continuous time setting is adopted. The nonlinearities corresponding to Hicks' ceiling
and floor are introduced by means of Lotka-Volterra equations which had been
developed earlier to describe the interaction between a predator and its prey. In a
metaphoric way, the two species appear in Goodwin's model as the mutual influence
of wages and investments generating a cyclic pattern. This heritage, in particular, is
represented in Chapter II, where Glombowski and Kruger elaborate on the original
Goodwin model. In Chapter 10, Puu develops the treatment of nonlinearities further
in a multiplier-accelerator framework. He also provides examples showing how
complex dynamics and chaotic patterns may emerge.
We have argued from the outset of this chapter that for a long period economic
research has been under the lock and key of a competitive equilibrium notion that
has generally obstructed dynamic analyses. A recent study which strives to shed light
on cyclic behaviour within the competitive equilibrium framework may be found in
Grandmont (1985). He describes a discrete-time market economy which, in a
stationary environment, can generate a sequence of competitive equilibria forming a
cycle (periodic orbit). This pattern is endogenous and arises from the conflict
between a wealth effect and an intertemporal substitution effect in an economy with
overlapping generations. Cycles of different periods will typically coexist and the
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occurrence of these cycles is the result of a bifurcation-like phenomenon. The aim of
the paper is to illustrate that cycles can persist in an economy satisfying the
conditions of competitive equilibrium, and that such cycles must not and need not be
imposed from outside.
Scientific disciplines are indeed evolving systems for which synergetic properties
may be of special importance. From this perspective, the contribution by Grandmont
is illustrative and complements some of the work in this volume. It also draws our
attention to the potential rewards which may accrue from an association between
micro and macrooriented models of systematic fluctuations. Such a strategy is clearly
related to Haken's suggested approach. Although the starting-point differs, one can
recognize elements of this framework in Chapter 9 (by Haag, Weidlich and Mensch).
Their model operates with a stylized micro- specification and generates aggregate
macropatterns.
The above model is said to be based on Schumpeterian concepts, and thus features
innovators and imitators as the prime movers, creating microeconomic differences
among producers. At any point in time this corresponds to a picture of monopolistic
competition of the kind found in Chamberlin (1938). In the model, investors have
propensities to allocate their investment capital to expansionary, E-type, and
rationalizing, R-type, investments. Microshifts in individual propensities combine to
generate swings in the aggregate economy reflected by the aggregate investment
structure index Z(t) = (E(t) - R(t))/(E(t)) + R(t)). The transitions of investors between
the two types of investments are activated by two parameters, one called the
'alternator' and the other the 'coordinator'. A dynamic specification of the first
parameter is necessary to keep the Schumpeter clock ticking over forever. The final
choice of such a specification is left open. The most noteworthy feature of the model
construction is the linking between microevents and macropatterns, which is
obtained by means of a master equation formulation of the microsystem.
In Chapter 10 by Puu, basic knowledge about the economic system is also used to
establish constraints or principles for the behaviour of the economic system at the
aggregate level. Applying strategies of this kind enables us to make use of established
economic theory when introducing new mathematical techniques in the analysis of
the dynamic behaviour of economic systems. The heritage from economic theory
represents accumulated knowledge and experiences over several centuries and has
been sadly disregarded in many recent contributions to economic dynamics.
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The background to the Puu model is aggregate multiplier-accelerator analysis which
was discussed earlier in connection with the contributions by Hicks and Goodwin. As
observed then, linearization of the pertinent differential equations brings about
explosive cycles and exponential growth. The introduction of a nonlinear investment
function prohibits such solutions. The investment function relates the investment
level to changes in income (or demand), dY/dt. In this case, nonlinearity means that
as dY/dt becomes very large the increase in the investment level becomes
asymtotically zero. With this assumption (which may be thought of as a system
consistency property) the existence of a limit cycle is established. At this point two
interacting economies are studied. Both behave in accordance with the
multiplier-accelerator principle. One of the economies is assumed to be large enough
to drive the smaller one. As a consequence the smaller economy is represented by a
forced nonlinear oscillator. In general the interacting frequencies will be
incongruent. The outcome is various complex combinations of cycles and, in
particular, chaotic motion.
The model by Glombowski and Kruger (Chapter 11) contains a series of exercises with
an enlarged version of Goodwin's predator-prey model. They introduce a general
model with a large number of aggregate economic relations establishing conditions
for the dynamic behaviour of the model. By means of a systematic variation of the
coefficients of the general model they obtain different variants with a reduced
number of equations. Each case is assessed with regard to equilibrium values of steady
state solutions and cyclic motions. The numerical experiments not only simulate
closed orbits but also cases with slowly explosive cycles. Among the cases studied the
authors manage to formulate variants which display frequencies and amplitudes
(cycle periods) which conform more accurately to empirically observed cyclic
patterns than the cycles which are generated by the original Goodwin model. The
variations in the model concern the endogeneity and neutrality of productivity
change, technical progress, and so forth. Although the authors do not use such
arguments, one might interpret their various reduced model variants as being
generated by assumptions that the eliminated parts of the system equilibrate rapidly
relative to other parts. Moreover, as the general approach has some affinity with
"experimental mathematics" (Chapter 15), it demonstrates the difficulties in
summarizing the results and interpretations in a "tractable" or conclusive form.
In Chapter 12, written by Medio, we return to a multiplier-accelerator setting
displaying certain similarities with the approach in Chapter 10. Medio introduces a
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multi sector model x = Ax+Bx where x is an activity vector, A an intermediate delivery
matrix and B a capital increment matrix. This model is modified to allow for
discrepancies between actual and desired levels. The equilibrium conditions are
replaced by an adjustment mechanism with a lag structure. In a fashion similar to
Puu, Medio formulates a nonlinear investment response. The stability of the system is
studied and conditions for periodic solutions are established by means of Lyapunov
functions and bifurcation theory. The results turn out as follows: For a sufficiently
weak accelerator, stability obtains. Moreover, there exists a critical value for the
accelerator; in this neighbourhood a Hopf bifurcation will occur and a family of
periodic solutions will exist. The nature of the cyclical oscillations is not examined but
they are illustrated numerically.
The presentation by Puu illustrates that the interaction between economies may have
its own impacts on economic fluctuations (see also Puu, 1986). Beckmann's
contribution (Chapter 14) presents examples of economic processes in space which
generate wave and diffusion equations. A key point here is the importance of how
space is represented. Two variants are considered: (i) explicit distances and (ii) local
interaction implying that interdependencies fade away quickly as distance increases.
Various aspects of spatial dynamics are also treated in Chapter 16 by Blommestein and
Nijkamp. In their case the change processes are generated by the adoption and
diffusion of innovations.
Chapter 15 by Dendrinos and Sonis concentrates on relative dynamics in discrete time
with reference to spatial processes such as the dynamics of population stocks over
spatial locations when driven by comparative advantages. They discuss examples
which conform to the slaving principle. One such case describes fast population
dynamics dictated by the current values of slowly changing parameters representing
location advantages. They also mention the possibility of representing the speed of
change in stocks by means of lag structures. With its focus on turbulence in location
dynamics, their paper constrasts the processes of diffusion 'lnd competitive exclusion
outlined by Sonis in Chapter 8.
5. MARKET COMPETITION VIEWED AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
A superficial glance at the contents list of this volume might cause the reader to
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conclude that the volume consists of a number of disconnected ideas and models. In
the preceding four sections we have endeavoured to outline some basic concepts and
perspectives which hopefully identify many coherent elements and general
principles which pervade all these contributions and point to future work. One
unifying observation is that all the chapters deal with dynamic processes in market
economies. Incentives to invest and to adjust prices, production volumes and
consumption are clearly related to our perception of market economies. One group of
chapters focusses specifically on the competition between firms, while another
group examines aggregate models which are themselves based on assumptions about
such competition. Associated with this one finds an even stronger focus on changes
in production structure and in the composition of techniques and products. The
aggregate models refer to growth and cycles of the production volume or economic
activity.
In section 1 we identified competItIve equilibrium analysis as a mainstream research
programme which has persisted for several decades since its inception around 1950.
Such a widespread research programme corresponds to the vigorous stage of what
Kuhn (1970) has described as a paradigm. Unfortunately, a paradigm may also
achieve a state of maturity in which 'research' no longer dominates, and
conventional wisdom is preserved via ceremony, defence of the established
theoretical body and hostility against heretics. With its focus on competition in a
market system, the above-mentioned general equilibrium paradigm may more
specifically be referred to as Walrasian or neo-Walrasian market theory. In this
tradition the analysis is more emphatically nondynamic than in the parallel tradition
of Marshall or in the thinking of Adam Smith.
In recent decades we can identify many economists who have tried to modify or break
away from the Walrasian tradition. Frequently they have related their efforts to the
work of scholars such as Smith, Marshall, Chamberlin, Keynes and Kalecki (see, e.g.,
Negishi, 1985). In particular, Schumpeter constitutes a prominent pillar and popular
source for such work. This is also the case for this volume. However, the reader may
also discern a similar kind of reference to certain (incomplete) aspects of model
formulations by Hicks and Samuelson.
This volume provides some small samples and suggestions of new directions in
economic modelling. The joint concern is with the type of dynamics considered, the
pertinent dynamical formulations and the appropriate techniques for analyzing and
19
solving the models. One characteristic which is recurrent in the various chapters
relates to those nonlinearities which reflect the basic properties of a changing
market economy. An associated characteristic is the desire to depict the market as a
dynamic process in which one can identify competitive phenomena such as survival
of the fittest, an ongoing search for market niches, and the development of
specialization. Other elements of common interest include creativity, knowledge
creation, innovations and imitations as well as the occurrence of production in time
patterns that resemble the product cycle. Development and maturity yielding
routinization, market extension and increasing scale of production are also of mutual
concern.
In this image of the market system, the emergence of novelties is combined with the
adoption of decision rules (including production techniques) which gradually
become rigid routines and are eventually replaced by new ones. In such a system,
adjustment processes and adaptive behaviour are important elements of the
dynamics. Such processes of synergetic interaction lead to self-organizing
behaviour. From such a novel perspective, the contributions in this volume still
appear primitive. We still find very few attempts to introduce systematic aggregation
procedures. The ensemble of chapters illustrate a clear need to develop frameworks
in which properties of macrosystem dynamics can be imposed effectively as
constraints and conservation principles for microsystems, and in which properties of
disaggregate, subsystem or microsystem dynamics can be used in the derivation and
formulation of aggregate dynamic models.
In several of the chapters discussions about COmpetitIve equilibrium notions of the
Walrasian type are included. It has been argued that evolutionary economics and
models of structural adjustment must pertain to disequilibrium processes. In our view,
such claims may be superfluous. By the way dynamics is portrayed in this volume,
response and adjustment patterns are underpinned by specific arguments and
assumptions. These assumptions may indeed be derived from standard economic
theory and conventional thinking. For example, the composition of production
factors may adjust to their respective marginal productivities (compare Puu, 1986).
Often the resulting processes do not generate paths along which the conditions for a
competitive equilibrium are satisfied. The possibility of such trajectories is a natural
consequence of choosing formulations with dynamic equations. First, the dynamics is
defined for a much richer set of states than just the set of competitive equilibria.
Second, necessary system consistency conditions frequently imply that the model
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develops patterns which may be characterized as processes of economic
disequilibrium. The point we are stressing here is that the basic assumptions should
mainly concern the dynamic behaviour rather than the structures which follow
from the dynamic processes.
One way of establishing a bridge between the field of 'evolutionary economics' and
more orthodox economic theory would be to suggest that innovations bring about new
products and production processes which mature along a development path
resembling a product cycle. Near the outset of this path, dynamic competition of the
Schumpeterian type is the dominating characteristic. During the second phase the
production evolves in the direction of price competition in which standardized
product attributes and routinized behaviour reflect the type of price-taking
behaviour which corresponds closely to orthodox theory. We may illustrate this
suggestion with the help of the following table which compares some conjectured
properties of dynamic and price competition. It is hoped that the set of chapters built
around this theme may stimulate further innovative thinking in the Schumpeterian
spirit.
Table 2 Price and dynamic competition
PRICE COMPETITION
Price sensitivity in product markets
is high; discounting may prevail
Market forms resemble sales by auction;
markets are global and saturated
Large-scale production techniques,
standardized competence and
routinized jobs
Standardized techniques adjust to
export cycles and a race to minimize
production and delivery costs
R&D is low and oriented towards
process improvements and marketing
Productivity is determined by cost
efficiency, and adjustment of capital
DYNAMIC COMPETITION
Price sens!tlVlty in product markets is low;
price-making strategies prevail
Sales by orders; customer-adapted products;
markets are segmented and immature
Adaptive production techniques where
knowledge-orientation, creativity, and
originality dominates
Innovations and imitations occur in
response to import cycles and novelties
in the market place
R&D is high and oriented towards product
developments and refinement
Technical and design advantages as well
as patents generate temporary monopoly-
equipment (capital intensity)
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like profits on the basis of nonmaterial
investments
Adapted from Johansson and Stromqvist (1986)
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PART A: DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION

Chapter 2
Creativity and Economic Dynamics Modelling
A.E.~~SSON
NEW KNOWLEDGE IN NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
The neo-classical theory of economic dynamics focusses on the consequences of
growth of labor and capital on the total level of production.
As a particularly simple example, we can use the following model from early
neo-classical growth theory (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956):
C = 0' F(C,L) -6C (1)
where C = net growth of capital
C stock of capital (giving a proportional flow of capital services)
L - stock of employed labor (giving a proportional flow of labor services)
0' ,;. rate of investment out of production
6 - rate of depreciation of capital
F is assumed to be a linearly homogenous and r-differentiable production function
with r> 2.
Observing that (d(CIL)/dt)/(CIL) _ dC/C - dLIL
e/c = O'(F(C,L»/C - 6-'Tl
where c - CIL
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c = (d(CIL»/dt and 11;' (dL/dt)IL.
Assuming L(t) = L(o)e11t we have
e/c = (J F(C,L(0)e11t)/C-6-11.
At an equilibrium e/c = 0 and hence
capital/output.
Thus, an increase in the rate of depreciation or of labor should decrease the
equi I ibriu m capital-output-ratio.
To illustrate this assume F to be of the form F = LCi C 1-Ci. This implies that
(J/(6 + 11) = C/(LCi C1-Ci )
(J /(6 + 11) = Cl-(1-Ci) ILCi
Le. c = [(J/(6 + 11)]O/Ci).
The equilibrium capital intensity (c) is monotonically increasing with the propensity
to invest «(J) and decreasing with the rate of depreciation (6) and of the growth of
stock of labor (11). Production, stock of capital and labor will ill grow at the same net
rate 11 at the equilibrium, Le. the exogenously determined rate of growth of the stock
of labor.
Technological development is mostly introduced into this model in an equally
simplistic fashion as a "labor augmenting factor", X. Thus, in efficiency units, labor
would grow at the rate (11 + X). With the assumed function, the equilibrium rate of
growth of capital and production would now be (11 + X), keeping the capital per
efficiency unit of labor constant at the level [(J /( 11 + X+ 6 ) ]1/Cl-~ The propensity to
invest (J, can be made a function of the marginal productivity of capital, without any
basic change to the conclusions.
In tbis growth model and all similar simplistic models, the focus is on the potential
capacity of an economy to ill1..luU. to exogenously determined technological changes.
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Technological change is thus not an endogenous economic variable in these models.
1ECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC IN1ERDEPENDENCIES
The same allegation can be asserted against dynamic input-output models as well. To
show this, we assume a model of an economy with n sectors in static (aij) and
interdependencies:
(3)
where x n-vector of production levels
Ak ,;. n-by-n-matrix of input-output parameters at technology k
n-by-n-matrix of
gy k.
investment growth-of-output parameters at technolo-
This model can be transformed into the slightly different version (4).
(4)
where g
A
planned rate of growth
unknown rate of capacity utilization.
A long term growth equilibrium is defined to be a state in which the planned rate of
growth is such that A = 1 and x ~ O. Let us assume that a number of different
technologies are available. For each technology k, A k is a function of gk as
illustrated in Figure 1.
Using the Perron-Frobenius theorem for indecomposable, square, non-negative
matrices. we are assured that Ak increases with gk for any given technology k.
There is thus a maximum g*, and an associated x*. compatible with a general
equilibrium for any technology k. In Figure 1, g*II is larger than g*r' Hence,
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technology II will be chosen in favor of technology I, if the equilibrium long term
growth rate is to be maximized.
.oX 1 (at technology I)
.oX 11 (at technology II)
~ ~~__-=....o=:;;... .oX = 1
L..-----------'!r---~9_---------. 9k
9j
Figure 1 Long Term Equilibrium and Capacity Use with Two Technologies
In this model class, technologies are given exogenously and chosen by the economic
actors so as to ensure a maximum long term equilibrium growth rate.
We can thus conclude that technological development is exogenous, both to
neo-classical and inter-industrial growth models. Subsequently, the creation of new
technologies will be analyzed at the macro and micro level, and basic components of
models of interdependent technological and economic development will be proposed.
STATIC ANALYSIS OF CREATIVITY AND TIm TECHNOLOGY OF TIm FIRM
At the level of the firm, creativity has two effects
1. it influences the combination of inputs to generate an output, and
2. it influences the combination of inputs so as to change the characteristics and
thus the unit value of the output.
The first type is often called process R&D, while the second is called product R&D.
31
Both types of creative activity are normally integrated. Decisions on the two types of
creative efforts can be illustrated by model (5):
(5)
where 1T';' profit; p';' product price; Q flow of product; C,;. material capital;
K i ';' knowledge of type i; p, lj( ,;. factor prices.
Necessary conditions of a maximum are:
(a1T/aK 1) = (ap/aK1)Q-lj(1 = 0
(a1T /a K 2) = p(a Q/aK2) -lj( 2 = 0
(a1T/aC) =p(aQ/aC)-p=o
(6)
implying that there are economies of scale jn product development, because the cost
of improving the product is spread over all units produced.
In the sequel, we disregard the distinction between process- and product R&D by
formulating a value function F.
ENDOGENOUS lECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ECONOMIC MODELS
A two sector model
Little has been written on endogenous technological development since the days of
Schumpeter.
In an article in 1978 I proposed a neo-classical growth model, in which technological
development was determined by R&D-investments taken out of value added
{Andersson, 1978]. The simplest version of the model has only one sector of
production and one R&D-sector:
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C = [1 - 1.1.] a F(C,K) ; Inyestment
K = 'Y 1.1. a F(C,K) R....&....J2
(7)
where K stock of knowledge (proportional to service flow)
investment allocation ratio for non-material (or R&D) purposes
productivity of the R&D-sector
stock of material capital.
Labor is here assumed to be pre-allocated between the activities of the economy.
Endogenous determination of labour use does not significantly alter the
characteristics of the model [Andersson, 1978] .
If 'Y, 1.1. and a are parametrically given and
sense, then a general equilibrium growth
Furthermore, it will be relatively stable, in the
F is well-behaved in the neo-classical
trajectory can be proved to exist.
sense of Nikaido [1970].
The knowledge-material-capital-ratio will, in the long run, converge towards a
constant, determined by the investment allocation ratio, 1.1., and the R&D productivi-
ty, 'Y.
Optimal control of 1.1. of the system can also be deduced. The optimal level of 1.1.
depends on the exact form of the production function and the productivity of the
R&D-sector (and the goal function).
For goal functions, independent of 1.1. , one invariant result emerges: the shadow-
prices of material capital and knowledge should be kept at a constant ratio, equal to
the productivity of the R&D-sector. With a homothetic production function, this
implies that the system expands along the turnpike with constant proportions of
knowledge and material capital.
Multisectoral Economy-Technology Models
The neo-classical two-sector model of endogenous
convenient starting point (but a starting point, only)
creativity and economies.
growth of knowledge is a
for a more general study of
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One extension is into a multi sectoral framework, with one
commodities and many sectors producing knowledge. In this way,
trade between sectors is avoided. A possible extension of the
model is the following system of differential equations:
K 2 H2(0 1J.2F(C.K!.K2,K3);K!,K2,K3)
K 3 H3(0 1J.3 F(C,K! ,K2,K3);K!,K2,K3)
3
with L IJ.j = 1 and IJ.j ~ 0
j=!
sector producing
the complication of
former neo-classical
(8)
H j ~ 0, continuous, and monotonously increasing with 0, IJ.j and {K j } ,
where K·J stock of knowledge of type j,
by R&D of type j(;' Kj).
assumed to be real valued and augmented
Every production system is located on some or~anizational network with some
frictions of communication between nodes, separated by links.
Accessibility measures have been proposed to represent the effect of such frictions
on the value of non-tradeable resources. Fujita and Smith (1985) have shown that a
discounting formula representation of accessibility is equivalent to a contact
maximizing search procedure:
3
A = L Kj exp{ -~dj}
j=!
where dj organizational "distance" to knowledge of type j.
A spatial version of system (8), employing the given accessibility representation, has
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been studied in Andersson-Mantsinen (1981):
Cj = 0)1-1.1-1-1.1-2-1.1-3) c«p: Kj exp{-l3 djj))1e
Ki='Yl.I-i CC\(~Kjexp{-l3dij))1e
(9)
Assumption I.I-j > 0, ~ I.I-j = 1 (i = 1,2,3)
Ci. > 0; 13 > 0; Ie> 0; q(O) > 0; Ki(O) > 0; 0i <1; 'Y > O.
Extensive simulations with model (9) under different parameter assumptions, within
the bounds given, have shown that:
'" the system converges to some positive common growth rate in the long run, as
expected by the theorem due to Nikaido (1968),
'" increasing O·I increases the common long term equilibrium growth rate,
'" decreasing any distance, dij , increases the common long term equilibrium growth
rate,
'" changing the parameters 1.1- j from a slow growth into a fast growth pattern leads to
steady convergence of the growth rates of different sectors towards the new,
higher common long term equilibrium rate of growth if Ci. + Ie < c"'. If Ci. + Ie > c"',
growth rates increase much faster in the central nodes than in the periphery of
the network, leading to increased inequalities between center and periphery.
SYNERGY AND CREATIVITY
It has been stressed by numerous analysts, e.g. Weidlich, Mensch, Haag [unpublished
manuscripts] , building on Haken(1980), that the development of knowledge should be
seen as a synergistic process, Le. a process in which interactions between variables
of a system are essentially non-linear. Model (9) can be rephrased so as to capture the
argument.
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• Ci. IeC = 0'(1-11-1-11-2-11-3) c (~Kj expH3dj})
J
K1 = 0' 11-1 ceJ.O: Kj exp{ - ~dj })Ie[al+a112K 1K2+a I l3K 1K3+a 123K2K3+a1123K 1K2K3]
(10)
A second order interaction is given by ahjjK jK j' a third order interaction is given by
a\lKjKjK 1, etc.
System (10) cannot be expected to have any simple analytjc properties. It is, however.
wen known that systems of this kind can behave in rather unexpected ways at some
patterns of parameters. It should thus be expected that, if the system is stable in some
development phase, it can easily "flatten out" and be unstable and even unpredictable
in some other phase. when the slowly changing parameters (ah jjrn) have gone
through some critical threshold.
It is in these phases that new knowledge development plans should be formulated.
Qualitative jumps of the system (10) can be expected to occur in these stages, even if
the shifts of II-rcontrols are small.
The problem of inefficiency of decentralization of R&D decisions occurs even
without the introduction of synergistic interaction. In this case we have
Fj(Cj,Kl.K2.K3....•Kj•...) = ceJ.jKlexp{-~dil} + CCi. j K2 exp{-~~2} + ... ceJ. j Kj exp{-~dii} +
. .. if Ie = 1. Assuming output price equal to unity, profit maximization of sector
requires aF / aC j - p = 0 and aF / aC j - '" = 0, where p and '" are the prices of
material capital and knowledge, respectively. This is not an optimal position for the
system as a whole, because Kj enters all the Frfunctions where (j = 1,... ,i•... ,N). The
larger .the N, the larger the degree of inoptimality, cet.par. Synergetic effects
reinforce this conflict between decentralized optimality and system optimality.
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TIIE ROLE OF SYNERGIES
The consequences of synergies are currently under numerical analysis based on
system (10).
Some empirical observations of the role of synergetics have been made in association
with historical studies of creative regions. Examples of such regions are:
1. Athens 500-300 B.C.
2. Florence 1400-1500 Andersson [1985]
3. Vienna 1880-1930 Janick & Toulmin [1978]
4. New York 1950-1980 Hoover and Vernon [1961 ]
5. San Francisco 1960- Andersson [1985]
In all of these regions of creative explosions. the following characteristics have been
recorded:
1. A starting point of deep knowledge in a number of scientific and artistic fields.
2. A sponsoring institution with a tolerant attitude to different scientific and artistic
activities.
3. A perceived social disequilibrium.
4. Possibilities of planned and spontaneous intensive local interaction and extensive
non-local interaction.
5. Institutional and other structural instability or genuine uncertainty.
These observations lend some credibility to the modelling of creativity, technologi-
cal and economic development as a synergistic process.
A fruitful theory of creativity can not, however, be based on a macro foundation
only. A micro theory is needed. As shown above, not much has to be added to the
neo-classical theory of production to generate a theory of decisions on employment
of creative persons, provided the firm is big enough to handle the choices
deterministically. When we require a micro theory of creativity, it is not a quest for a
new theory of the firm.
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MICRO ANALYSIS OF CREATIVITY
Creativity is not only a social phenomenon, occurring in organizations, firms and
regions. In many cases, creativity must be seen as a dynamic psychological
phenomenon, associated with individuals. To understand creativity at this level, we
need a fundamentally dynamic theory of the cognitive process, i.e. to paraphrase
Polya, not only a theory of "problem solving" but also a theory of "problem finding".
Psychologists normally model the brain as a basically linear recursive system with
the following components.
(
Envilonment
Motivation
J,
Perception
J,
Short Term Memory
J,
Long Term Memory
J,
Cognitive System
.L
Conceptual System
Xi are vectors of variables often assumed to be real-valued.
Figure 2 Classical Recursive Structure of the Psychological System
It is usual among economists to accept this model in a condensed version:
71Environment
I 1
I Motivation
\ .L
\
'Decisions
(price. income, etc.)
(preferences. objectives)
(demand, supply, etc.)
Figure 3 Condensed Recursive Psychological System
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Two major advantages of the classical paradigm are obvious:
With the recursive formulation, the standard experimental strategy of psychology is
facilitated. It is quite easy to control the experiment, if all relations are recursive.
Statistical estimation is also facilitated by a recursive model formulation. It has been
shown (Wold, 1964) that ordinary-least-squares methods can be used in recursive
systems without identification problems and other losses of statistical qualities.
Unfortunately, recent studies of human and artificial intelligence have undermined
the basis of this handy formulation of the classical, recursive and linear
psychological paradigm.
The Perception System
A recent study by Stewart and Peregoy (1983) shows that the perception system must
be modeled as a non-linear dynamic subsystem. With series of experiments,
employing a standard perception stimulus, they have shown that the stimulus
response relations are best represented by a catastrophe model. The model of
perception can be illustrated by two diagrams.
V(x)
~~ ------------------.".::~------
•••
-----,-,-;.
--------- ",
------------ ",,
"-
a < 0 ----.. a ( 0 --... 8 ( 0 --.... 8 < 0 --.... a c. 0 ....... 8 > 0 ...... a > 0 ....... a > 0
@-t]-t1J-~-fm-~-t!J-~
R, R 2 R 3 R. R e R 7 R.
Figure 4 Two Fold Catastrophes Developed by Beginning the Experiment at two
Different Ends of Stimulus Sequence with Hysteresis
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Despite some differences in patterns of response among different groups of subjects,
the result is clear: for the vast majority of subjects it is not possible to represent their
perception structure by a l.i.ill:..ll.r., dynamic model.
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PREDICTED cusp
CALCULATED CUSP. MALES AND FEMALES
CALCULATED CUSP, FEMALES
CALCULATED CUSP, MALES
Fi&ure 5 Estimated (calculated) Cusps for Different Groups of Subjects in Stewart-
Peregoy Study
The Co&nition-Reco&nition System
Pattern cognition and recogmtlOn can mostly be regarded as problem solvin&. Any
child permanently recognizes his or her mother and other relatives from the age of a
year or two. Most computers are quite inefficient. however, so there seems to be some
basic logical difference between the artificial and human cognitive systems. In a few
- not well controlled - experiments, I have studied the response to a meaningful
figure from Hofstadter (1980), shown in Figure 6.
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Fi&ure 6
The respondents were asked to look at the figure and respond directly to:
1. what they recognized, and report
2. what they could see, when some other interpretation eventually became possible.
The results were the following.
The majority of respondents answered that the immediate impression is a piece of
abstract art. After a time delay of 30 to 180 seconds the response changed and an
intellectually meaningful pattern was reported. There were, however, great
differences in delay time between people with different conceptual systems.
The experimental group consisted of 30 musicians and 15 artists. The artists were
generally ~ in jumping from the first, artistic, to the second - intellectual -
interpretation. Training, i.e. conceptual development, obviously enhances the
cognition-recognition pattern.
The experiment shows that at least a fold catastrophe model is needed to represent the
non-linear nature of the cognitive system.
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The Memory System
Traditionally, the brain has been assumed to be an inventory with located storages.
This inventory is then often assumed to have two sequential compartments. The first
companment "the shon term memory" - is subjected to rapid depreciation and only
sends on a limited amount to the second compartment - the "long term memory",
where items to be remembered are assumed to be stored in well located sites for later
retrieval. This static and spatial theory of the memory is now being substituted for a
dynamic, non-spatial theory [Nilsson (1984), (1985)].
In these new models, the stress is on memorizing rather than memory. Remembering
is seen as an interaction between a set of available cognitive capabilities in situations
when an individual is motivated to remember something. Information is assumed to
be distributed over the whole system without retrieval addresses. To quote Nilsson
(1985):
"The basic argument to be made with respect to storage of information, is that the
whole storage system undergoes a subtle change whenever an encoding takes
place. Thus, it is proposed that no single memory trace is formed at the time of
encoding. Instead it is argued in line with Craik [4] "that the system has an
increased likelihood of recreating the same pattern of activity on a subsequent
occasion, especially if many aspects of the original event are re-presented to help
drive the system into the same general configuration" (p. 345).
The reasoning behind this is as follows. It is assumed that situations, objects,
pictures, words etc., constituting the to-be-remembered (TBR) information, and
the context in which these items occur can be decomposed into a large number of
physical features. These features are assumed to furnish the individual with the
basis for various perspectives or "affordances" [6], for each particular object,
word etc. The information about a given situation is there to be picked up by the
individual and different combinations of features are assumed to set the stage for
potential affordances.
The current cognitive environment [17] of the individual as invoked by
instructions, current mood states, and motivation is assumed to determine which
points will be activated by means of this spreading activation of interrelated
points. Aspects combine to form what we refer to as functional dispositions [18] .
A functional disposition serves as a means for acqulTlng the information
conveyed by the current situation, that is for integration of this new information
with the overall, already existing experience and knowledge of the individual.
This disposition is conceived of as a psychophysiological process, which increases
the neural excitability of those points activated. This increase in neural
excitability serves the purpose of facilitating the formation of new neural
connections. Expressed differently a function disposition is a wider and more
complex activity pattern than an aspect, and the functional disposition means a
readiness in its most global sense for the individual to act in accordance with
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what the current object or event has to offer. At any given moment the
rememberer is prepared to act, or in other ways deal with the situation, on the
basis of the affordances conveyed by the object and the functional dispositions
activated. "
Source Nilsson, (1985).
The conclusion of the analysis is that remembering is not separable from cognition
and conceptualization. Remembering becomes an integral part of the cognitive
process, earlier shown to be a non-linear dynamic process. The essential factor in
remembering is the activation of conceptual models, organizing the perceptions of
the environment.
A SYNTHESIS
A micro theory of creativity can be tentatively formulated as a reflection of our
discussion of the perception, cognition and memorizing systems. This system can be
seen in the following abstract way:
XI= fl (xI,x2,xS,E)
x2 = f2(x l,x2'x~
x3 = f3(xI,x2,x3,x6,x7'xS)
x6 = f6(x l,x2,x3,x6,x7'xS)
x7 = f7(x l,x2,x3,x6.x7'xS)
Xs = fS(x l,x2,x3,x6,x7 ,xs)
Enyironment
Motiyation
Perception
Cognition and Memorizing
Conceptualization
Decisions
Memorizing is part of the solution of this non-linear dynamic system. We can now
define a creative micro-process to be one in which this indecomposable dynamic
system has an expanding conceptual system i.e. with x7 > O. This does not preclude an
equilibrium. It is obviously possible to have a situation where ?I xi = xi' all i, with ?I > 0,
a situation of general learning.
Because of the essential non-linearity of the perception and cognition system there
can be no uniqueness of solutions of the total system.
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As an alternative to this equilibrium approach to the analysis of cognition, G. Hinton
has designed a model based on repeatedly minimizing energy or neg-entropy, until
an optimum which is lower than other reachable minima is found. Thus, at least
heuristically, some of the problems of non-uniqueness of solutions are avoided.
However, the Hinton approach makes the implicit assumption that decisions of the
creative process are triggered by a wish to avoid use of energy, a disputable
motivational assumption.
Most of the evidence indicates that external motivations (economic rewards and other
inducements) have little effect on the general creativity of individuals, given the
choice of education, region, and occupation (Amabile, 1983, Simonton, 1975, Smith,
Carlsson and Danielsson, 1984). Environmental stimuli primarily influence the choice
of education, occupation and region, which indirectly influences the intensity use of
an individual creative potential.
INTEGRATING MICRO AND MACRO ANALYSIS OF CREATIVITY
In the same way as psychological decision analysis and engineering production
theory have been built into static economic market models, the micro analysis of
creativity must be integrated into the macro analysis.
It is clear from our discussion above, that the brain operates in a non-linear, often
structurally unstable way in perceiving, solving or finding problems as well as
remembering. Slow and steady changes of the environmental parameters can trigger
off completely new steady state solutions in terms of perceptions and conceptual
elements like theories, models and methods.
Empirical evidence suggests that creative societies are normally confined to small,
integrated environments, well connected to other similarly small integrated
environments. Macro analysis should be based on this assumption. It means that small
dense networks of non-linear micro systems are connected into a large network of
communicating creative organizations or regions. The implication of this is that the
synergisms of type (0) models could be deduced from analysis of small integrated
creative organization models, in which smallness makes the micro units distinguish-
able.
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CONQ.,USIONS
After a long period of analysis of economic adaptations to parametric changes of
technology, economics could move to an endogenous treatment of economic and
technological interactions. Some macro models based on the Schumpeter (1934)
paradigm have been advanced. However, these models suffer from a lack of creative
activity analysis at the micro level.
A micro model of creativity is advanced. It is argued that such a micro model must be
non-linear and dynamic 1) . Furthermore, such a model should not be expected to
have the property of uniqueness of solutions. Rather, non-uniqueness or structural
instability is the key to an understanding of creativity at the micro level (as well as-
for other reasons - at the macro level).
Macro analysis of creativity must take into account the empirical evidence
suggesting that creative environments are composed of synergistic groups of
creative individuals on dense parts of communication networks.
NOlES
1) It is quite possible that the differential equation paradigm is too simple for the
purpose. See Rosen (1985) for an alternative.
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Chapter 3
The General Theory of Disequilibrium
Economics and of Economic Evolution
R.H.DAY
Existence is either ordered in a certain way,
or it is not so ordered, and conjectures which
harmonize best with experience are removed
above all comparison with conjectures which
do not so harmonize.
THOMAS HARDY
Various kinds of simple dynamic economic behavior are well understood: the
existence and character of stationary states, steady or balanced economic growth, and
periodic business cycles. Each of these types of behavior has its corresponding
explanation or set of alternative explanations. Theories of general equilibrium
explain stationary states or steady, balanced growth. Theories of business cycles
explain periodic oscillations in the economy. Unfortunately, simple dynamic
behavior is not exhibited by typical economies of record. Instead they exhibit
complex dynamics: irregular fluctuations; overlapping waves of development and
structural change; and institutional change and evolution.
If there were a tendency for economies to converge to simple dynamic paths within a
fixed institutional framework, none of this would be important, because the departure
from balanced growth or cycles would eventually abate. Theories of the steady state
and of cycles would approximate with ever greater accuracy the path of actual
events, and society would settle down once and for all to a fixed organizational
structure. But this too is not the case. If anything, the pace of change has accelerated
with the advance of human progress; the duration of growth and decay periods have
shortened correspondingly. Fluctuations have dampened for a time, only to erupt
again in even wider swings; in spite of the remarkable growth in statistical methods
of estimation. progress in forecasting is negligible at best. Economic change is as
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erratic, or even more so, than ever.
The ubiquity of complex behavior has not dissuaded theorists from extending the
theory of equilibrium from the mere explanation of stationary states and balanced
growth to a rationalization of the business cycle. This is not because they eschew an
interest in the empirical facts of change. Indeed, some of the most beautifully
motivated and influential work in this direction has been aimed precisely at the
explanation of the stylized facts of the business cycle. But to square with reality, it
has been necessary to augment the equilibrium theory and its underlying
convergence postulate with an assumption of perturbing exogenous shocks. These
presumed shocks will be seen to fall in two classes. In one class are structural
changes (foreign aid, migration, technological discovery) sufficient to induce the
observed waves of development. In the second are more or less random shocks - such
as weather, political tampering with policy variables, earthquakes, etc. - which
continually perturb economic motion and give it the irregular character universally
observed in the data. Given their presence. the facts of complex change are quite in
accord with equilibrium and the convergence postulate.
From the point of view of pure theory, this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs,
however, because it rests on two ad hoc assumptions: that of convergence and that of
exogenous shocks. Without denying the practical necessity in empirical work of
incorporating exogenous variables, and even of assuming the perturbing influence
of random shocks, there is still the open question as to how an economy would behave
when the former are constant (or some other simple function of time) and when the
latter are absent altogether. If the convergence postulate does not hold, then complex
dynamics may very well persist; and whether or not it holds and under what
conditions is an open question.
Somewhere Paul Samuelson observed that economic equilibrium is a state which, if
brought about, would have certain properties. His colleague Frank Fisher, in a cogent
review of the literature, pointed out the deficiencies in the theory of how such
equilibria might be reached. He went on to consider a disequilibrium foundation for
equilibrium economics in an attempt to alleviate the theoretical lacuna. But I think it
would be more instructive - as it often seems to be the case - to tum his sequence
around. and to recognize in equilibrium a foundation for a disequilibrium theory of
economic change. This is because it, in effect, asserts that if an economy is out of
equilibrium it must change. and of course, by hypothesis, it must change out of
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equilibrium. This leads to a modelling problem: how do economies work in
disequilibrium? And this leads to several analytical questions: Under what conditions
will an economy in disequilibrium converge? When will it perpetuate change in
disequilibrium? To this we may add, when will that change be complex? In the
following pages, the beginnings of answers to these questions are outlined.
CHANGING ECONOMIES
Let us begin by identifying salient features of actual economies that must be the basis
for any theory of change. Consider that time is decomposed into elemental periods
(days, weeks, months, seasons, years). At the beginning of each such period, a state of
technology, resource availability, social organization, and individual preferences
prevail, and, of course, a history of past consumption, production and technological
practice has occurred. On the basis of this, individuals and organizations in the
economy make their plans, modifying or retaInIng old plans or drawing up
altogether new ones, and carrying out various other actions. In the next period the
situation has changed. Resources have been depleted, capital may have been
augmented, prices and other indexes of value and wealth will be modified and so on.
The system is poised for a new round of planning and action.
Observed over a sequence of periods, the economy will exhibit a history of specific
activities that were and were not pursued, of specific technologies and resources that
were and were not utilized, of specific constraints that were or were not binding. In
the course of this process the consumption and/or production activities actually
utilized change; Le. the constraints actually impinging on choice and actions switch.
Some variables that appeared relevant will no longer appear so; other variables that
once seemed of no importance at all will now appear to play an active role in
development; some technologies may be abandoned, different ones taking their place;
some resources, previously plentiful and perhaps thought of as free goods, now
become scarce and attain great value in exchange; still other resources, once crucial
in the production transformation, are abandoned, perhaps even before they are
exhausted, again becoming valueless.
Viewed in the aggregate, waves of growth or decline in productivity and fluctuation
in output and value will occur, and in the long run, various "epochs" or "ages" will
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appear, dominated by characteristic activities and resources. In the short run, we
shall see individuals and organizations occasionally change what they do and how
they do it. In general the economy's technological regimes will switch, its
consumption and production patterns will change: its structure and behavioral
patterns will evolve.
It will not appear to converge to states that have the earmarks of equilibrium.
Individuals will rarely be seen to do their best; they often experience regret, and
from time to time they are forced to change their plans or even to act in a manner
contrary to plan. Markets rarely balance, and individual plans are often incompatib-
le. Normally, some people are becoming better off, while others are becoming worse
off, frequently the former at the direct expense of the latter. Neither do aggregate
indexes of activity converge to steady states of balanced growth or circular flow.
To summarize: economic agents rarely achieve optimal plans; their plans are often
inconsistent; the flows their actions generate are out of balance; their fortunes
fluctuate in divergent paths; the economy is a disequilibrium process.
TIlE ECONOMY AS AN ADAPTING PROCESS
A fruitful starting point for a theory of the evolving, disequilibrium economy is the
adaptive process, a dynamic system in which a behavioral unit of interest, the agent,
(firms, households, government bureaus, and individuals in them) responds to its
own internal conditions and to prevailing circumstances in its environment. Since
agents and environment influence each other, interactive feedback is involved.
From each agent's point of view, other agents are part of the environment. The
economy may then be thought of as being made up of a set of interacting adaptive
processes, Le., as a complex, adapting system.
To be feasible, action must be consistent with internal states, but since the intended
actions of a given agent may be inconsistent with those of other agents in the
environment, it may be impossible to execute them. Therefore, actions must generally
be based, not just on intentions, but on internal states and/or external states. These
have the effect of insulating the agent from inconsistencies with the outside, or make
it possible for the agents to generate unbalanced flows (co n sumption exceeds
50
production or vice versa, etc.). This must happen in either of two alternative ways.
One is the stock-flow mechanism. The other is the contingent tactic.
STOCK-FLOW MECHANISMS
Actions bring about material, financial, informational, and energy flows which
modify internal and external stocks. The flows among various agents, based on
individual adaptive processes, are in general imperfectly coordinated. The resulting
imbalances in flows are mediated by stocks, which make it possible for flows into a
given agent to be unequal to flows out from the given agent. Internally, the agent
can maintain strategic reserves of materials and energy potentials to enable
production and consumption to take place if shortages or delays in supply occur. And
they can maintain financial reserves (cash balances, liquid portfolios) to make
possible a flow of expenditures that might otherwise be curtailed when sales fall.
Externally, special agents or institutions whose primary function is to mediate
unbalanced flows by regulating stocks have come into being. For example, stores are
inventories on display, which make it possible for consumers to purchase goods, and
producers to supply them, without either knowing the plans or actions of the other.
Banks and other financial intermediaries regulate the flow of purchasing power
from uncoordinated savers to investors. Their ability to create credit provides a
means of coordinating activities at different points in time, and of facilitating
exchange when current monetary stocks are inconsistent with intended investment
or consumption expenditures. Of course, there is nothing in what we have said so far
which guarantees that existing internal or external stocks will succeed in providing
the buffers required, or, if they do for a time, that they will continue to do so. That is
why another possibility is pursued when volition can be exercised.
IN1ENDED ACTION AND CONTINGENT TACTICS
In addition to stocklflow adjustments, which have the effect of rendering feasible the
unbalanced flows induced by disequilibrium actions, there is the contingent tactic,
which facilitates a timely remedy for intended, but currently infeasible actions.
Generally speaking, the process of generating intended actions is more or less
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elaborate and deliberate. It takes time, uses resources, and is therefore costly. But
actions must take place continuously, and in order to avoid a catastrophic crisis of
inaction, contingent tactics must be timely: they must not take too much time to
formulate and they must not use too many resources to execute. And of course they
must work. But by the very nature of disequilibrium and its inherent uncertainty,
viability is not guaranteed, and in "the real world" there is evidence on every hand
that it is not always achieved.
MODES OF ECONOMlZING
Our concern is with economic activity including resource allocation, production
distribution (including exchange) and consumption. The process that generates
behavior of this kind is economizing behavior because in general it requires the use
of scarce resources and involves a trade-off of alternative ways of doing things.
Economizing, in this sense, is a mental activity leading to economic action. To accord
with the facts of disequilibrium we have just outlined, it must incorporate a crucial
distinction between intended actions and contingent tactics. Consider now how
intentions and contingent tactics of economizing behavior are formed.
As we have seen, economizing takes place within a complex, adapting system based on
stock-flow adjustment mechanisms. It is constrained by the inherent limitations of
the mind. There is the imperfect perception and knowledge of the environment.
Existing states are perceived imperfectly and the feedback structure that determines
how the environment of a given agent works is only partly understood. The exercise
of conscious thought involves limited memory, limited recall and limited powers of
ratiocination. These imply limits on the ability to solve complex decision problems.
Moreover, individuals do not always know what they want; their preferences are
incomplete or undefined. Still further, individual people possess limited capacities for
interpersonal communication and cooperation, frailties which are amplified in
organizations. a fact illustrated in the childhood game of "telephone".
In short, both thought and communication require effort, take time and are
imperfect.
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BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL CHOICE
Rational choice is the conscious, deliberate process of selecting the most preferred
among perceived alternatives. As a means of arriving at intended actions and
contingent tactics, it is bounded by cognitive limits and is imperfect. Faced with
cognitive limits, individuals form simplified representations of alternative activities
and constraints. Their optimization is therefore proximate. In routine situations they
conceive of choice as a departure from previous activity, and explicitly consider a
small number of alternatives in the neighborhood of what is familiar. The
willingness to depart from current practice - that is, the extent of the region
searched - may depend on experience and on the behavior of other agents. Thus,
adaption to current economic opportunity may be more or less flexible. The set of
alternatives that may be considered at a given time, called the zone of flexible
response, depends on experience and imitation. This dependence means that
economizing is both adaptive and more or less cautious.
The choice within the constraints determined by technology, resource availability,
and by the willingness to be flexible in responding to opportunity, is directed by
preferences which are represented by various goals which may be arranged
according to some (perhaps temporary) hierarchy or priority order. A first goal
dominates comparison of alternatives until a satisfactory solution is obtained
according to this goal; then a less important goal is used to choose among the
alternatives satisfying the higher order goal, and so on, until a single choice is
reached.
OBEDIENCE, IMITATION, HABERATION, EXPERIMENTATION
Rational thought requires effort and takes time and resources itself, and it can only
be effected when well-defined preferences exist. But there are other options. These
include obedience to an authority, that is, doing what you are told; and imitation, that
is, doing what someone else is doing or has already elucidated. Both of these may be
attractive models of behavior compared to thinking for one's self, because they save
intellectual effort for other mental tasks and because they make accessible possibly
superior forms of behavior that could not have been created through one's own
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exercise of imagination and rationality.
An additional mode is universally involved in human economizing activity. It is to do
what one has been doing. This allows for a kind of mechanical. unconscious mode of
behavior that requires neither imagination or rationality, and is thus even more
stingy with mental energy than imitation. It enables one to behave according to a
habitual pattern. Because the English language does not contain a verb meaning to
act according to habit, I coined the term h abe re (habear). If I habere. I execute a
frequently repeated sequence of actions that requires little if any conscious thought.
"Habering" or "haberation" is certainly an extremely important mode of behavior,
and in a mind of bounded rationality, an indispensible faculty for economizing the
mental energy that drives conscious thought.
Still another mode of behavior must be distinguished. This allows for purposeful
activity when the conditions of rational thought do not exist. when a habit
appropriate to the purpose is yet unformed, or the motivation for imitation is lacking.
As a general mode it may be called experimentation. It may involve a systematic
exploration of a controlled environment or model as a way of arriving at a decision. It
might involve trial and error search in a sequence of local experiments. in which
the direction of search is modified in response to a measure of success or failure. Or. it
may involve vaguely purposeful exploration or even play. It can be directed at
solving all sorts of mental and physical problems or it can be essentially unmotivated.
In either case. it is a freewheeling. sometimes more or less random process that
involves trial of alternative thought or action patterns when careful methods of
ratiocination cannot be exercised. or when the requisite skills have not been
acquired.
TIlE ECONOMY OF MIND
All of these modes play a useful role in the allocation of scarce intellectual capacity to
alternative purposive tasks. They imply the existence of a higher level cognitive
faculty that must direct the mode of mental activity to that governing behavior at any
given time. What is implied in this description of behavior is an economy of mind: a
system of mental resource allocation and of choice among alternative modes of
transforming internal or mental states and information about the external world into
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economic choice and effective behavior. Such a higher order faculty cannot operate
according to the usual laws of pure economic rationality, however, because the
consequences of choosing one over the other mode of behavior are rarely known. At
the risk of introducing a confusion with other uses of the term, shall call this
faculty i u d gem e n 1. How it works is a matter which should be of concern to
economists, for its exercise must be a routine aspect of economic behavior. It is
responsible for orchestrating a system of information processing, planning and
control that will lead to intended action which is practical, i.e., which can be realized
as often as possible. In addition, it leads to a contingent tactic, or hierarchy of
contingent tactics that can take over the governance of economizing behavior when
intended actions are infeasible. Such algorithms will involve one, or more, or
perhaps even all of the economizing modes we have mentioned. Since all of them
involve internal and environmental feedback to the agent, we may refer to such a
system as adaptive economizing with feedback.
RECURSIVE PROGRAMMING AND MULTIPLE-PHASE DYNAMICS
The mathematical analysis of such a dynamic, multi-mode microeconomic theory has
scarcely begun, but one example emphasizing boundedly rational economizing with
feedback has been extensively applied. This is the recursive programming model, a
dynamical system in which behavior is represented by cautious, local optimizing
subject to stock and flow constraints, to constraints that define the local region of
flexible response. Here the constraints depend recursively on past behavior of the
agent and other agents in the environment in a way that represents the
accumulation of stocks, and the effects of imitation and haberation. The solution of
such a model typically exhibits changing modes of behavior, nonperiodic
fluctuations and sensitivity to perturbations in initial conditions and parameter
values. In addition, they exhibit changing sets of utilized activities and tight
constraints. When these sets switch, the variables and equations governing the
evolution of the system switch, in effect bringing in a different set of causal
structures and feedback loops. These structures are called phase structures of
regimes. A given model may contain a single regime or a very large set of potential
phases. The result is an endogenous theory of structural evolution and overlapping
waves of technological development, based on explicit economic tradeoffs.
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CHAOS
Radically simplified models of this kind generate nonlinear difference equations
which are capable of generating deterministic, erratic behavior very much like the
irregular fluctuations observed in reality. Moreover, as recent research has shown,
these characteristics can be generic, Le., present for more or less continuously
varying classes of parameters, and ergodic. with long term frequencies of variable
values converging to stable probabilities.
The nonlinearities responsible for these results are to be expected in other dynamic
economic models. They occur because of the ubiquitous presence of nonnegativity
restrictions on many economic variables, because of "natural" hypotheses such as
liquidity traps. increasing and diminishing returns, and so on, and because of the
quadratic nature of monetary values which always involve the multiplication of
price and quantity.
In my opinion, it is not too early in the development of this theory to conclude that
endogenously generated irregularity of these kinds is a very important ingredient in
explaining the actual fluctuations of economic data. But this kind of chaos is a
diversion from the main thread of the theory under consideration. There are much
more crucial instabilities inherent in economic process than this one.
GLOBAL INSTABILITY AND INVIABILITY
These are suggested in extensive simulation expererience with empirical, recursive
programming models. In general it has proven to be a nontrivial task to find
parameter values that lead to convergence or even to viable solutions. Indeed, the
typical model will work for a time, mimicking with more or less verisimilitude an
actual history of some region or economic sector, but then becomes even less stable
and stops working altogether. Models that stop working are called inviable. Their
analogs in the real world are bankruptcies, banking system collapses, hyper-
inflations and revolutionary economic breakdowns.
The latter forms of instability are relatively rare, but bankruptcy is a normal and
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continuing part of the working of an advanced economy. In this sense, inviability
(global instability) is a further characteristic of complicated dynamics of individuals
well captured by the theory and models we have put forward. But that poses a
problem: if economies are inherently inviable. what keeps them running?
Viability is organic: life-bearing systems are not maintained for individual
components. which are. for individuals. globally unstable subsystems that eventually
disappear. Rather. the forces of change and development are acted out on a level that
transcends individuals. a level within which the dynamics of reproduction. of birth
and death. determine the viability of populations.
Societies adopt a similar solution when they provide for bankruptcy proceedings and
new technologies. new preferences and new organizations. A quite analogous process
also operates within the individual organization. with respect to rules of conduct that
govern behavior within them. These rules of conduct are constantly judged by the
economic forces of survival. accumulation, decumulation and demise. They are
modified or replaced from time to time by innovative acts of planning and
management. Indeed, human culture generally is a population of rules and
regulations that originated in numerous acts of innovation and assimilation. These
too are unstable. Many have disappeared. Of those existent. only a few are
flourishing.
The recursive programming model of boundedly rational economizing with feedback
takes on expanded meaning once we accept the view that economic systems are
unstable, and globally so. Indeed, this approach represents economic changes as a
counterpoint of adoption and abandonment of alternative ways of conducting
economic activity and alternative objects of material form. Beyond this endogenous
dynamics of development. it points to the inherent tendency toward breakdown that
can only be overcome by more general evolutionary forces.
EVOLUTION AND CREATIVE MORPHOGENESIS
Biological evolution consists of the genetic processes of variations interacting with
forces of individual behavior and environmental selection.
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The economic evolution that is our subject here is, of course, imbued with the broader
biological process, but in addition consists of a cognitive process of variation and
selection interacting with the complex adapting system of individuals and
organizations. These mental acts operate through an intricate, generative Gestalt in
which the mind, processing whatever inputs it has, generates a new thought and
creates a new sequence of acts that embodies that thought in some new form that was
not there before.
This creative faculty must lie at the foundation of rational processes of thought, and
hence of all of economics. Rational thought, after all, requires the comparison of
alternatives according to well formed values, the perception of the limits of choice,
Le. the set of feasible alternatives and the selection of a candidate from this set that
best satisfies preference. Especially when involving the possibilities for future
action, this process involves "imaginative rehearsal" of possible scenarios of what
might happen, sequences of imagined act and consequence that form conscious
stories of what might be. To choose rationally is to compare stories, to select one and
then to design a sequence of actions that will make those stories come true.
The imagination is also required to imitate what someone else has already figured out
what to do for himself, as in the enjoyment of a new piece of music, the adoption of a
new way of allocating resources, a new technology, a new product for consumption.
Even obeying an authority requires an imaginative rehearsal that can lead to actions
never taken before. Thus, imagination is an intimate part of the exercise of both
rational and nonrational thought and, to the extent that people make conscious
choices in their daily lives, it is routine: we can say that every human possesses it to
some, however limited, degree.
This faculty of imagination which plays its routine role in everyday life rises to an
exalted position in the functioning economy when it leads to invention and
innovation of new ways of doing things, new things to produce and consume, new
rules of conduct, new forms of information, decision and organization and new
understandings of ongoing physical and biological processes in the nonhuman
world. For these are the elements of variation that feed the process of selection and
evolution that keep the economy as a whole working in the face of individual
bankruptcies and the breakdown of various institutional systems of action.
Individuals who possess these capacities to a high degree are called entrepreneurs in
the world of business. It is their particular role to fashion into being the mechanisms
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that allow an economy to work when its agents are boundedly rational, its
transactions imperfectly coordinated, and its long-run behavior intrinsically and
globally unstable.
Entrepreneurs are both the result of - and the mediator of - evolution, both in its
narrow biological sense and in its broader cultural sense. Once a part of human
culture, their activity does not switch on and off according to well-defined
accounting messages or in response to carefully anticipated need. It functions more
or less continuously, thereby providing a continuous source of perturbation to the
analytical structures that define routine production, consumption and managerial
activity. The implication is that economies will evolve whether they need to or not.
Thus, the very faculty that makes economlzmg modes possible in general, and which
plays an essential role especially in rational planning, is the source of a continual
flow of perturbations that would disrupt any equilibrium that should accidentally
occur.
lRANSACTIONS AND MARKETS
Among the activities engaged in by individuals in the course of allocating resources
are transactions. Transactions among agents are mutually interrelated actions
involving the exchange of information and goods, and the establishment or
modification and constraints on further action. Such behavior involves further
aspects of disequilibrium and instability that have not been accounted for so far.
Transactions occur in several different manners which involve traditional mores for
collection and redistribution in primitive economies, more or less bureaucratically
administered rules within the complex organizations of modem economies, and
decentralized market processes among individuals and organizations. The latter have
in traditional economic theory been represented by bargaining between
individuals in isolation or in a sequence of bilateral negotiations among freely
associating traders, or as structured auctions, bidding systems, or negotiational
procedures. These Bidding-Negotiation-Bargaining forms, which describe bilateral
trade among nations, real estate transactions and the formulation of wage contracts,
are of considerable importance, but like other aspects of rational activity are
extremely time consuming and resource intensive. Though characteristic of market
59
economies in early stages of development, they are increasingly supplanted as
development proceeds by two fundamentally different processes of exchange.
Most evident on the retail scene are stores, which are nothing more nor less than
inventories on display, as noted above. Almost as evident, and perhaps even more
important, are Order-Delivery-Information systems that govern most wholesale,
construction and heavy investment transactions. Individuals and organizations order
goods. Producers, warehouses and stores receive orders and either fill them or delay
delivery, adjusting their order backlog accordingly. Even the stock market, which is
often thought of as an example of a competitive market, works in part on the basis of
order-delivery-information systems with special broker-specialist agents.
From a physical point of view, these latter two Inventory-Order-Price Adjustment
market types are stock-flow mechanisms that mediate transactions among agents
using periodic price-adjustment rules. No doubt the specific character of the
commodities involved, such as their storability, their time period of production or
their relative cost, influence or determine what type of market mechanism is used in
transactions involving them. But a noteworthy fact is that Bargaining-Negotiation-
Bidding processes are not pervasive in the real world. Indeed, one could imagine an
economy where they were absent altogether and exchange occurred using Inven-
tory-Order-Price-Adjustment procedures exclusively. The basic virtue of these latter
mechanisms is that they enable exchange to take place when supply and demand are
not equated at prevailing prices. The participants need not postpone other activity
while a sometimes interminable process of haggling works itself out.
When studied in highly simplified, experimental settings, direct exchange systems
based on Bidding-Negotiation-Bargaining sometimes converge rapidly to competitive
equilibria. These settings may be typical of some markets that are held at a single
place at periodic intervals for relatively short periods of time, with relatively small
numbers of people, such as auctions. Other markets, however, lack these
characteristics. They are held continuously, can involve large numbers of
individuals whose participation is not simultaneous, but strung out over time, and
who may be separated by great distances. Inventory-Order-Price Adjustment
mechanisms make such markets possible.
Certainly, markets of the latter type did not always exist. Their creation, however,
introduced new avenues for exchange and with them, new possibilities for
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specialization in production, while enabling all this to happen in a decentralized,
imperfectly coordinated flow of disequilibrium action. They have played, therefore, a
crucial role in the progress of technological development and the growth of income
and wealth. They provide a good example of how entrepreneurial activity has led to
an evolution in the form and number of economic institutions.
MARKET INSTABILITY, UNCERTAINTY AND EXPOSURE
At the same time their complexities of dynamic interaction enhanced the conditions
for disequilibrium, complicated change and inviabilities. The data of modern
financial and commodity markets reflect this.
Markets both create opportunity and introduce exposure. They widen the scope of
choice; they also expose participants to a widened range of uncertainties about the
values of stocks and flows, of goods in exchange and even of access to the market
system itself. Because of these uncertainties, and the realization from time to time of
inviabilities due to exposures to an unpredictable fluctuation in values, some
individuals and organizations are made worse-off by the system.
A further complicating force in decentralized exchange is the fact that individuals
are routinely exposed to asymmetries in the power of bargaining, in part (and
fundamentally) because individuals vary in their cognitive capacities, and because
they vary in the initial conditions they bring to every act of exchange. These lead to
asymmetries in the costs and benefits of exchange, and of changes over time in these
costs and benefits. Such assymmetries lead to dissatisfaction not just with exchange
but with the system of exchange.
POLITY
Implicit in the market system is a cooperative agreement to engage in peaceful,
voluntary exchange on terms specified by the system. When plans cannot be realized
and contingent tactics fail, individuals face the catastrophic risk of imminent demise.
At such time, the prevailing system comes under review. Furthermore, consider
asymmetries in bargaining power which, when extreme enough, can cause a
61
breakdown in the system of voluntary exchange, and usher in a system based on
coercion or deceit. Thus, market exposure creates constituencies for organizational
innovation and motivates that enticing alternative to voluntary exchange called
plunder: the taking by force or deception of what is possessed by another.
To prevent the destructive tit-for-tat of plunder or the fury of revolutionary
breakdown in the prevailing economy, the participants of an economic system must
develop a generative process of polity that allows for changes in the rules of
economic conduct, an avenue for politicoeconomic morphogenesis so that recourse is
restored for those who stand to lose too much or too often. If an equilibrating
economy could be established, such a polity could (in the absence of creative
thinking) wither away, leaving a fixed system of institutions and rules, or merely a
collection of individuals with no institutions or rules at all. It would verge ever closer
to a competitive or communal ideal in which everyone planned to do their best,
everyone carried out their plan and no organization could be put forward to which
anyone would object. But this cannot be the ideal world which can actually be
brought about. Because individuals have limited powers of cognition and
communication, and because of complicated dynamics and non-uniformity of
preferences and goals, equilibrium behavior cannot emerge. It must, therefore,
always be the case that disequilibrium persists and with it the potentially
catastrophic exposure and the asymmetries in the costs and benefits of participation.
To eliminate disequilibrium is to destroy the system of decentralized. discretionary
action and to replace it with one of administered rules of behavior based on tradition,
imitation and obedience to authority. It is to constrain rationality and limit creative
morphogenesis to operate within the bounds of established bureaucracy.
Alternatively, a society can embrace disequilibrium in a dynamic form of organiza-
tion based on an alternative principle to that of a social equilibrium. That principle
has been called Willing Participation. In such a society, most of the people most of the
time will accept its working, will contribute to its functioning, will refrain from
plunder and will defend it from any force from inside or out that would attempt to
supplant discretion by coercion. Rationality, in such a system, cannot operate
exclusively according to exact laws of deterministic. dynamical systems, because the
functioning of these laws is too complicated; because their intrinsic working leads to
unpredictable change and again and again to inviability; and because the more
creative participants in the economy continually perturb it with wholly
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unanticipated possibilities for change.
Instead. such a system of polity must rest on access to its instruments, and because
people will not generally agree, it must allow access to instruments of argument,
persuasion and debate; modes of mental conduct and communication that go beyond
the economizing modes of behavior and form the ingredients of democratic discourse
and the basis for willing self-transformation. It becomes the medium through which
institutions evolve. Subject to the opportunities and limitations of political process -
and these limitations are severe - the people in such a system possess a freedom
limited by the rules and operation of their collectively imposed and individually
accepted system. Their potential participation in the continual evaluation of its
components and in the process by which those components may be modified, replaced
or augmented, is their exercise of liberty. It is not unlimited freedom, but a limited
potential. It is the basis of their willing participation in a system whose functioning
they sometimes regret.
The laws of such a system are not analytical in the Newtonian sense that governed
the development of my argument through the concept of global instability. Instead.
they are dialectical in the Aristotelian sense that understanding emerges from the
free interplay of ideas and of the discussions about them. At the social level
argument, persuasion and debate play the role that search and experimentation play
in the faculty of mind that underlies individual volition. Their function is to
synthesize - from the conflicting views of its boundedly rational participants -
changes in the system of economy. of its distribution of wealth. of its rules and
regulations that govern individual opportunity. of the understanding of how it
works. and even of the values that guide rational thought. Thus the system, the new
system so changed. will work - at least for a time - with minimal economic plunder
and without debilitating social discord. The system of polity that provides the
framework for their exercise coexists and codevelops with a market system. It both
makes continuing disequilibrium possible. and mediates the evolution of mechanisms
that perpetuate the process as a whole. I call it "the Dialectical Republic".
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CHAPTER 4
The Balanced Path of Economic Development:
A Fable for Growth Merchants
D.F.BATIEN
Once upon a time the tiny Kingdom of Entropia was enthralled by a great debate. 'This
is a growing economy, but it still needs some qualitative improvements', some were
heard to argue. 'Steady growth is best', came the reply, 'since we cannot live happily
with sudden fluctuations or unexpected structural change'.
A few bemused onlookers called the debate gamesmanship. But most agreed that it was
healthy if it would lead to a better understanding of how the tiny Kingdom might
evolve in the longer term. So the King extended an invitation to all the leading
scholars to gather together in one year's time in order to discuss the Kingdom's
preferred path of economic development. In the meantime, he appointed a Committee
of Enquiry to ascertain the basic facts about Entropian life.
The King's Committee soon reported that the population in Entropia was growing in
accord with the familiar Verhulst equation of logistic growth. Being constrained by
the Kingdom's limited resources and a ban on migration, the rate of population, P, was
found to obey the law:
P = ex. P(N-P) -')'P, ex.,')' > a (1)
with ex. and ')' pertaining to the birth and death rates of the population, and N defining
the largest population which Entropia could currently sustain. The term (N-P)
implied a saturation of the Kingdom's population to a finite steady-state level (Fig. 1),
po, where
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and workforce
~_------ Population P( t)
_--------Workforce L(t)
O-l--~---------------------.Time t
pO = N - bin)
Fi~ure 1 Growth of Entropia's Population and Workforce
po = N -(y/et.). (2)
The Committee's mathematician proudly announced that it was a simple task to
demonstrate that this state is asymptotically stable whenever it exists (Le. po> 0),
whereas the trivial state, po = 0 - corresponding to the extinction of Entropia's
population - is unstable!
For a moment, the King appeared satisfied with this result. Then his demographic
advisor furtively pointed out that Entropia's population was currently within five
percent of this stationary state. A nod of agreement from the Committee's economist
signalled that. since the number of working Entropians was a fixed proportion, 11.. of
the population, the work force was rapidly approaching a similar capacity constraint.
Suddenly, the stark truth dawned upon the King. The size of his Kingdom was finite.
Turning quickly to the Committee's economist the King asked: 'Before I am obliged to
reconsider our migration policy, what is the kingdom's state of economic growth?' To
this question came the confident reply that Entropia was a competitive economy
making full and efficient use of its scarce factors of production, namely labour and
capital, to produce a single. all purpose commodity. It was estimated that the
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efficiency of Entropian capital was increasing at a steady rate ».. and that the
productivity of the labour force had hitherto been advancing at a similar rate.
Although uncertainty prevailed concerning the economy's expansive capabilities in
the very long run, Entropia's production capacity, %(t), at time t was assumed to be the
following function of available capital, K, and labour. L:
%(t) = e». t[K(t), L(t)] , ».>0 (3)
where L(t) = IL P(t). The economist's report acknowledged, however, that a detailed
investigation of the state of Entropia's technology would be desirable following wide
variations in the reported productivity and profitability of each firm.
The Committee had also sought counsel on the issue of economic development in the
long run from a prominent supply-side economist known as 10, whose views on
capitalism were held in very high regard. 10's advice began: "The essential point to
grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process
[16. p.82] ..... The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from the new consumers' goods. the new methods of production or
transportation , the new markets. the new forms of industrial organization that
capitalist enterprise creates" [16, p.83] .
Following such a profound statement, some puzzled members of the Committee asked if
this engine could be driven by an increase in the population or from changes
underway in Entropia's physical and social environments. 'The essence of economic
evolution is none of these' replied 10, 'since I am speaking of a process of qualitative
change'. "The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S.
Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation - if I may use the biological
term - that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within.
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of
creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism" [16. p.83] .
'Are you suggesting that economic development is an endogenous process?' queried
one of the Committee members. "Yes", 10 replied: "By development, therefore. we shall
understand only such changes in economic life as are not forced upon it from
67
without but arise by its own initiative, from within..... Nor will the mere growth of
population and wealth be designated here as a process of development. For it calls
forth no qualitatively new phenomena" [15, p.63]
At this point, the ramifications of ]o's counsel began to dawn upon the King. First, he
realized that to approach economic development as a factor exogenous to the
economic system, as implied by equation (3), would be erroneous. Second, since such
development is a creative process that replaces old states with new ones, it was
largely foreign to the classical dynamic theories of balanced and periodic business
cycles. Such endogenous and discontinuous changes might not merely disturb the
steady state currently prevailing in Entropia, but may instead displace it forever.
Third, he suspected that the potential rate of development in Entropia might be
dictated more by the competence and creativity of his subjects than by their total
number.
The King commended the Committee for its infonnative report. He then announced
the provision of a generous prize for the discovery of Entropia's optimal development
policy, emphasizing that the main objective of such a policy would be to detennine
those conditions under which innovative technological progess could evolve at a
hannonious and sustainable pace.
And so it came to pass that all the leading scholars from within and beyond the tiny
Kingdom duly assembled at the palace. Invited to speak first because of his
pioneering scientific work on processes of self-organization, Ilio likened the
competitive process of industrial innovation to the onset of structural fluctuations
observed in population biology. 'The key to this competitive type of evolution is the
appearance in small quantities of new species which we call mutants or error copies'.
said Ilio. 'One might imagine that by treating industrial innovations as fluctuations
relating to the structural stability of the equations of industrial dynamics, a criterion
might be developed concerning the long-term evolutionary prospects for Entropia's
economy'.
To illustrate Ilio's suggestion, an economist called Davo offered the following analogy:
'In the absence of qualitative changes, we know that Entropia's rate of industrial
development is limited by the availability of our scarce factors of production. Thus we
can assume that industrial output grows in a similar manner to the population, Le. as
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defined by equation (1). In such an equation. let us replace P by xl' the current
supply capacity of Entropia's industry, and relate ex. to the rate of entry of new firms
into this industry and y to the rate of exit of old firms.
Now suppose that some of the new firms commencing production at one stage are
technologically superior. Instead of just copying our current "best-practice"
technology. these firms introduce a new technology of their own to produce a better
all-purpose product. Let x2 denote the productive capacity of firms of this new
innovative type and suppose that, after some time. their number is sufficiently large
to enable their growth to be described by an equation of the following form:
(4)
In equation (4), the values of ex. 2 and y 2 are related to the entry and exit rates of the
innovative firms. respectively. Furthermore, if the parameter D defines the total
demand at time t for Entropia's all-purpose commodity, then the trajectory described
by equation (4) implies that the market share of the new innovative firms depends
partly on the difference between their entry and exit rates. This is in accordance
with our recorded observations of competititve behaviour.
The rate equation describing the growth of those old firms already established in the
industry takes an identical form:
(5)
The state of the industry immediately before the innovative firms appear is given by
If we rewrite equation (4) in the functional form
(6)
our criterion for evolving away from x2 = 0 reduces to the following simple
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requirement l :
This means that the very presence of one or two innovative firms enhances the rate
of entry of others, which may be called an autocatalytic process. Applying this
criterion to equation (4) we find that if
(7)
then the group of innovative firms steadily grows to occupy a niche in the industry
(see Figure 2). D l denotes the total demand before, and DZ the demand after the
innovation.
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Figure 2 Productive Capacity Expansion of Entropia's Industry (adapted from [3])
The King thanked Ilio and Davo for their valuable insights, then invited his favourite
economic advisor to respond to these ideas. Being an exceptionally creative
economist in his own right, Ako offered the following comment: 'I am extremely
impressed by this theory of self-organizing, dissipative systems. It seems that a new
scientific paradigm has emerged. But perhaps I may be permitted to suggest that the
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notion of innovation implied in your theory is not the traditional economist's view; in
which technological development is supposed to be influenced by additional state
variables such as prices and profits. If I understand your model correctly, innovation
is being portrayed as a structural change the timing of which is essentially
uncenain. Those economists among us would doubtless wish to probe beneath this
mathematical elegance in order to identify the specific catalyst.'
'My sentiments exactly', quipped the King in a rare moment of solidarity. 'But can you
enlighten us, Ako, about the circumstances under which such technological progress
might take place?'
'I would propose that the creation of new knowledge is the key catalyst. Entropia's
production function (equation 3) ought to be modified in the following way:
.%(t) F[O(t),K(t),L(t)] (8)
so as to consider the current capacity of the learning base, O(t), as an endogenous
factor input. Then we could begin to explore how knowledge formation interacts with
labour competence and capital formation in the Entropian economy.'
Upon hearing this statement, an elderly observer (who had hitherto listened in
silence to the proceedings) rose to his feet and made the very simple heuristic
suggestion that the whole Entropian economy, and its numerous agents, operate in a
manner akin to learning systems, being basically governed by Volterra-Lotka
equations. Introducing himself as Cesaro, he argued eloquently that the concept of a
learning society offers a very powerful route to a unified theory for genetic
evolution, ecology, sociology, and economics. Some Entropians murmured that the
plethora of logistic market penetration models amply describing the long-term
behaviour of so many different foreign markets certainly added strength to his
argument 2 . But a stubborn group of economists were not enthusiastic about this
abstract generalization. To steer the discussion back on a more familiar course, they
nominated a scholar named Katso to speak on their behalf.
Katso spoke. 'I begin with a remark concerning the learning process. In the
Entropian world of dynamic competition, each firm is constantly striving for a better
production method. As Ako has told you, a firm may succeed in putting a new
production technology into practice through its own promulgation of new ideas. We
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may view this as learning from within, and call the process innovation. Another firm
could instead learn only from observing the techniques of other innovative firms.
Let us refer to this process of adopting one of the methods currently in use by other
firms as imitation. "It is the dynamic interaction between the continuous and
equilibrating force of imitation and the discontinuous and disequilibrating force of
innovation which governs the evolution of Entropian industry's state of technology"
[8. p.18?] .
'Bravo', cried an enthusiastic group of Entropians. 'Your realistic theory suggests that
Entropia's industry will not reach a neoclassical equilibrium with perfect
technological knowledge even in the long run. We have observed that the actual
production method of many of our firms always lags behind the best-practice
technology. Can you tell us more about our production techniques?'
'Entropian industry consists of a large number of firms competing with each other to
produce one single, all-purpose product. Just as Davo has suggested, the industry as a
whole is continuously experiencing a turnover of firms as new ones enter and old
ones withdraw. Since there is no automatic awareness of the best-practice techno-
logy, each firm is most likely using a slightly different production technique.
Furthermore. each chosen technique embodies the technology (and hence capital
equipment) of its date of construction. Observe that since the market price of your
all-purpose product is identical everywhere. the smaller each firm's production cost
per unit of output (ci)' the more profitable will be the corresponding production
technique. We shall refer to the unit profit of production method i as 1T i'
'Since a limited number (m) of production techniques prevail in Entropian industry,
we can arrange them in order of decreasing best-practice, thus:
BEST
PRACTICE
cm < cm_! < ..... < Cj < ..... < Ct WORST
PRACTICE
We can then describe the overall state of technology in Entropia at a given point in
time as the distribution of these different production techniques (or unit production
costs) across all our firms. If we let fj(t) stand for the relative market share of firms
whose unit cost equals Cj (and whose unit profit equals 1T j) at time t, and Fj(t) denote
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the cumulative market share of those same firms at the same time, we can depict our
entire Kingdom's state of technology in the form shown in Figure 3. We must
remember, however. that the profile of this distribution will be constantly changing,
as new firms enter and old firms update their technology or withdraw.'
'What conditions. then, must be met in order to guarantee technological progress?'
asked the King.
'Each firm. whether new or old, can attempt to put a new production technique into
practice (innovate) or it can copy another technique already in operation (imitate).
If the above concepts are clear and my assumptions are granted, I wish to introduce
the following proposition regarding imitation'.
'A proposition. a proposition', the assembled crowd shouted. It was evident that
Entropians were enchanted by the prospect.
Katso resumed. ' Proposition: Let us assume that the probability of any firm imitating
an existing production technique of unit cost ci is proportional to the market share,
fi(t). of those firms which already employ that technique at time t. The unit cost of
the technique which the firm implements will be lower than the one currently in
use but at least as high as that of the best-practice technology. Then. since the total
number of firms in Entropian industry is large, we can approximate the change in its
technological structure by the following series of differential equations:
i=l.m (9)
where F i(t) denotes the time derivative of Fi(t) and 13 is an imitation coefficient which
reflects the speed of the spread of information between firms and the amount of
information needed to make a positive imitation decision.'
It took only a moment's reflection on the part of some of the crowd to recognize that
each of the above differential equations describes a similar logistic path to the
growth process depicted in Figure 1. Taken together, the envelope of S-shaped curves
postulated by Katso portrays a bandwagon phenomenon (in terms of imitation) which
would eventually swamp the whole of Entropia with best-practice technology. This
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Figure l State of Technology and Profitability of Entropian Firms (adapted from [8])
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process of cumulative diffusion is illustrated in Figure 4.
Fm(T)
04------------------------. Time t
T
Figure 4 The Evolution of Entropia's State of Technology through the Cumulative
Process of Imitation (adapted from [8])
Katso continued: 'The limiting state, in which all Entropian firms have adopted the
best-practice technology, corresponds to the familiar paradigm of neoclassical
economics. However, this very tendency towards technological uniformity is in itself
a strong catalyst for the introduction of a new and better production technique.
"Indeed, to destroy the stalemate brought about by the imitation process and to create
a new industrial structure is the role our capitalist economy has assigned to
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs or to innovative firms" [8, p.169] .
Katso had now completed his elegant discourse concerning the envelope of imitation
curves, and was modestly preparing to proceed with a formal discourse on
innovation. Anticipating that this might rest on the very reasonable assumption that
someone succeeded in implementing a new production technique (whose unit cost,
c m+ l' is less than cm ), the King chose to intercede: 'Thank you, Katso, for your
interesting proposition. It would be instructive to analyse how a new wave of
imitation is spawned by the introduction of a new technology. Nonetheless, I prefer
to discover what triggers such innovative progress in the first place. Technological
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unifonnity may in fact be one catalyst for innovative progress, but such a condition
would then confound your basic proposition. I wonder if the profitability criterion is
not a sufficient incentive for innovative firms with a new production technique to
enter the market. and for Entropian output to suddenly expand at a much greater rate
than by imitation alone?'
At this juncture. a clever economist named Bojo, who had been waltmg restlessly
throughout Katso's presentation, stood up and said: 'An important feature of Katso's
proposition is that it describes the evolutionary path of the cumulative proportion of
Entropian firms employing each production technique, but it does not define the
actual production level of each. A similar problem arises with respect to market
penetration models which portray the evolution of each competitor's market share.
The profile of market share development over time tends to exhibit a reasonably
smooth regularity which is largely unaffected by differences among individual
firms. Rather than abstract from supply-demand mechanisms, it would be preferable
to introduce a framework which addresses such issues, and in which the parameters
of any substitution process may function as a reflection of changes in relative prices
in combination with changes in taste and technology.3
Bojo continued: 'Suppose that an entirely newall-purpose product were to be
introduced in Entropia, and that this product possessed certain characteristic
advantages compared with your current product. This superiority might prove
sufficient to expand the market in tenns of total demand (as depicted in Figure 2),
with the potential market share for the new product depending on its Qualitatiye
characteristics as well as its price relative to that of your current product. Given that
a new equilibrium may be attainable, it is possible that the process of firm-by-firm
imitation postulated by Katso will generate the following logistic pattern of growth in
aggregate demand for this new product:
y(t) = 13 'y(t)[D(p) - y(t)] , and y(o) = DO (10)
where y(t) is the level of demand for the new product at time t, 13' is an imitation
coefficient, DO is the equilibrium level of market demand for your current product,
and D(p) is the new equilibrium level of market demand. For convenience, we shall
assume a strictly linear downward-sloping demand-price relationship:
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(11)
We shall simplify the comparative characteristics of this new product by combining
them into the composite form of a lower "qualitative price", resulting in a potential
demand increase of D(p) - DO' Thus equation (11) portrays the equilibrium demand
curve for the new product. with the disequilibrium adjustment process being
determined by equation (10). This latter process corresponds to the envelope of
diffusion curves described earlier by Katso (see Figure 4.)'
'But how is this price, p(t), to be determined?' asked one of the King's advisors. 'Surely
it cannot be an exogenous factor in this process of adjustment?' another queried.
Bojo resumed the argument.
'To answer such questions, we must tum from the demand side and explore the
growth of your capacity to supply the new product. Our international studies reveal
that the rate of increase in capacity depends on the profitability of producing the
new product. Let the profit per unit of new output, 1T (t). be defined as
1T (t) = p(t) - c(t) (12)
where the unit cost. c(t), includes the cost of all the pertinent factor inputs: labour,
materials, capital and knowledge. Let 'Y denote the fraction of profit ploughed back
into capacity expansion. and let p be the ratio of external to internal funds invested at
any time. It then follows that the growth rate of capacity, x(t), will be linked to the
rate of profits by
x(t)/x(t) = 'Y(1+p)1T(t).
Combining (12) and (13), we have
x(t) = «. x(t)[p(t) - c(t)]
where a. = 'Y (l+p). 4
(13)
(14)
'I have the impression that a crucial point in your exposition may have just been
reached', interrupted Katso. 'It is conventional to assume that the continuous inflow
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of technological knowledge and process refinement serves to constantly reduce the
unit cost of any new product, so that we usually have
c(t) < O.
This downword-sloping learning curve is often presumed to take an exponential
form. In Entropia's case, however, we know that inelasticities exist in the supply of
labour, implying that as the adoption of the new innovation grows and output
expands, a point may be reached when the composite unit cost of factor inputs (and,
in particular, wage costs) will start to r.iG. rather than fall. Let us now assume that we
have reached that point where the unit cost of composite inputs, c(t), increases (for
simplicity, we assume a linear relationship):
(15)
Such increases in unit cost can serve to bring Entropia's economy back into
equilibrium.'
At this point, Davo took up the argument: 'Combining (14) and (15), we have
(16)
Given that technology (cO' c1) is fixed, the growth of Entropian production will reach
a ceiling when the unit cost is driven as high as the market price. This is all in accord
with basic product cycle theory.
Referring to (10) and (16), we can see immediately that both capacity growth and
demand growth are governed by logistic processes in which the price of the new
product plays a key role. In our closed Entropian economy, the growth rates of
demand and capacity cannot remain out of step with each other for very long. Price
will serve as an equilibrating factor to balance the two growth processes (in the
absence of further innovations). We may refer to such a transition as a balanced
adoption path.
Along this balanced path, we have
x(t)!x(t) = y(t)!y(t) and x(t) = yet).
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(17)
By substituting (6) into (11) and the result into (0), we reach the fundamental
discovery that
(18)
or, in simpler terms, that
~(t) = Ax(t)[B - x(t)]
x(O) = DO
Entropia's balanced path of economic development is therefore a logistic process
whose key parameters reflect the joint dynamics of demand growth and capacity
growth. 5 The saturation level of output, B, depends on the rate of imitation, the
equilibrium level of demand, and the factur input schedules defined in equation (15).
The balanced adoption coefficient, A, depends on two rate constants (which govern
the dynamics of demand growth and capacity growth) and two elasticities (one of
demand and the other of supply). Note that the balancing factor is given by the
product AB, and that this is independent of the elasticity of supply.
Figure 5 illustrates the main implications which may be drawn from our explanation
of Entropia's balanced path of development. The introduction of a new, all-purpose
product acts as an economic catalyst which creates a potential for adjustment up to B,
with the scope for new economic growth being B - DO. We may fruitfully capitalize on
this innovation by encouraging Entropian firms to switch progressively from their
old product to the new one in such a way that the demand for the innovation and the
capacity to produce it grow at a harmonious rate.
Figure 5 also shows the effect of the balanced development process upon production
capacity, price, unit cost, and profitability. As the new industry expands, the
increasing cost of the composite input pushes the unit cost along the path described
by c(O) - c(t), tending toward the stationary level Co + c1B. The price of the new
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Figure 5 Entropia's Balanced Path of Innovation Diffusion (adapted from [10])
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product will also tend toward the same stationary level so that, over time, profit
margins are progressively reduced. As the price of the new product falls, for adopters
there is a potential profit to be gained from switching to the new product.6 Thus
profitability will be viewed differently by the producers of the innovation and those
who might imitate it; since it varies systematically over time for both, but in opposite
directions' .
At this juncture, Jo was seen to nod his approval of this dual view of profit as the
temporary reward for the innovator's entrepreneurial activity; being destined for
destruction as the more competitive diffusion process proceeds. So much so that Jo
rose to his feet and declared: "Profit..... attaches to the creation of new things, to the
realization of the new value system. It is at the same time the child and the victim of
development' (16, pp. 153-154).
Realizing that an imponant consensus may be near, the King asked Bojo and Davo to
summarize their findings. Davo concluded: 'Given the fundamental data available to
us, Entropia's balanced path of innovation diffusion may be governed by just two
factors: the adjustment gap (B DO) and the dynamic attributes of demand and
capacity growth, as summarized in the balanced adoption coefficient A. It is to the
control of these two factors that further attention must be directed.
The Entropians were clearly impressed by all these suggestions. But they were a
practical and inquisitive people who were soon full of queries. What must we do if we
are not already on this balanced path of development? Can we abide by this rule even
when Entropia's economy is out of equilibrium? How do we ascenain the best time for
innovation rather than imitation?
Before any of the assembled scholars could respond to these questions, the King
interceded. 'Please restrain yourselves for a moment. It is time for an assessment of
all these valuable ideas by my two invited judges, who will announce the final
prizewinner.' He then introduced Rico and Sido, two prominent American economists
who were widely known for their evolutionary theory of economic change.
Rico began. 'We have listened with much admiration to the theories and prognoses
about the state of development in this tiny Kingdom. There is valuable wisdom in all
that has been offered. Thus we found it extremely difficult to select one winner from
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such interesting contributions. Before announcing our decision, Sido and I would like
to offer a few ideas of our own which may serve to clarify some of the uncertainties
which remain with respect to Entropia's future.'
Sido continued: 'I ask you first to recall Ilio's notion of comparative fitness in
population biology, since the concept has much in common with the relative
profitability of different production techniques. Just as fitness clearly depends on the
characteristics of the environment confronting the species, so profitability depends
on the market price confronting firms with similar yet inequivalent production
methods. The final price in tum depends on the various methods of all firms
operating at anyone time. In fact, the essential character of Schumpeterian
competition hinges on the exact technological diversity which exists among
Entropian firms. It is the general robustness (or fitness) of the cumulative
distribution of profitability or productivity across all firms (as depicted in Figure 3)
which best describes the state of technological development in Entropia at any point
in time.
Now consider the model outlined by Davo and Bojo. If the initial price, p(O), and the
corresponding output level DO' are driven out of equilibrium by the introduction of
an innovative product, a process of imitative adjustment will occur in order to reach a
new equilibrium. In Figure 6, the lines d - d and s - s represent the adopters
equilibrium demand curve and the producers' equilibrium supply curve, respective-
ly; intersecting at the output level B. From the disequilibrium point (P(O),DO)' price and
output will follow the arrowed path until B is reached and the new product becomes
part of a stationary economic routine. A similar adjustment process may be
precipitated by a shift in either schedule. As Katso explained, it is this dynamic
interplay between the equilibrating force of imitation and the disequilibrating force
of innovation which governs the development of Entropia's economy in the long run.
For this fundamental insight, we declare Katso the prizewinner.'
At this announcement, the King shouted rather excitedly: 'Surely we can now
identify two warning signals which, when considered together, might help us to
identify the time for qualitative change. First, we must monitor the shape of
Entropia's technological profile over all firms, as depicted in Figure 3. If this is
concave to the origin, then Entropian industry as a whole is quite robust. If it is
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The Path of a New Equilibrium State in Entropia (adapted from [10])
linear or convex, however, then a significant group of firms will be vulnerable to
small rises in our unit cost. At best, they must be willing to renew their technology; at
worst, they must discontinue their productive activity.
Second, we must measure the degree of equilibrium prevailing at any point in time.
As Entropia approaches a state of equilibrium and technological uniformity, we must
encourage new entrepreneurs and new firms to generate new ideas (see Figure 7).
Only by innovation and disequilibrium can Entropia overcome its scarcity of
resources and find a new and better balanced path of economic development.'
The crowd finally dispersed. happy that a formula had been found for their
Kingdom's future. Naturally, a few skeptics remained. Those who had argued for
steady growth in Entropia at the outset of the great debate could not accept the
desirability of a disequilibrium state. Others remained uncertain about the nature of
desirable innovative activity and the legality of imitating an innovation.
To these consternations, the King responded in the following manner: 'We can never
expect economic life in Entropia to be easily predictable or perfectly stable.
Inevitably. there will be many uncertainties. Just remember the name of our tiny
Kingdom! But if we are willing to breed or adopt innovations at the appropriate times,
and not to cling too tightly to our old ways, then we may be assured of reaching a new
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balanced path of economic development!
To further this end. the King proclaimed balanced development a national objective
and instituted special incentives for timely innovations and rapid imitations. A series
of balanced paths was duly attained and thus Entropians enjoyed. subject to the
linearity assumptions needed to reach (18), a remarkably dynamic economy ever
after!
NOlES
1The stability of the pair of equations (4) and (5) will be determined by a
characteristic equation of degree 2. This equation has two roots. one of which has a
value close to that of the original characteristic equation and, in particular. has a
negative real part. The problem we are dealing with concerns the structural stability
of the original system with respect to pertubations which increase the order of the
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differential system. Allen [1] suggested that the criterion for evolving away from
values of x2 which are practically zero is that the determinant of the new
characteristic equation should be such that at least one root contains a positive real
part. Such a criterion does not depend explicitly on the properties of the original
system alone, although a higher level of productivity will ensure that x2 survives.
2The analyses conducted by Fisher and Pry [7] and Peterka [14] are two of the most
interesting.
3For a detailed discussion of the Lancasterian foundations of this choice framework,
see Batten and Johansson [4].
4At this point, Bojo was seen to wave gratefully to V. Peterka [14] for suggesting this
formulation.
5As he reached his interesting conclusion, Davo hastened to declare that this unified
framework came from J.S. Metcalfe [10].
6Note that p(t) need not necessarily fall (as depicted in Figure 5c) for the excess of
p(t) over c(t) to contract.
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Chapter 5
Competitive Growth of Firms In an Industry
E.AKIN
1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter 10 of their book "An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change". Nelson
and Winter (1982) describe a model for the dynamics of competitive growth among
firms in an industry. As its title suggests. the book is generally inspired by
evolutionary biology. and their model can be analyzed completely using mathemati-
cal techniques recently developed for applications in population genetics.
In a wide class of models one must impose unrealistic assumptions - such as equal
numbers of factors and firms - to obtain isolated equilibria. Our analysis contains
examples which illustrate the way in which the degeneracies introduced by relaxing
such assumptions can be handled.
We demonstrate that every initial state tends to equilibrium in this model. subject to
structural assumptions possibly vulnerable to criticism (see section 3). However. our
principal conclusion - that enriched technical diversity can result in a decrease in
total output - is both robust and surprising. We shall show that homogeneity
assumptions can restrict attention to misleading special cases.
2. BEHAVIOR OF TIIE MODEL
Our industry consists of firms indexed by j = {l.....n}; Xj ~ 0 is the output per unit
time by firm j of the common industrial product. So at any moment the industrial
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state is described by a vector x. in the set of nonnegative vectors. Rn+. The total
output denoted Ixi. is I j Xj'
The firms employ factors indexed by i = {t, ...•m}. ll:ij ~ 0 is the demand at unit output
by firm for factor L We assume fixed technology and constant returns to scale in
production so that the aij's are constants and the total industrial demand for factor
By P and wi we denote. respectively, the price of the product and the wage for factor
L So the unit profit for firm j is
and its net income is Xj1T j'
We introduce dynamics by assuming that each firm grows at an absolute rate
proportional to its net income or. equivalently. at a relative rate proportional to its
unit profit. Assuming a common proportionality constant we can rescale time or
price to make it unity. We then obtain the following system of differential equations:
X·1T· =x.(p -I· w·a··)J J J I I lJ . (2.2)
Define the market share or relative size Sj of firm j by the ratio of its output to the
total product. Le. Sj = Xj /ixi. Thus. if Ixi > 0 (some firm is operating), the distribution
vector s of relative sizes satisfies: 1~ Sj ~ 0 and I jSj = 1. Employing system (2.2) it is
easy to verify that the dynamics of total output and relative size are given by
(2.3)
and
(2.4)
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Thus, the growth rate of Sj is the amount by which the profitability of finn
the industry average where the average itself is weighted by relative size.
exceeds
If the prices - and consequently the unit profitabilities - are assumed to be constant,
then system (2.2) is completely decoupled and can be solved explicitly. Finn grows
exponentially at rate 1T j' The industry is eventually dominated by those finns whose
profi tabili ty equals maxj {1T j }, in the sense that Sj approaches 0 if 1T j is less than the
maximum.
Just as in other biological contexts, however, growth is restrained by various
negative feedbacks. In our model we will assume that instead of remaining constant,
the price of the output may fall as supply increases and that the wages of the inputs
rise as demand increases. Thus, we assume
P is a function p(lxl) > 0 with p' ~ O.
(2.5)
In particular, the wage Wi is positive if the demand aix is positive. The condition
w i(O) = 0, while pennissible. is only appropriate for factors used exclusively by the
industry we are considering.
An individual finIi's behavior is myopic if it disregards the impact of its own growth
upon prices. To a potential monopolist this is the fonn of the problem of the commons
which usually appears in a multi-player version of Prisoner's Dilemma. For the
consumer the result is a healthy growth of output due to competition.
While the system can no longer be solved explicitly, we will describe its behavior in
considerable detail, reserving the more intricate proofs for the following section.
First, we impose some technical assumptions:
For every j, there exists i such that aij > O. As aix approaches
infinity so does wj(ajx)' For every j. p(O) > I j wj(O)aij' (2.6)
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The first assumption states that any mode of production requires some input. The
second statement is a mild description of the limitation of factor resources. Together
they imply that total output remains bounded. The third assumption simply restricts
our attention to firms whose technology is profitable at some total output level, which
may be quite low. Our model is now (2.2) with assumptions (2.5) and (2.6).
1. Lemma: Assuming (2.5) and (2.6), there exist constants K. t > 0 such that total
production Ixl ~ K implies that mean profitability fr is negative. Hence, if Ixl ~ K,
d Ixl / dt < O. On the other hand, Ixl ~ t implies fr j is positive for all j. Hence,
for Ixl ~ t, dXj /dt > 0 if Xj> O.
f.r..Q.Qf: The state vector x can be written as Ixl s where s is the distribution vector
of relative size and so
Now for any distribution vector s, some ~s is positive by (2.6) and so maxi(ais) is a
positive continuous function as s varies over the compact set of distributions. So 6> 0
exists such that maxi(ais) > 6 for all s. According to the second condition in (2.6),
we can choose K ~ 1 such that wi(K6)6 > p(l) for all i. Now, given x with I xl ~ K
choose iO as a value of is attained for this particular
distribution vector. The monotonicities of (2.5) imply
So fr < 0 at x. Consequently, dIxit dt = Ixl ij < O.
The third condition of (2.6) implies that there exists 6 1 > 0 such that
p(6 1) > Ii wi (6 1 ) aij for all j. Choose t ~ 6 1 and positive such that Ixl ~ t implies
aix ~ 6 1 for all i. e.g. t = 61tmax(l ,aij)' When Ixl ~ t:
P(lxl) ~ p(6 1) > I· w.(6 1)a.. ~ I· w·(a· )a..I I IJ - I I IX If
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So 1T j > O. Clearly, Xj > 0 then also implies dx/dt = Xj1T j > O. /I
(N.B. We use If to signal the end of a proof or the end of a statement whose proof is
deferred)
It follows from lemma I that any solution path of the system eventually enters the
compact region of states with total output at most K. Once in this region the path
remains there. This means that the price feedbacks are sufficient to exclude the
unrealistic possibility of unbounded growth.
The role of entry requires elaboration. If the current industrial state is x, then the
support of the state, denoted supp(x), consists of those firms which are producing
positive output. In general, for any vector Y e Rn, supp (Y) = (j e J: Yj F 0 j. So if j
is not in supp(x) Xj = 0 and firm j is not producing, Le. its technical possibility is not
currently being realized). If J is a subset of J we denote by RJ+ those states with
support contained in J, i.e. where
RJ = {Y eRn: Yj = 0 if j iij = (Y eRn: supp (Y) C ]j.
A state x is called interior if supp(x) = J; Le. Xj > 0 for all and all firms are in
production. The set of interior vectors is denoted Rn+' which is the interior of Rn+
in the vector space Rn. The set of states with support equal to J is denoted RJ+, the
interior of RJ+ in the subspace RJ.
Along a solution path xt of the system, the support does not change. If Xj =0 at t =0
then dx/dt = 0 and so Xtj remains at O. If Xj > 0 at t = 0 then Xtj > 0 for all t; though
it is possible that Lim Xtj = O. We regard the latter as the elimination of firm j by
t-+ 00
competition.
A state e is called an equilibrium if the solution path starting at e rests there
constantly; Le., dx/dt = 0 at e for all j. This means that for every j either ej = 0 or
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production. In particular, at an interior equilibrium 1T j = 0 for all j.
other words, at equilibrium the profitability is zero for all firms which
asymptotic elimination of existing firms may occur in the model, the
allow for entry by new firms. Instead we regard entry by firm j as a
perturbation - a little exogenous jump to a new nearby state with Xj positive but
small - after which the differential equations again apply to yield a solution path
starting from this new initial point.
1T /e) = O. In
are currently in
Thus, while the
dynamics do not
These considerations split the concept of the stability of an equilibrium into two
parts. An equilibrium is internally stable if it is stable against perturbations
preserving support. It is~ if it can withstand all perturbations. By stability
against a perturbation from the equilibrium, e, to a nearby point, x, we mean that
the solution path beginning at x remains near e. So if the outputs of the existing
firms are altered slightly from their values at an internally stable equilibrium, e, the
system may respond by continuing to change but the resulting outputs all remain
close to their original values. We shall demonstrate that all equilibria are internally
stable. However, they will not all be stable because some will be vulnerable to entry.
Suppose ej = 0 while Xj is positive though small; (i.e. firm has begun production).
Stability requires that Xj returns toward zero or at least remains small. However, if
firm is potentially superior (i.e. 1Tj > Dcan occur because ej = 0) the industry may
start at x and then move away from e toward a position where firm produces a
substantial share of the output.
Our analysis proceeds from the existence of a suitable Lyapunov function. Define:
P(lxl) = f Olxl p(u)du, Wi(y) = f 0 YWi (u)du
(2.7)
It is easy to check that
au/ax· = p(lxl) -I· w·(a· )a.. =1T.J I I IX IJ J (2.8)
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and so
(2.9)
Furthennore, dU/dt = 0 if, and only if. for all j, either Xj = 0 or 1T j = 0; (i.e. if, and
only if, the system is in equilibrium). Notice that if p and wi are constant then
U(x) = plxl -! i w iaix = Ixl 'i'r, which is the total industrial profit.
U has an interesting economic interpretation. Fix the distribution vector s and let
the total output Ixl vary so that we are moving along the ray through s towards x.
Recall that aix = Ixl ais' Change the variables in the integral defining Wi by letting
u = vais' so that when u = aix' v = Ixl. It then follows that
(2.10)
The integrand is now the mean profitability 1'r evaluated at vs. So competititve dyna-
mics act to maximize
U(x) = Ixl . {I/lxl f Olxl 'i'r (v • s)dv}.
The expression in braces is an integral average of 'i'r along the ray from 0 to Ixl.
Presumably. if the industry behaved as a cartel the dynamic would tend instead to
maximize Ixl· 1i'(lxl • s) = Ixl • 1i'(x), the total profit.
Still restricting our analysis to the ray defined by the fixed distribution vector s, we
can draw the classical graph of unit income and cost for the industry as total output
varies (see Figure 1). The graph reveals that U. the shaded area for output level lxi, is
the Marshallian notion of surplus, being the sum of consumer surplus, factor surplus
and total profit (labelled CS. FS and TP, respectively, in the figure). This interpreta-
tion of U is due to Sidney Winter.
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y(s)
With w(v)
U(x)
C.S.
F.S.
T.P.
I j wj(vajs)ajs'
U(lxls) =C.S. + T.P. + F.S.
consumer surplus
factor surplus
total profit = Ixl 'i'r(lxls).
The output level where U achieves its maximum along the ray will be denoted y(s).
Thus, at x = y(s)s average profit 'i'r vanishes and thus, from (2.3), dlxl/dt = 0 at x .
Lemma 1 and (2.10) imply that U increases when Ixl ~ t and decreases when Ixl ~ K.
Thus, for every distribution vector s the zero profit level y(s) lies between t and K.
Observe that the condition 'i'r (x) 0 which defines Ixl = y(s) for s = xllxl is much
weaker than the equilibrium condition 1T /x) = 0 for all j in the support of x.
Actually, U is not just a Lyapunov function. The dynamical system is really the
gradient system for U when the notion of gradient is interpreted properly. So if we
regard the graph of U as a topography lying over the multidimensional state space,
the point representing the industry state climbs along the curve of steepest ascent,
approaching equilibrium at a peak. The topography defined by U has a rather simple
shape because U is a concave function.
Notice that the symmetric matrix
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is negative semi-definite; Le. if Y eRn then
(2.11 )
We denote by Hx(Y) the expression in (2.11). The quadratic form Hx is called the
Hessi an at x of the function U.
If the initial point x has support equal to J then U is increasing on the solution
path xl' unless x is an equilibrium. Since the path remains in kJ+ the largest value
it can approach is the maximum of the restriction of U to RJ+. We denote by U*j
this maximum value and by Mj the set of points at which the maximum value is
achieved:
U*j = maximum
(2.12)
In particular. when J J we will drop the subscript and denote by U* the maximum
value of U and by M the set of points where it is achieved. Notice that if J is a
proper subset of J there may be points x in Rn+ - RJ+ at which U(x) = U*j. By
definition such points are not included in Mj.
These maxima are all achieved because U(x) declines in value after x leaves the
compact set defined by Ixl ~ K. Deferring the proof until the next section, we state
our first major result:
2. Theorem: The set M of points at which U achieves its maximum consists entirely
of stable equilibria and it includes all interior equilibria. if any exist. If xt is any
solution path in the interior kn+ then the limiting equilibrium limt .. 00 x t exists and
lies in M.
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3. Corollary: U {Mj: J C J} is the set of all equilibria. For any solution path xt the
limiting equilibrium Limt-+ oo x t exists. All equilibria are internally stable but only
those in M are stable.
Proof: Restricting ourselves to those firms in some subset J of J. we can apply the
theorem to the system on RJ+ and thus see that Mj consists of equilibria including
all of those in the interior RJ+. Stability in RJ+ implies internal stability with
oJ
respect to the original system. Any solution path lies in some R + and so approaches
an equilibrium in the corresponding set Mj.
But if e is an equilibrium not in M. Le. U(e) < U*, then we can perturb e slightly to
a point x in Rn +. The associated interior solution path xt moves away from e
because it approaches a point in M.
The theorem and its corollary say that from any initial state the system goes to
equilibrium. In essence, this is because the system admits the Lyapunov function, U.
Furthermore, along a solution path in RJ+, U rises toward its maximum value U*j.
There are no saddle points or local maxima of intermediate height. This is a
consequence of the concavity of U. Intermediate maxima only occur when we
compare different supports sets J.
The approach to equilibrium would be easy to prove were the critical points of U
Le. the equilibria - isolated. However, they need not be, and we want to see how to
cope with these infinitely numerous degenerate equilibria.
In general, we call two states x and -x in Rn + productively eQuivalent if they
determine the same total output and the same input demands, Le. if EA(x) = EA(x)
where EA: Rn -+ Rm+ 1 is the linear map defined by
The matrix of EA is just aij augmented by an initial row of negative unit values. We
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denote by A the image of EA, Le., the subspace of Rm + 1 spanned by the columns of
the's augmented matrix. The dimension of A is r == the rank of the augmented matrix.
We denote by B the kernel of EA - i.e., the subspace of Rn perpendicular to the rows
of the augmented matrix. Thus, states x and x, vectors of Rn+, are productively
equivalent if. and only if, the difference vector x - x lies in B. Because the functions
U(x), Ixl Tr (x) and 1T j(x) depend on x only through the total output and input
demands, they take on the same values at equivalent states. This proves the first part
of:
4. Lemma (a) If x and x are productively equivalent states then U(x) = u(i), n(x)
n(x) and, for all j, 1T /x) = 1T j(x),
(b) If Y is a vector in B then, for all x, Hx(Y) = O. Conversely, if for some x
H x(Y) = 0 then Y lies in B provided that I j Yj = O. If either p'(lxl) < 0 or an interior
equilibrium exists then the latter condition is superfluous.
fr.Q.Qi: That Hx(Y) = 0 for Y in B is clear from (2.11). Conversely. because w\ > 0
and p' ;:ii 0, Hx(Y) = 0 implies p'(lxl) (I j Yj) =0 and for all i I j aijYj = O. Thus, EA(y) =
o provided I j Yj = 0 which is true if p'(lxl) < O. If an interior equilibrium e exists,
then 1T j = 0 for all j, i.e. -1 = -li(w/p)aij for all when Wi and p are defined by
their values at e. This means that the first row of the augmented matrix is a linear
combination of the remaining rows and so I j aij Yj = 0 implies I j Yj = o. If
5. Co roll ary: (a) If x and x are productively equivalent states with support
contained in J, then x E M] if, and only if x E Mj.
(b) If e is an equilibrium and x is productively equivalent to e then x is an
equilibrium provided that supp(x) C supp(e).
f.m.Qf: (a) follows from U(x) = U(i'). For (b) observe that 1T j(x) = 1T j(e) =0 for all j in
supp(e). Because this set includes supp(x). x is also an equilibrium. #
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Notice that without the support condition part (b) need not be true because 1T j(x) =
1T j(e) need not be zero when ej = O. Consequently the definition of Mj had to be
-restricted to points with support in J.
E A maps Rn+ to a cone in A which we will denote by O. The interior states, Le. Rn+,
o
consisting of strictly positive vectors, are mapped onto the interior 0 of 0 in the
subspace A. Thus each point of 0 represents an equivalence class of productive
states. Each equivalence class is a convex cell consisting of the intersection of Rn+
o
with a translate of the subspace B. A point lies in 0 if~ member of the
equivalence class is interior. Except in the trivial case where B consists of zero alone,
not ill members of the equivalence class are interior. We provide the reader with an
example of such a situation.
6. Exercise: If e is an equilibrium then there exists -e an equilibrium equivalent
to e whose support, contained in supp(e), consists of at most rank(aij) firms. A
fortiori, the number of firms in supp(e) is at most the number of factors m. (Hint:
Choose e equivalent to e such that J = supp(e) C supp(e) is minimal among such
points. Then prove B () RJ = 0). #
Although equivalent points have the same U value, the topography over an interior
maximum is not like a hemisphere. Instead, imagine a cylindrical arch with lines
drawn at constant height parallel to the cylindrical axis. The line segment at the peak
of the arch represents an equivalence class of equilibria. The interior points of the
segment are interior equilibria and each end point represents a boundary
equilibrium with some firm excluded. We now slice the arch of this picture in such a
way that each slice is an invariant manifold for the dynamics and each slice
intersects the top segment at a single point. To do this we define for b 6 Rn the
log-linear function:
(2.14)
By summing over the j's in the support of b we see that L b is defined and infinitely
differentiable on the open subset
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(2.15)
when J = supp(b). Observe that for any J. Rn+ C OJ. In fact, OJ= U {R/l : J1~ J}.
7. Proposition: For bERn and J = supp(b) let x E OJ and xt be the solution path
beginning at x (which remains in OJ for all t).
(a) If b satisfies EA(b) < 0 (Le. the m + 1 components of EA (b) are
nonpositive and are not all zero) then Lb(x t ) is a monotonic increasing function of
t. If e is the equilibrium Lim t -+ 00 x t then ej = 0 for some j with bj < O. In particular.
no equilibrium of the system lies in OJ.
(b) If b satisfies EA(b) = 0 (Le. b lies in B) then Lb(x t ) is constant in 1. Thus,
the function Lb is an invariant of motion when the system is restricted to OJ.
Proof: As the support of xt does not change as
OJ and we can differentiate along the path:
varies. the solution path remains in
Furthermore. p(lxl) > 0 and for all i wi(aix) ~ 0 with equality only if aij = 0 for all j
E supp(x) ~ supp(b). In the latter case I j aijbj = O. In part (a), I j bj ~ 0 and I j aijbj ~
o for all with at least one inequality strict. In part (b), all these expressions are
zero. Hence the derivative along the solution path is positive in (a) and zero in (b).
Thus. in (a) no equilibrium can exist in OJ. In particular. if e is the limiting
equilibrium in (a), ej = 0 for some j in supp(b). But if ej > 0 whenever bj < 0, then
Lb(x t ) would approach -00 as xt approaches e. This is impossible because Lb(x t ) is
finite and increasing in t.
Part (a) is useful in illustrating why interior equilibria need not occur. For example.
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we say that firm h dQminates firm h if aij, ~ aij, fQr all with at least Qne
inequality strict. This means that firm j 1 makes better use Qf all factQrs than h and
we WQuid expect that from any initial state in which bQth firms Qccur, h will be
eliminated due tQ cQmpetitiQn frQm h. Letting bj, = +1, bj, = -1 and bj = 0 Qtherwise,
EA(b) > 0 and by pan (a) Limt.... oo xth = 0 fQr any sQlutiQn path in DU, j,l'
HQwever, it is pan (b) which provides the key result. FQr be B we call Lb(x) an
assQciatiQn parameter Qr assQciatiQn number Qf the interiQr state x. In general, if
b e B1 == B n R 1 then the assQciatiQn parameter Lb(x) is defined fQr any state x in OJ,
I.e. with supp(x) ::> J::> supp(b). Pan (b) says that the assQciatiQn parameters are
CQnstants Qf mQtiQn.
TQ interpret the assQciatiQn parameters, define fQr q any distributiQn vectQr (I.e.
q e Rn+ and Iql = 1) the cQrrespQnding geQmetric average Qf a state x:
where the prQduct is taken Qver j in supp(q) Qr alternately Qver all j with the
cQnventiQn that 00 = 1. Because I jb j =0 fQr b e B, we can multiply any b 1= 0 in B by a
PQsitive CQnstant tQ Qbtain the sum Qf the pQsitive cQordinates unity. Then b = q+ - q-
where q+ and q- are distributiQn vectQrs Qf disjQint SUPPQrt and
(supp(x) ::> supp(b» (2.16)
where supp(b) = supp(q+) U supp(q-). Thus Lb(x) is the IQg Qf the ratiQ Qf geQmetric
average Qutput Qf tWQ disjQint families Qf firms.
Recall that the dimensiQn Qf A is r, the rank Qf the augmented prQductiQn matrix. SQ
n - r is the dimensiQn Qf B. TQ Qbtain a representative list Qf assQciatiQn parameters,
we chQQse a basis (b1,... ,bn-r ) fQr B and define LB : Rn+ .... Rn-r by:
B b1 bn-r
L (x) = (L (x),... , L (x». (2.17)
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8. Proposition: The function EA x L B: Rn+ -+ 0 x Rn-r is a diffeomorphism, i.e. a
one-to-one, onto differentiable function (recall that 0 is the open cone EA(Rn+». #
This result is proved in Akin (1979, page 81), and says that each interior state is
described uniquely by its equivalence class and its association numbers. If we fix the
association parameters, the interior state remains free to vary over a curved surface;
technically a manifold of dimension r in Rn + . The manifold intersects each
interior equivalence class at exactly one point. The manifold is an invariant
manifold for the dynamical system by Prop. 7(b) - Le., a solution path beginning in
the manifold remains in it.
We now state the result which completes the description of theorem 2.
9. Theorem: The set M of points at which U achieves its maximum is a single
equivalence class with respect to productive equivalence.
J* 0 J*Define J* to be the smallest subset of J such that Me R +. Then M n R + = M n DJ*
is nonempty. In particular, interior equilibria exist (Le. M n Rn + ,. ~) if, and only if
J* = J, in which case DJ* =R
n+.
With BJ * == B n R J*, the association parameters defined using vectors in BJ* divide
D J* into invariant manifolds. If d is such a submanifold of DJ * then d n M consists
of a single equilibrium point e. e is globally asymptotically stable for the restriction
of the system to d. Thus, if xed and xt is the solution path beginning at x, then xt
remains in d for all t and e = Limt-+ 00 xl' #
While we again defer the proof, let us consider the special case where interior
equilibria exist; Le., U achieves its maximum at some point of Rn+. By corollary 5, M
is a union of equivalence classes: for
new result is the converse which says
o
o because interior equilibria exist.
e e M, x equivalent to e implies x e M. The
EA is constant on M. The point EA(M) lies in
By proposition 8 we can regard EA and LB as
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providing a global nonlinear system of coordinates on Rn+. So when we fix the LB
coordinates at arbitrary values we get a submanifold. d. of Rn+ of dimension r. Since
M is obtained by a particular choice of the EA coordinates it is clear that M n d
consists of a single point e. By proposition 7 the LB coordinates are invariants of
motion and so d is an invariant manifold. On d. U is still a Lyapunov function but
now e is the unique point at which U assumes its maximum value. Thus. by
restricting to d. the degenerate nature of the equilibrium is eliminated and by
Lyapunov's Theorem e is locally stable in d. Furthermore. theorem 2 says that the
limit equilibrium of every solution path xl in d lies in M. So Liml-+ 00 xl = e. These
results clarify the nature of the stability of e. If we perturb e to a nearby point x
then x lies either on d or on a nearby d'. The solution path xl moves back toward M
in d' approaching e' = d' n M, an equilibrium near e.
It has probably occurred to the reader that it should be possible to avoid these
equivalence class problems by aggregation. For example, if ai 1 = ai2 for all i then
b = (1.-1,0....,0) lies in B and Lb(x) is the log of the ratio xl/x2' We can define y =
xl + x2' define the new industrial state by (y, x3 ..... xn). and we get dy/dt = y 1T I'
However, this case of replication of identical firms appears to be the only situation in
which aggregation is possible. In general, the problem is that while dlxl/dt = Ixl'fr
depends only on the equivalence class EA(x), the change in the demands aix depends
not only upon EA(x), but on the association parameters, too.
Returning now to the general case, suppose we begin at some equilibrium e which is
vulnerable to entry. After entry has occured the industry evolves to a new
inequivalent equilibrium e'" where U(e"') > U(e). In comparing the new equilibrium
with the old one, methods of comparative statics do not apply because we are not
considering a single equilibrium in a system with parameters. Instead we are
comparing two widely separated equilibria in a single system. Recall that equivalent
equilibria have the same total output. It seems reasonable to conjecture that one
result of a new burst of technology - if it is commercially successful - is an increase
in output. Given a homogeneous wage structure, this conjecture is true.
10. Theorem: Assume that the wage functions are homogeneous and of some common
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positive degree, i.e. wi(aix) = a. i(aix)k with k and the a. i's being positive constants. If
e and e* are equilibria such that U(e*) > U(e), then the total outputs satisfy le*1 > leI.
f.r.Q.Qi: For any fixed distribution vector s, we defined the zero-profit level of output
y(s) by n(y(s)s) = O. As we move out along the ray determined by s, the point x =
y( s)· s is that level of output where 'fr = 0, or equivalent, (dlxl)/dt = O. So y(s) is the
real number y which satisfies the equation:
Because the function p is nonincreasing and positive while each wi is increasing
and satisfies (2.6), the solution exists and is unique (see Figure 1). By our
homogeneity assumption we can write this equation as
with x = ys.
Clearly at any equilibrium e = lei s, 'fr = 0 and so lei = y(s). So it suffices to show that
U(y(s*)s*) > U(y(s)s) implies y(s*) > y(s).
Integrating the homogeneous terms in the definition of U we get for all x:
In particular, when x ys with Y y(s), (2.18) implies:
y
U(ys) = J 0 p(u)du - (yp(y))/ (k + I)}.
Thus, in the homogeneous case, U(y(s)s) is a function of y
it is an increasing function of y because:
y(s) above. Funhermore,
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Y
d/dy tf 0 p(u)du - (yp(y))/(k+l)] = (klk+l)p(y) - (l/(k+l))yp'(y) > O.
Thus, U(y(s*)s*) > U(y(s)s) implies y(s*) > y(s).
At first glance this result appears satisfying, but it turns out to be an artifact of the
homogeneity assumption. To see this let us consider the two-firm-two-factor case. If
neither firm dominates the other - necessary for the existence of an interior
equilibrium - then we can label the factors so that (excluding the exceptional cases
where a12 = 0 or a21 = 0):
(2.19)
11. Theorem: Suppose that the production coefficients (aij) for a two-firm-two-factor
case satisfy (2.19). Suppose further that the product price p > 0 is a constant. We can
choose positive constants 13 i'a. j (i = 1,2) to define the wage functions wi(d j ) =
13 i (a. id i + d2 i)' where di is the demand for factor i, so that the following conditions
hold:
(1) Each single firm equilibrium is vulnerable to entry by the other.
(2) The unique interior equilibrium has total output less than the output at the firm
1 equilibrium.
The result is robust in the sense that slight perturbations of the price functions
preserve conditions (1) and (2).
Notice that if the industry actually consists of two firms then our model is
inappropriate, because the myopic behavior we have postulated would not occur
under conditions of oligopoly.
Suppose, however, that "firm I" represents the aggregate of a large number of firms
each using the column 1 technology. Together they produce the "firm I" equilibrium
output. If firms employing type 2 technology now enter at any small positive level,
then the industry evolves to the stable equilibrium where both modes are in
operation. However at this new, technologically richer equilibrium, the total output
to the interior equilibrium distribution, s*, the original
one which intersects the p line earlier (le*1 < lei), but
area (U(e*) > U(e)). It is easy to draw such alternative
alternati yes can actually occur in the model requires
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is less that it was under the regime of type 1 technology alone.
The result can be described geometrically by using Figure 1. If we use two different
distribution vectors s I and s*, then the price curves p(v) are the same for both , but
the wage curves w(v) = Ii wi(vais)ais will usually be different. In going from the
case of firm 1, sl = (l,O),
wage function is replaced by
which encloses a larger total
wage curves, but that such
proof.
f.!.Q.Qi: First we change the coordinates so that total production is one of the new
coordinates i.e. we define u = xl + x2' v =x2' As shown in Figure 2, the first quadrant
in the xl x2 plane (i.e., R2+) is mapped on to the triangular region defined by u ~ v ~
O. The xl axis (x2 = 0) is now the u-axis and the x2 axis (xl = 0) is the line u = v. The
Lyapunov function U in the new coordinates is given by
(2.20)
v
c
----tJ--------="'-=--------4a----=..=- u
o A
105
We focus on the right angle triangle OAB shown in Figure 2, where A
(1,1). The conditions which U must satisfy are:
(a) Along the segment OB, aU/av < 0
(b) At the point A, aU/dv > 0
(c) At the point A, a 2u/ auav < 0
(d) At the point A, aU/au = 0
(e) Along the segment AB, a3U/ aua 2v < O.
(I,Q) and B=
To see that these conditions yield the results we want, note that (e) and (c) imply
a 2u/auav < 0 along AB. Together with (d) this implies
(f) Along the segment AB, au/au ~ 0 (vanishing only at A).
Condition (d) says that A is firm I's equilibrium with total output I, Le. the maximum
of U in the u-axis (= the xl axis) occurs at A. Moving vertically from A, (b) implies
that U increases, so that the equilibrium at A is vulnerable to entry. To find firm 2's
equilibrium we move along the ray u = v (= the x2 axis) and compute
aU/ax2 = au/au + au/avo (2.21)
By (a) and (f), au / ax2 < 0 at B and so the maximum of U along this ray occurs
earlier at some point we have denoted by C in Figure 2. At C, aU/ ax2 = 0 and so by
(2.21) and (a), au/ax 1 = au/au> 0 at C, namely firm 2's equilibrium is vulnerable to
entry. Thus, the maximum value of U on the triangle does not lie on either the
hypotenuse or the base. From (f) we know it does not lie on the vertical leg of the
triangle either, and so the maximum of U on the triangle occurs at some interior
point (denoted ... in Figure 2). As ... is an interior local maximum for U, it is the
unique internal equilibrium point. As it is inside the triangle, the total output (its u
coordinate) is less than 1. We do not know, but merely presume, that the output at ...
is greater than the output at C (as shown in Figure 2).
A little elementary calculus shows that (a)-(d) are equivalent respectively to (a')-(d')
(defining 6 1 = a12/a11 and 6 2 = a21/a22 and noting that (2.19) says I> 6 j >0):
106
(a') (w2(ta22»/(w1(ta12» > (all - a12)/(a22 -a21) = (a11/a22) «1-6 1)/(1-6 2»
for all 1~ t >0.
(b') (w2(a21»/(w1(a ll » < (a11/a22) «1- 6 1)/(1 - 6 2»
(c') (w'2(a21)a21) / (w't(a11)all) > (a ll /a22)«1 - 6 1)/(1 - 6 2»
(d') p = wI (all)all + w2(a21)a21·
Finally, for (e) it is sufficient that:
(e') W"j > 0 for i = 1,2.
Notice that all positive choices for C(, i' l3 i imply (e'). To translate the remaining
conditions in terms of the C(, i' l3 i choices, we define
F(t) = (ta22+C(, 2)/(6 1(ta12+C(,1 »,
G(t) = (62(ta21+C(,2»/(ta11 +C(,1)
K = (l31a211(l-61» / (l32a222(l-62).
Some algebra shows that (a')-(d') are equivalent, respectively, to
(a") F(t) > K for all 1 ~ t >0
(b") G(1) < K
(c") G(2) > K
(d") p = l3 1[ct. 1a\ 1 + a3111 + l3 2[C(, 2a221 + a3211 .
Now we are ready to make our choices. Notice that in order for both (b") and (c") to
hold, G must be an increasing function of t which requires that C(,la21> C(,2a11. It
then follows from (2.19) that (with C(, l'C(, 2 > 0) C(,1 a22 > C(,2a12 and so F(t) is also an
increasing function of 1. Furthermore, it is easy to check that, because
6 16 2 < l'C(,2all > 6162C(,la21 implies F(O) > G(2). We choose C(,1 and C(,2 so that the ratio
satisfies:
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Then F(t) > F(O) > G(2) > G(l) for all 1 ~ t > O. Next choose the ratio 13 1/13 2 so that
G(2) > K> G(l). For example, if we choose ct 1= all and ct2 =6 2 ~1 we get K = G(3/2) if
These choices for ct l' ct 2 and the ratio 13 1/13 2 imply (a")-(c"). Finally, multiplying the
pair (131,13 2 by a suitable positive constant we get (d").
3. DISCUSSION
11
In introducing the Lyapunov function, V, we remarked that system (2.2) is the
gradient system for V. The usual notion of the gradient system for V defines the
absolute rate of change dx/dt by the partial derivative aV/ axj' But in our model it is
the relative rate of change (d.tn Xj)/dt = (dx/dt) / Xj which is the partial av/aXj' The
concept of the gradient depends not only upon the function, V, but also upon the
choice of an inner product used to measure the length of vectors and the angles
between vectors. The usual, absolute rate version is associated with the ordinary
Euclidean measurement of length and angles in Rn . The relative rate version uses the
Shahshahani metric introduced in Shahshahani (1979) and elaborated in Akin (1979).
In contrast with Euclidean geometry, the Shahshahani metric is a kind of
Riemannian metric meaning that the inner product between vectors depends on the
point at which the vectors are based. As a general rule of thumb, the Shahshahani
geometry rather than the Euclidean one is the natural geometry for dynamic
problems where relative rather than absolute rates are the focus of attention.
Let us now look back to the original assumptions of the model. The assumption that p
and wi are functions of Ixl and aix respectively ensured exactly that the system is the
gradient of the single function V. Then, the monotonicity assumptions of (2.5) imply
the concavity of V. However, even with p and wi as arbitrary functions of x, the
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dynamics of (2.2) still preserve association parameters. This is important because the
plausible conditions of (2.5) are really too simple. That wi depends on the factor
demand aix signifies that the supply of factor
not on the wage of other factors.
depends only on the wage wi and
Thus (2.2). if equipped with
character and (possibly) the
constants of motion Lb remain
also endures.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREMS 2 AND 9.
more realistic supply functions. loses its gradient
ubiquitous convergence to equilibrium. But the
and so the associated foliation by invariant manifolds
We will begin by summarizing our previous results about the system and then execute
the proof in a series of eight steps.
The function U defined by (2.7) and (2.10) is a Lyapunov function; i.e.• U is constantly
increasing on solution paths. remaining constant only when the entire system is at
an equilibrium. U is a concave function with negative semi-definite Hessian given
by (2.11).
The concept of productive equivalence is defined using the linear map EA of (2.13). U
is constant on each equivalent class. The vectorspace B is defined to be the kernel of
E A so that two vectors are equivalent if. and only if. their difference is a vector in B.
If J C J = p .....n} then BJ == B n R J is the set of vectors in B with support contained in
J. A vector b of BJ defines by (2.14) the association parameter Lb(x) of a state x in OJ
(c.f. (2.15». These association parameters remain constant on any solution path of the
system which begins in. and so remains in. OJ. So fixing the association parameters at
particular values defines a manifold in OJ which remains invariant under the system.
Restricting the focus to R.J+ C OJ. proposition 8 says that each equivalence class in
Rj+ intersects each invariant manifold at exactly one point. Thus. the association
parameters of a state x
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OJin R + together with its equivalence class, described by
evaluating EA at x, uniquely describe x.
Finally, we mention a technical trick we have used before (e.g. corollary 3). If we are
beginning at a point x and investigating the behavior of the solution path
beginning at x, we can assume x is interior; Le. supp(x) = J. If not, we can restrict
the focus to the dynamical system defined only for the firms in supp(x). We will refer
to this device as interiorizatjon.
~: Suppose e is an equilibrium with supp(e)
U(e) = U* if and only if 1T j ~ 0 at e for all j in J.
J. Then U(e) U*j (c.f. (2.12)).
£.I.Q..Q.f: We begin with the latter statement. If some 1T j = aUla xj > 0 at e, then by
increasing the coordinate of e slightly we increase U and so U(e) is not the
maximum value of U. Now suppose 1T j ~ 0 at e for all j. Because the function U is
concave, the graph of U remains below its tangent plane at e:
U(x) S U(e) + I .(x. - e·)1T·
- J J J J
where the 1T j = (a U I a x/s are evaluted at e. Because e is an equilibrium with
support J, 1T j = 0 for all j in J. For the remaining j's 1T j ~ 0 by hypothesis and Xj - ej =
Xj ~ O. So the sum is nonpositive and U(x) ~ U(e). Hence U(e) = U*.
For the first result, we can assume - by interiorization - that J = J. At an interior
equilibrium 1T j = 0 for all
proved.
and so U(e) = U* according to what we have already
~: If e is an equilibrium with support J then e is locally asymptotically stable
in the invariant manifold of RJ+ defined by the association parameters of e.
£I.Q..Qi: Again we can interiorize and assume J = J. No vector (except 0) of B is tangent
to the invariant manifold through e. Technically, this follows from proposition 8
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that the function EA x LB is a diffeomorphism. Hence, by lemma 3(b) the Hessian Hx is
negative definite when restricted to vectors tangent to the invariant manifold. So, the
Lyapunov function U restricted to the invariant manifold has a strict local maximum
at e. Local asymptotic stability at e follows from Lyapunov's Theorem (see, e.g.
Hirsch and Smale (1974) page 193).
~: The set Mj is the intersection of RJ+ with a single equivalence class. Mj
consists entirely of equilibria and includes all equilibria with support equal to J.
Proof: By interiorization we can assume J = J. By corollary 4(a) M is a union of
equivalence classes. Because U is a concave function the set M = (x: U(x) = U*}
(x: U(x) ~ U*} is a convex set and so is its image under the linear map EA. Now if J1 C
J it is sufficient to show that M n R+ J1 - if nonempty - consists entirely of equilibria
and has as its image a single point under EA. Then every point of M is an equilibrium
and the image EA(M) is a finite set (at most one point for each subset J1)' As M is
connected and nonempty EA(M) is a single point; Le., M consists of a single class.
By interiorization we can also assume J1 = J. If e e M is interior then because e is a
local maximum for U on RJ+, 1T j = au/axj = 0 for all j at e and e is an equilibrium.
Proposition 7 implies that the restriction of EA to the invariant manifold through e
is a diffeomorphism onto the open cone (, in A. Because EA(M n RJ+) is a convex set
o
in 0, its preimage is a connected set of equilibria in the invariant manifold through
e. But by Step 2 any equilibrium in the invariant manifold is locally asymptotically
stable and so is isolated. Thus, the set of such equilibria is at once connected and
discrete. Hence, it is the single point (e}. Because every equivalence class intersects
the invariant manifold through e, the only interior points in M are those equivalent
to e.
The last sentence of Step 3 is a restatement of Step 1.
~: Every solution path xt approaches a limiting equilibrium point as t approaches
infin ity.
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E.r.Q.Qi: For any system of differential equations whose solution all remain bounded
(c.f. lemma 1) we can define the limit point set Q of the solution path xt as the set of
limit points of convergence sub-sequences [Xt }. In general, Q is a compact,
n
connected set invariant under the system. We have to show that Q consists of one
equilibrium point. Often Q may consist of more complicated elements than mere
equilibria. Limit cycles offer a well-known example. In our case, the Lyapunov
function ensures that limit cycles do not occur. Since V(x t ) is a bounded increasing
function of t it has a limiting value V. By continuity of V V(e) = V at every point e
of Q. If we now compute the solution path beginning at e, then we remain in Q by
invariance. So V remains constant at V on this new solution path and this only
happens at equilibrium. Thus, every point e of Q is an equilibrium. We are not
quite done. We have shown that Q is a compact, connected set of equilibria in which
V is constant. In most systems equilibria are isolated, e.g. there are only finitely
many, and from this it is easy to show that Q consists of a single point. In our system
there are equivalence classes, convex cells, consisting of equilibria. So more
information is needed to show that a single limiting equilibrium point exists.
Assume - by interiorization - that the original solution path xt is interior - I.e., lies in
Rn+. Now let e E Q and let J = supp(e). Any vector b E B J defines an association
parameter Lb(e). Because b E B, Lb is defined and remains constant on the original
path xl' Hence, Lb(e) is this constant value. Thus, the association parameters of e are
determined by Xt. On the other hand, by Step 3 there is at most one equivalence class
of equilibria with support equal to J. Because the equivalence class and the
association parameters are determined, so is e. We have shown that for every subset
J of J, Q contains at most one point with suppon equal to J. Thus, Q is finite. But as
Q is nonempty and connected, it does indeed contain exactly one point.
~: If xt is a solution path and supp(xO) J, then limH 00 V (x t) = V·J, I.e. the
limiting equilibrium for the path is one where V achieves its maximum on RJ+.
f..r..Q..Qf: Interiorize to assume J=J. By Step 4, xt approaches some equilibrium. It is
sufficient to show that if e is an equilibrium with V(e) < V· then no interior
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solution path approaches e. Let J1 = supp(e). By Step I, there exists j such that 1T j >
o at e (of course j t. J1 since 1T j = 0 for j e J1)' So e has an open neighborhood G at
every point of which 1Tj> O. Assume xt is an interior solution path with limit e and
so the path eventually enters G and remains there; i.e., there exists T such that
xt E G for t > T. Because xt is interior and lies in G, dxjdt = Xj1T j > 0 at xt for t > T. So for
t > T, xtjis monotonously increasing and so cannot approach the limit 0 = ej' This
contradiction completes the proof of Step 5.
For the remaining steps we will require an extension to infinite values of the log-
linear function Lb.
- -Lemma 2: For beRn let J+ = U: bj > O} and J _ = {j: bj < O} so that J = J+ U J_ is the
support of b. Let Dj+denote OJ U OJ'_ :::> OJ. On Dj. Lb is a continuous function to the
compactified real line [- 00 ,00 I defined by:
1
+00
Lb(x) = IjbjLn Xj
-00
for x E OJ+- OJ
for x E OJ
for x E OJ- - Or
ErQ.Qf: On 0:1+ the sum I J+ bjL n Xj is a real-valued continuous function. If x E 0J+ - Or
then Xj = 0 for some j in r. So as y in OJ approaches x, Ijbj Ln Yj approaches +00. A
similar argument (or the same one applied to -b) yields continuity at points of 0T- - OJ.
oj
solution path in R + with e = Limt-+ 00 xt then supp(e) = J*.
~: Given J C J, let J* be the smallest subset of J such that Mj C Rj +*. If xt is a
oj
In particular, Mj() R + i~
nonempty.
E.r.Q.Qi: By interiorization assume J = J. We show first that (supp(x): x E M} is closed
under union. It is then clear that J'" is the largest member of the collection.
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By step 3 M is a single equivalence class and so it is convex. If e1 ,e2 E M then e3 =
Now suppose e E M with supp(e) = J l' a proper subset of J*. We show that e cannot be
the limiting equilibrium of any interior path xt . Choose e* E M with supp(e*) = J*.
Since e* is equivalent to e, b = e* - e is a vector of B. In the notation of the lemma,
e E OJ- and because supp(e) is a proper subset of supp(e*), e t OJ. By the lemma Lb is
defined and continuous at e with Lb(e) = -00. If xt is an interior solution path then
Lb(x t ) is constant at some real value. Since xt as well as e lies in Dr Limt -+ 00 X t = e
would violate continuity of Lb at e.
~: Define the equilibrium function e: Rn+ -+ R n+ by e(x) = Limt-+ 00 xt where xt is
the solution path beginning at x. e-1 (M) = Rn+ - {RJ+: V*j < V*} is an open subset of
R n+ containing Rn+. The restriction e: e- 1(M) -+ M is a continuous retraction onto M,
Le. e(x) = x for x E e- 1(M) if and only if x E M.
Proof: e is well-defined by Step 4. By Step 5 e(x) E M if, and only if V*j = V* where J =
supp(x). Now let {xn} be a sequence in e- 1(M) converging to a point X oo of e- 1(M). We
want to show that the sequence {en == e(xn)} in M converges to the point e oo == e(x 00 )
of M. Because M is compact it is enough to show that the limit of any convergent
subsequence of {en} is eoo ' So we suppose that {en} converges to e* and prove e* = e oo '
Since there are only a finite number of subsets of J. we can restrict to a subsequence
if necessary to assume that all points of the sequence {xn } have the same support
(possibly different from the support of xoo )' Finally, by interiorization we can assume
that this common support set is J. So we have reduced to the case where {xn } is a
sequence of interior points converging to X oo E e- 1(M) and {en} is a sequence in M
converging to e*. Since the solution path beginning at xn converges to en' we can
choose Yn on the solution path with distance less than n- 1 from en' Then {Yn} is a
sequence of interior points converging to e*. Because xn and Yn lie on the same
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solution path they have the same association parameters.
We must show e* = e oo . Because e* and e oo lie in the equivalence class M the
difference vector b = e* - e oo lies in B. (This is where we use X oo e e- 1(M).) Let J1 ;;;
supp(e*) and J2 ;;; supp(e oo ) C supp(x oo ) == J. Then supp(b) C J1 U J2. Let Ln = Lb(xn) =
Lb(Yn)' Now (Yn)j -+ e*j' In the notation of lemma 2, e* e Dj+ and eoo e Di-. eoo is the
limit of the solution path X oo beginning at xoo ' So supp(eoo ) C supp(x oo ) and X oot t
e Dj_ for all t. By the continuity result of lemma 2 and the constancy of association
parameters
On the other hand, {xn } and {Yn} are interior sequences with limits X oo and e*
respectively. So by lemma 2 again
Lb(x oo ) =Lim Lb(x n) = Lim Lb(Yn) =Lb(e*).
n-+ 00 n-+ 00
(Recall that Yn is on the xn solution path.) Hence, Lb(e*) = Lb(e oo ) and e* e D"j..
e oo e Dj_ imply that this common value is finite. Thus, e*, e oo e Dr This implies that
e* and e oo have the same support.
where the sum is taken over the common support set. But if U,v> 0 then
(u-v)(Ln u - Ln v) ~ 0 with equality only when u = v (because the log is increasing).
Hence, e*j = e oo . for all j in the support, i.e. e* = eoo .
J
~: Every equilibrium is internally stable. An equilibrium e is stable if, and only
if U(e) = U*, Le. e e M.
f.r.o..Qi: If U(e) < U* then e is vulnerable to entry; i.e. if x is an interior point close to
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e then e(x) E: M. So the solution path approaches an equilibrium inequivalent to e,
and a fortiori does not remain near e.
If e E: M then e is stable in a very strong sense. Notice that if S
then e- 1(S) is an invariant set containing S. In particular, if G
is any subset of M
is a subset of M,
open in M and containing e, then e-1(G) is open in Rn+ and contains e. For [; > 0
let Gt; consist of the points of M of distance ~ [; from e, so that Gt; is compact and its
M interior contains e.
Because U is a continuous Lyapunov function {U ~ u* - [;} == (x: U(x) ~ u* - [;} is a
closed invariant set containing e in its interior. For [; > 0 small enough this set is
bounded and so is compact. Also, for [; > 0 small enough U*r~ U* - [; implies U*] = U*
and so this set is contained in e-1(M). Then e-1(Gt;) n {U ~ U* - [;} is a compact
inv}riant set containing e in its interior. Because the intersection of these sets as [;
approaches 0 is {e}, it follows t~at if N is any neighborhood of e, there exists [; > 0
such that N:> e-1(Gt;) n {U ~ u* - [;}. Because the latter set is invariant, stability
follows.
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Chapter 6
Technical
Effective
Progess,
Demand:
Capital Accumulation, and
A Self-Organization Model
G. SILVERBERG
1. IN1RODUCTION
Concepts such as the representative firm and consumer, "perfect" competition and
foresight, and market equilibrium still dominate economic theory. This has led, on
the one hand, to "micro" economic models of the Walrasian type, and to
"macro"economic models of steady state, full employment growth on the other. At the
same time, it is clear to even the most casual observer of the real economic world that
diversity of expectations and business strategies, market power, sectoral,
technological and foreign trade and many other forms of disequilibrium have always
prevailed. Can these be regarded as mere blemishes on an otherwise correct method
of analysis, or do they change "the ball game" the economic theorist is up against in a
genuinely fundamental way?
The answers of economists such as Milton Friedman that the underlying
evolutionary process in capitalist economies ensures that the results of static
optimization theory are generally enforced - appear a little too glib (see in particular
the discussion in Nelson and Winter, 1982). It is by no means clear that once diversity
of expectations and behavior, dynamic disequilibrium, and basic uncertainty about
the future are introduced, they will simply go away, even in the proverbial long run.
The purpose of this paper is to formulate such an evolutionary economic process
explicitly, and to bring to bear some of the analytic methods of the theory of
self-organization to clarify the relationship between industry structure, technical
progress, and market evolution.
The theory of self-organization is concerned with the coupled dynamics of
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subsystems which interact to produce a "field" at the macro level, and in tum are
themselves influenced by this very field. (For an overview of the principal methods
and applications within the expanding field of self-organization theory see e.g.
Haken (1983), Ebeling and Feistel (1982), Nicolis and Prigogine (1977), and Prigogine
(1976». Under suitable constraints - external input of energy and competition for
scarce resources - such a dynamic feedback structure can be shown to result in
coherent behavior of the disparate components, and to be characterized by a small
number of aggregate parameters.
Since Adam Smith, the problem of the emergence of coherent behavior from the
uncoordinated pursuit of self-interest has been one of the central economic
questions. The answer he gave - the invisible hand of the market - and its modem
generalization in general equilibrium theory. are among the first formulations of
feedback structures in modem science. However, we now know that the conclusions
to which this tradition leads - stability, uniqueness, and Pareto optimality of the
resulting equilibrium - are only valid under severely restrictive and unrealistic
assumptions.
In general, we must expect such systems to display much richer dynamics. The a
priori assumption that an economy is actually governed by such an equilibirum can
only be regarded as an article of ideological faith without scientific foundation. (Thus
e.g. Smale (1980, p.289) objects that "general equilibrium theory has not successfully
confronted the question 'How is equilibrium reached?' Dynamic considerations would
seem necessary to resolve this problem.") Not only will the system display richer
dynamics under given conditions. but it may also be subject to radical changes in
regime due to innovations, switching effects, external shocks and internal noise.
These changes, which may be likened to phase transitions. are the principal objects
of study in the theory of self-organization. Moreover. they may well display a
progressive or evolutionary character.
Since at least von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947. pp.8-12), it has been well known
that the problem of economic decision making and rationality, even in the normative
domain. is not simply that of individual maximization. Although much theoretical
progress has been made in game theory since then. and some very suggestive
parables have been uncovered (such as Prisoner's Dilemma and its extension into the
evolutionary domain by Axelrod (1984», game theory has failed to replace more
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classical optimization approaches in positive and normative economics. Indeed,
Schwartz (1965, pp.83-88) has argued that the original game-theoretic program was
too ambitious. H.A. Simon's concept of bounded rationality acquires attractiveness
here - that economic agents adhere to simple rules of thumb which have shown
themselves to be more or less satisfactory in most circumstances (e.g. Simon 1959).
How such rules become established, and why they may retain their validity for a
certain time, only to be replaced or overthrown later remains uncertain.
Schumpeter's conception of the economic process as one of creative destruction may
hold the key to understanding how the market process "optimizes" in an evolutionary
sense in historical time. He saw most economic agents as indeed acting in accordance
with perceived rules of behavior. However, every now and then more enterprising
individuals or firms attempt some form of innovation, whether technological,
organizational, marketing, etc. Some of these innovations succeed, and as they
acquire weight they force other agents to either bow out of the market, follow suit, or
even "counter innovate" in their tum. In contrast to static neoclassical models,
evolutionary processes of this kind require time - they are diffusionary in character.
This implies that we are dealing with a very different form of optimization than in
choice-theoretic models with their implicit infinite reaction speed: the process will
be an ongoing one, open ended, of varying intensity, and possibly subject to
dead-ends, breakdowns and other pathologies.
2. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND TIIE DYNAMICS OF COMPE1TI10N
In a recent article, Kaldor (1983) points out that of the pioneers of the theory of
effective demand, only H.-J. RUstow took into account the fact that in a dynamic
economy, the cost structure of industry will not be uniform, but rather will show a
considerable variation both between firms and within the capital structure of firms
themselves (see, for example, RUstow 1951, 1984; the basic insight, however, goes back
to RUstow's 1926 doctoral dissertation.) This productivity gradient imposes a
technological constraint on the realization of full employment, in addition to the
distribution of income, the propensity to save, and the degree of monopoly power -
the main factors otherwise associated with the problem of effective demand.
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Numerous empirical studies have borne out that this gradient is a constant, and not
merely a temporary feature of a dynamic economy. That this is so forces us to rethink
our notion of market competition. For in a regime of "perfect" competition, a firm
with a decided cost advantage should be able to comer the market instantly by
slightly lowering its price below that of its competitors. On the other hand, the theory
of imperfect or oligopolistic competition. while putting this notion into question, does
not offer a clear alternative dynamic description.
If we tum to the businessman's view of reality as it comes across on the business
pages of major newspapers, we immediately perceive that competition is regarded as a
question of the struggle to defend or enlarge the firm's market share in the face of
an overall demand largely beyond the firm's policy-making purview. This struggle,
both domestically and internationally, is seen as turning on relative competitiveness.
a concept which in practice is often left ill-defined, and until now has found no
proper place in economic theory. That market shares display sufficient constancy to
be regarded as key variables in strategic decision making indicates that many
markets, particularly in manufacturing industry. are considerably less than
"perfect". We suggest that market share is a key microeconomic variable of concern
to the firm in determining output and pricing policy, instead of the marginalist
concepts of the neoclassical theory of the firm for which there is little or no direct
phenomenological evidence. This may be due to advertising, product differentiation,
customer loyality, or simply the finite reaction time of the market to respond to price,
quality and other signals.
Schwartz (1965. p.8) has shown that under such conditions of oligopolistic price
competition , a Nash solution to the noncooperative game is mark-up pricing, with
the mark-up factor dependent on the elasticity of demand facing each firm, itself a
function of industry structure. Kalecki (1965, ch.1) also made mark-up pricing and
monopoly power a central element in his trade cycle and distributional models.
without however, being able to say what determines the mark-up factor.
As Schwartz's solution corresponds to a game-theoretical equilibrium, it does not
show how this position is reached, nor how market shares may change over time as a
result of the varying business strategies pursued by different firms. We propose the
following first order model to capture the dynamics of "imperfect" market
competition, based on the work of Manfred Eigen on prebiotic evolution (see Eigen
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1971; for the analogy to processes of economic competition see Ebeling and Feistel,
1982, pp.247-8).
Let fi denote the market share in total real orders of the i-th firm. Let Ei be the
"competitiveness" of the i-th firm, E average industry competitiveness weighted by
market share. For the time being we will not specify further what we mean by
competitiveness. The evolution of market shares will be described by the following
system of differential equations:
(I)
The coefficient A describes the speed of response of industry structure to disparities
in competitiveness. "Perfect" competition would correspond to an infinite value of A.
A might well depend on the degree of industry concentration, the extent of brand
loyalty, or the like, and thus itself be subject to change as the industrial structure
evolves (e.g. due to increasing concentration of the industry). In the following we
will consider A to be a constant, however. As can readily be seen, the linear form of
the equation for the rate of growth of market share ensures that the equations are
consistent:
(2)
as must be the case if the market shares are to continue to add up to one over time.
Equation (I) only describes the dynamics of market shares and leaves the overall
level of demand D undetermined. Thus an additional equation is necessary to
determine the absolute level of demand di facing each firm (d i = fiD). A typical
candidate for modelling a small sector of the economy would be
D = D( i5, t), aD/a ii ;:i 0, (3)
where p = IT P/i is the average price. At a more aggregate level, demand might better
i
be represented as dependent on real wages in the consumer goods sector: D D(w/ P).
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If we regard the Ej's as constant, then the asymptotic behavior of the system is
apparent. The firm with the largest E, say i·. will outgrow and displace all of the
others until their market shares decline to zero and E = Ej•. This process is
independent of initial conditions. and is known as simple selection (see Ebeling and
Feistel 1982, section 7.3, for an exhaustive mathematical discussion). Coexistence of
more than one firm is only possible if surviving firms all have precisely the same
competitiveness value. In a stochastic environment, this stringent condition is
relaxed because small differences in the E's will not have a chance to lead to a
systematic divergence of market shares. But of course this approach only becomes
interesting when the E's are not constant. but subject to strategic planning and
evolutionary selection. Thus it is necessary to model what constitutes competitiveness.
and how it changes over time in response to the investment and pricing policies of
the firm and their appropriateness in a changing market environment.
The first major constituent is obviously price, even in highly imperfect markets. The
likelihood that a customer will switch his orders from one supplier to another is
related not to absolute differences in price, however, but to percentual ones. Thus,
price competitiveness can be represented to the first order by the logarithm of firm
price, for example. with a negative sign to accord with the sign convention of
equation (1) (lower than average price corresponding to higher than average
competitiveness).
A second factor is quality competition, which for many products can outweigh the
disadvantages of higher price. However, since it is not obvious which economic
decisions determine the quality level, or whether it is subject to purely economic
control at all, it is not clear how quality differences can be incorporated into such a
model. In addition, after a certain point is reached, quality differentials transform
themselves into the emergence of a new market and should perhaps better be
regarded as a form of product innovation or differentiation. In view of these
difficulties we will ignore the quality component in our definition of competitive-
ness.
Finally, the capacity constraint in the model of the firm's productive structure we
introduce below must also be allowed to feed back on orders. Otherwise, a firm with a
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price advantage would continue to enlarge its market share even if it neglected to
enlarge its capacity sufficiently to keep up with the expansion of demand. We model
this aspect of competition by introducing a delivery delay, signaled to the market
based on the backload of unfulfilled orders, the level of inventories, and the capacity
constraint on production. Firms with an above-average delivery delay lose orders.
even if they are price competitive.
Let dd i be the current delivery delay of the i-th firm. The simplest way to combine its
influence on overall competitiveness with that of price is to take a linear
combination of the two:
The reference. or average level of competitiveness, is given by
E =; Ei fi =-I fi In Pi - a I fi ddi =-In (II Pi fi) - add.
I i
(4)
(5)
From equation (5) it is clear that the reference level for price competitiveness, if
equation (l) is to be consistent, is not the arithmetic average p = I fi Pi but rather
the geometric average
p =II p/i. (I fi = 1).
i
(6)
3. EMBODIED TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY:
A VINTAGE APPROACH
It is widely recognized that investment in new equipment and plant is a major, if not
the major, chann~1 through which productivity improvements due to technical
progress are realized. Other avenues certainly exist. such as "learning by doing"; the
retrofitting of existing equipment with. for example. better instrumentation or other
subsidiary devices, raising overall efficiency out of all proportion to the investment
involved; better scheduling and control, etc. For the time being we will ignore these
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other factors and concentrate on pure embodied technical progress in which old
equipment must be replaced by new equipment in order to raise productivity.
In a previous paper (Silverberg 1984) we introduced a model of the one-shot
replacement of one capital structure by another in a dynamic setting. A
choice-of-technique criterion was derived which is independent of momentary
wage/price relations, and has the character of an evolutionary extremal function
(for a discussion of evolutionary extremal principles see Eberling and Feistel, 1982
section 7.2). This criterion accords with Kaldor's stylized facts of economic growth,
and makes Harrod neutrality of technical progress a plausible approximate result,
instead of a strictly necessary presupposition of the model. Furthermore, the
non-steady-state behavior of the model proved to be suggestive of a nonlinear
superposition of long and short cycles.
As all practical managers know, however, technical progress in the modern era has
been an ongoing, if perhaps variable affair, and not a one-time event. In the
theoretical economic literature this fact was reflected in the vintage models (Salter
1962, Solow 1960, Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962). In the more management oriented
literature, this was dealt with in the context of optimal replacement policy (see, e.g.,
Terborgh 1949, Smith 1961).
As has been pointed out by Clark (1980), however, a major drawback of the traditional
vintage models has been their restriction to steady-state, full-employment
equilibrium and a constant exponential rate of best practice technical progress. The
management oriented analyses, such as the MAPI and payback period methods, are
slightly superior in this regard: although they project a constant rate of technical
progress into the future, they permit the current "vintage" under consideration to
deviate from steady-state values (otherwise these methods would be of no practical
usefulness). This difference in viewpoint also leads to an apparent contradiction
between the two approaches. In the vintage models, a machine is replaced when its
unit variable costs equal total costs of new machines (including depreciation charges
and interest). i.e., when its quasi-rent falls to zero. In the optimal replacement
literature. a machine is replaced when the discounted cost of not replacing it,
including opportunity costs due to lost potential profits - given an expected rate of
future technical progress - is minimized. It is easy to show that even in a golden-age
steady state, they do not coincide, and the former is not in fact an optimal solution.
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Moreover, the latter method makes at least some explicit provision for uncertainty
about, and variation in, the rate of technical change. Thus expectational fluctuations
could lead to real, and by no means irrational, investment fluctuations.
In an early article, Bain (1939) attempted to show how the resulting variability of the
economic lifetimes of capital goods could lead to autonomous reinvestment cycles of a
more convincing nature than that due to a simple "echo" effect. Rosenberg (1976) has
also argued that technological expectations can lead to perverse patterns of optimum
investment expenditures. Although the argument is only valid if technological
change comes in discrete lumps (e.g. when IBM announces a superior new computer
generation to be introduced in two years, and thereby undermines its own or its
competitors' current sales), the point is well taken that the replacement decision is
both an economic one and crucially based on expectations which need not, and often
will not, be fulfilled. Moreover, since expectations about an uncertain future -
expecially concerning the course of technological development - cannot in their
nature be fully grounded rationally (Keynes' "animal spirits"), they will necessarily
differ between entrepreneurs and be subject to imitational and state of confidence
effects.
Thus in modelling the replacement decision, we adopt a rule of thumb perspective
(the still widely employed payback period criterion) on the one hand and, in dealing
with major innovations or "shifts in technological paradigms", a Schumpeterian
pioneering entrepreneur perspective on the other. (This latter aspect is dealt with
using an extension of the present model in Dosi, Orsenigo and Silverberg, 1986).
Let us begin with the normal business replacement decision. At any given time t,
firm i disposes of capital stock kj(t,t'), Tj(t) ;:iii t' ;:iii t, where kj is the capital stock
vintage introduced at time t', measured in capacity or efficiency units of the firm's
product and Tj(t) is the oldest vintage still in use at time t. Assume for the moment
that the best practice technology is unambiguously defined at each moment in time,
and is selected for investment by all firms. Thus the date of introduction of a vintage
determines its operating characteristics (we ignore losses in productivity due to wear
and tear, etc.), which we describe as follows. Prime labor required per efficiency unit
is denoted by a(t), the ratio of overhead to prime labor required per efficiency unit
by h(t), for equipment of vintage 1. Let the nominal wage rate at time t be w(t), and
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the price per efficiency unit of best practice equipment be P(t). We could allow for
other prime and overhead inputs such as materials, energy, etc., by making a, hand
w vectors instead of scalars. We regard investment in fixed capital equipment as an
irreversible decision and hence neglect any possible resale or scrapping value. We
now posit that the decision to replace the equipment slice ki(t,t') by an equal capacity
of new technology is governed by the following payback period calculation:
P(t)/(h(t')a(t') + a(t') - h(t)a(t) - a(t)} • w(t) ;:iii b i (7)
where bi is the payback period demanded by the i-th firm. For the moment we allow
firms to choose their own period arbitrarily in view
of technical progress and other factors. Later we
evolutionary "optimum" value by searching for the
the highest sustainable relative growth rate.
of their expectations of the rate
will attempt to determine an
investment strategy leading to
Thus given a (for the moment) fixed value bi for the maximum payback period
demanded of replacement investment, the firm will attempt to scrap a sufficient
quantity of old equipment to maintain btTi;:iii b i. For simplicity, we assume that the
overhead labor/efficiency unit shows no distinct trend over time, Le., h(t) = const.
Solving equation (7) for T determines the desired scrapping margin
(8)
If we denote by R(t) the amount of capacity which must be scrapped according to this
criterion, then we have
(9)
However, at any given time the firm may not be operating at its optimum scrapping
margin, so that a dynamic behavioral rule must be specified to allow it to catch up (or
fall behind) to this point. Thus we choose a first order control procedure:
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(10)
We deal with the decision to expand capacity separately from the replacement
decision. Theoretically, both should be dependent on a comparable expected rate of
return calculation. In practice, this is easier said than done. The main obstacle is to
estimate the gains and losses associated with different rates of growth of orders, as
against capacity, including foregone orders due to a lack of capacity. The forecasting
of orders is one of the variables most shrouded in uncertainty for the firm. It depends
on the future state of the whole economy, the relative growth of the specific sector,
and the competitive position of the individual firm. We deal with this problem by
having recourse to a rule of thumb. Firms attempt to maintain their average rate of
capacity utilization at a certain level Uo so as to have spare capacity available for
demand peaks, and to have a buffer against forecasting mistakes. Given an initial
forecast for the rate of growth of orders over the firm's investment planning horizon
r, and an actual (smoothed) rate of utilization u, firms adjust their desired rate of
expansion in response to the discrepancy between their actual and their desired rate
of capacity utilization:
(11)
Firms attempt to keep up with the expected growth of orders, correcting for an over
or underutilization of capacity. This is plausible because with constant unit prime
costs and fixed overheads, profits are an increasing linear function of the rate of
utilization. On the other hand, the foregone profits due to limited capacity in a
situation of high demand will also rise rapidly.
The rate of growth of orders confronting a firm is equal to the rate of growth of
orders in the sector, plus the rate of growth of the firm's market share (growth rates
are indicated by '):
(12)
For the time being we assume firms base their initial demand projections on .. animal
spirits", i.e. completely arbitrarily. The levels of expansion and replacement
investment can now be determined as follows. Let K be total capacity. Desired net
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capacity change is N = rd K in capacity units and rd KP(t) in value units. This can be
negative or positive. The desired level of replacement investment is Rand RP in value
units. If N is positive, then gross investment I = (N+R)P, and capacity S = R is scrapped
and replaced. If N is negative - Le., the firm deliberately shrinks to cut overhead
expenses - then gross investment purely serves replacement needs.
However, the financial position of the firm may not permit this desired investment
program to be realized exactly. The main source of financing for the modern
corporation is its cash flow F. If the cash flow matches desired gross investment, I = F,
then there is no problem. If I exceeds F then there is an incentive for the firm to seek
external financing or tap its financial reserves (cash, draft accounts, securities). If F
exceeds I the firm may prefer to go into financial investments, depending on the rate
of interest. The question of external financing and investment introduces an
additional complication which we postpone until section 6.
To simplify matters, we assume for the time being that firms always adjust their gross
investment level to their cash flow, and ration funds proportionately between
replacement and expansion investment as the need may be. This is consistent with
the description of investment budgeting given by Cyert, Debrost, and Holt (1979) as
well as interview studies such as Eisner (1956). We can thus define an investment
realization factor z = F/I if F ~ 0 and z = 0 if F ;:! 0 to yield the following realized
components of investment:
N gross investment
(value)
net expansion replacement scrapping
(in efficiency units)
positive
negative
z(N+R)P
zRP
zN
N
zR
zR
zR
-N+zR
We can regard the evolution of the firm's capital stock as a process of age-dependent
population dynamics. Gross investment I adds new equipment to the stock and
scrapping S due to replacement and/or contraction decisions removes old equipment
from the tail end (the age of which is endogenously determined and variable). Given
a predetermined development pattern for best practice productivity, we can now ask
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how the productivity of the entire capital stock will evolve as a result of these
investment decisions. For simplicity. we will regard overhead costs as unvarying
(h(t) = constant). and restrict the analysis to prime unit labor costs and productivity
aCt) and get). Consider an arbitrary characteristic of technology x(t) solely dependent
on a vintage's date of introduction. Then we can define the average value of x over a
given capital stock as
t
i = l/K{ x(t')k(t.t')dt'. (13)
Let B = lIP be gross investment in efficiency units. Then the net change in capacity
is obviously
N=K=B-S. (14)
The rate of change of x can now be derived from equation (13) by differentiation:
dldt (x) = 11K (B(x(t) - i) + S( x - x(T(t»)} ( 15)
If we consider a growing firm so that N = B - S ?; O. then from our investment table
above B = N + R, S = R, and thus
d/dt(i) = 11K (N(x(t) - x)+ R(x(t) - x(T(t»»). (16)
If we now return to prime labor productivity g and assume it is a monotonically
growing function then get) ?; g (t) ?; geT). Substituting g for x in the last equation,
this implies that a dollar's investment will contribute most to raising average
productivity if it is used to rationalize rather than expand the capital stock. Thus, if
for some reason businessmen expect demand to stagnate or decline and are under
competitive pressure, then they will have good reasons to prefer accelerated
modernization - i.e.. cost cutting - to net capacity expansion.
Equation (15) shows a certain affinity with Kaldor's technical progress function
(Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962). Whereas Kaldor posited a relationship between the rate of
129
growth of productivity and investment per man on new equipment, equation (15)
relates the rate of growth of productivity of operating equipment to the level and
composition of investment as well as the rate of development of best practice
technology. The duality of the investment decision (replacement vs. expansion), and
not just the level of gross investment, is thus shown to be a determining factor in the
evolution of productivity.
Let us return to the expansion investment decision, the effect of which is to enlarge
or shrink the productive capacity of the firm's capital stock. In section 2 we
introduced the delivery delay as a component of market competitiveness. Here we
have to specify the delivery delay dynamically as a result of net investment and the
level of production decisions. Letting incoming orders be denoted by d and outgoing
shipments by y we have
L = d-y (17)
where L is the backlog on the order book of the firm. The current delivery delay is
then
dd = L/y. (18)
We model the firm's short-term production decision by assuming that it attempts to
maintain this delivery delay at some standard operating level dd o . If the firm has
spare capacity at its disposal, this is no problem. The level of production adjusts to
demand with a certain finite reaction speed due to adjustment costs, the rate at which
hiring and firing can take place, etc. The firm runs up against an operating barrier
at full utilization of capacity, however. We model this process with the following
equation:
~u = ~(dd - dd o )(l.1 - u2), if u ~ 11 = 0 if u ~ I, ~ ~ o. (19)
It would be more realistic to assume that shipments are from stock and that the level
of production is also determined by a desire to maintain stock in a given relation to
average incoming orders. This would necessitate an additional intervening stock
adjustment equation, without fundamentally changing the mathematical structure of
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the system, so that we will ignore inventory dynamics for the present.
4. PRICE DYNAMICS
Equations (1) and (4) describe how quantities react to price and delivery delay
signals. While the delivery delay can be determined by production level and capacity
expansion decisions, it still remains to determine how prices are set. In the literature,
there are several traditional approaches. The marginalist theory of the firm regards
producers as having minimal market shares, and thus being absolute "price takers";
they produce up to the point at which marginal cost equals the uniform market price.
Since marginal cost is constant and below average unit cost in our model (as most
empirical studies have shown for manufacturing), this solution is clearly
inapplicable. Nor is the monopoly price/output criterion marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost - applicable, because in oligopoly, firms no longer confront static
individual demand curves.
The full cost, target price, or markup theory holds that firms determine average unit
cost at some standard operating capacity, and add a fixed percentage to arrive at a
price which is otherwise independent of demand and competitive pressures.
Although markup pricing has seemingly been confirmed repeatedly in interview
studies, there is a problem in applying it to our model.
We want to study markets with a differential cost structure resulting from different
investment strategies. If firms apply a rigid (and uniform) markup to costs, their
prices will also vary accordingly. High cost firms will therefore be condemning
themselves to losses of market share. It may be in their longer term interests to avoid
this by lowering the price. Low cost firms may be foregoing short term profits by
charging too low a price. Furthermore, a firm may be tempted to expand its market
share by price cutting, especially in periods of slack demand. Whether it will succeed,
however, depends on whether its competitors can or are willing to follow suit. This
obviously leads into the thicket of game theory, where neither a "kinked" demand
curve nor a static payoff matrix apply, but rather a "dynamic" payoff function as
given by equation (1).
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A general solution is evidently out of reach. A simplification is possible, however,
along lines sketched in a very suggestive paper by Williamson (1965). There he
argues that oligopolistic markets are characterized by two relatively stable states: a
state of high implicit inter-firm cooperation with high markups and little price
competition, and a state of minimal cooperation and low profit margins resulting
from price warfare. The dynamic system he proposes to capture this phenomenon
can be seen in retrospect to be an example of a cusp catastrophe. We will restrict the
following analysis to the high cooperation structure, and assume that prices change
in a continuous and stable manner in response to slowing varying changes in
competitive cost structures.
The problem of reconciling a markup approach with the tendency to a uniform price
level still remains. One solution for which there is considerable empirical evidence is
price leadership: one firm, usually the largest or oldest in the industry, sets prices
according to a strict markup formula, and the others more or less completely adjust to
this price. This would imply that the latter no longer operate according to a strict
markup. Moreover, the question of singling out the price leader and explaining why
this sometimes changes, still remains open. There are elements of a game and
information theoretic nature here which would carry us too far beyond the confines
of our present methodology. (Eiteman, 1960, has argued, however, that price
leadership is assumed by the most "mechanized" firm, Le., the one with the lowest
unit variable and highest unit fixed costs.)
Instead, we propose the following dynamic adjustment equation which appears to
capture the main aspects of the problem, and at the same time allows for shifts in the
price structure due to long-term changes in relative cost competitiveness. Let Pi be
the current price of the i-th firm and Pci its desired markup price. Let p be the
current average market price (weighted by market share). These two price "pegs" are
conceived as acting as "centers of attraction" for the current price in the following
manner:
(20)
where the p's are the logarithms of the corresponding price variables. A firm's price
is in equilibrium when it is the geometric mean of its markup and the average
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market price. If we neglect any variance in the delivery delays:
(21)
as can be seen by setting equation (20) equal to O. inserting equation (4) and
averaging over market shares. The dominant firm's price will always have the
greatest influence on the average price. and thus its markup price will indeed serve a
price leadership function. On the other hand. a small low cost firm can slowly begin
to pull the general price level down without departing so far from it as to initiate a
price war. If we regard market shares as changing significantly more slowly than
the adjustment of prices to their "equilibrium" values. then we can set fi = 0 to obtain
dldt C-p)= dldt(I f.p.) ;; I f.p·.
1 1 1 1
(22)
This implies that the average price level adjusts to average costs with a certain
(presumably high) characteristic speed. In "price equilibrium"
p = Pc (23)
so that strict markup pricing holds in the aggregate. even if it does not precisely hold
for each individual firm.
If we cease regarding market shares as constant. we can derive a more exact relation
for the dynamics of the aggregate price level by continuing to assume that price
dynamics are significantly more rapid than market share adjustments (the so-called
adiaba t ic approximation):
(24)
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The first term represents the shift to lower cost firms due to simple price competition.
The second represents the shift to higher cost firms in periods of high demand due to
their shorter delivery delays (assuming delivery delay and cost are normally
inversely correlated). The third term represents the rate of increase of average costs.
5. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL
The following Flowcharts (Figures 1 and 2) connect together the various subsystems
of the model described above. At this stage in the simulations, all reaction coefficients
(e.g. for prices, production level, etc.), tradeoff factors (e.g. between price and
delivery delay in equation (4», and the markup factor are assumed identical for all
firms in the industry. Although the demand growth "animals spirits" projections can
be left open as an additional degree of freedom, we concentrate for simplicity on
differences in the payback period (or equivalently in the desired maximum age of
equipment) in the following discussion of strategic interaction.
6. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
The above system was implemented as a model of sectoral behavior on a computer
using a Runge-Kutta-Merson subroutine for the solution of nonlinear differential
equations (NAGD02BBE). The program allows for numerical experimentation with up
to five different investment strategies simultaneously, and different exogenous rates
of growth of overall demand, nominal wages and best practice productivity. Capital
stock vintages are represented discretely by taking the average value of gross
investment over short intervals (one-half year in the following simulations).
Parameter values were initially selected to yield plausible time constants in the
various reaction equations. A systematic sensitivity analysis will be performed in the
near future.
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Figure 1 Dynamic Structure of Orders. Shipments, Prices, Costs, Delivery Delays,
Productivity and Cash Flow.
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Figure 2 Dynamic Structure of Investment Plans, Financing Constraints. and
Evolution of the Capital Stock.
136
The sectoral model can be run with two different financing modes in order to
investigate the influence of financial constraints on evolutionary performance. In
the first mode, firms can always realize their investment plans fully by borrowing on
an unrestricted capital market. Since no limit is imposed on the extent to which firms
can go into debt to finance investment, the "black hole" case of increasing debt ratios
is not ruled out. This requires that a profitability criterion be imposed which may be
at odds with the changes of relative market shares. Realistically, this should feed
back in the model on the willingness of sources of finance to continue to lend to such
firms. Since this would require a full-fledged model of capital markets, however, this
question was not pursued further along these lines. Instead, another financial mode
was introduced to characterize internal financing through cash flow and liquid
reserves. In this case, if cash flow exceeds desired gross investment. investment plans
are fully realized and the difference accrues to the liquid account (which earns
interest). In the reverse event, where cash flow falls short of desired gross
investment, investment plans can still be fully realized if sufficient funds are
available from the liquid account. If not, investment is rationed, as described above,
so that it can just be financed by current cash flow. This mode provides for an
automatic performance feedback on investment while allowing the pattern of
receipts and expenditures to differ over time.
In the following, two runs with essentially identical initial conditions, but differing
in investment mode, will be described. In the first run with unlimited external
financing, five firms or blocks of identical firms compete for market share with one
another, differing only with respect to their replacement policies. Each firm replaces
its oldest vintage when it has reached a specified age (here 10, 13, 16, 19, and 22
years). This is equivalent to differing payback periods when best practice
productivity is increasing at a constant exponential rate. The growth rate of overall
demand is exogenously given (3%) and is equal to the initial growth rates of each
firm. However, the rates change over time in response to variations in the rate of
capacity utilization they experience. The firms start the run with identical market
shares, prices, and capital stocks (a rectangular distribution spanning 20 years). It is
apparent that the firm with the shortest desired lifetime for its capital stock thereby
necessarily achieves a cost advantage over its competitors which translates into a
constantly growing market share (see Figure 3). Whether this is a profitable
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proposition is another question. however. Figure 5 shows the gross operating profit
rate on physical capital (at replacement value) as well as the profit rate obtained by
including interest income or expenditures, but net of depreciation (linear) in
relation to all assets (Le. including positive bank balances). It is clear that
profitability may suffer from an overhasty replacement program.
Although these runs are purely hypothetical exercises in evolutionary "optimization"
and are not meant, at this level, to describe a realistic market structure, they already
illustrate a very significant point. The interaction of firms pursuing diverse
investment strategies with differing vintage compositions of their capital stocks,
results in clear non-steady-state behavior of finn-level and aggregate variables (in
the present case with a periodicity of around 15 years), even though exogenously
given variables were chosen precisely to pennit such a growth steady state. This can
be seen for the gross profit rate (Figure 5), delivery delays (Figure 8) and desired and
realized capacity expansion rates (Figure 6).
The dynamics of price competition are shown in Figure 7, for the internal financing
case. The price leadership function of the largest firms is apparent, as is the
increasing inability of marginal finns to keep up with the market development due to
rising costs (until a radical cutback in their capital stocks allows their prices to fall
concurrently with their practical disappearance from the market).
The capital stock dynamics are among the most interesting features of the model.
Figures 9 and 10 show the ratios of average prime labor per unit output to the best
practice value, a surrogate for the average age of the capital stock for the two cases.
It is apparent that these values fluctuate even though the exogenous parameters
represent a growth steady state. To begin with, there is a sharp drop in this ratio as
firms discard their older initial vintages to attain their maximum desired age. An
"echo" effect in the fonn of a pronounced drop in the ratio can also be seen after 10,
13, 16, 19, and 22 years for finns 1 - 5 respectively. This is considerably less sharp the
second time around for finn 1 (at year 20). This ratio is not only a function of the
spread of the age distribution but also of its shape. This means that under
non-steady-state conditions it will also depend on past growth rates as well: high
growth rates in the past (other things being equal) leading to a younger capital
stock. The significance of this fact can be seen by comparing Figures 9 and 10, which
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differ only with respect to the financing mode. Although firm 1 aims at a 10 year
replacement policy and firm 2 a 13 year one, because firm 2 can devote more
financing to expansion in the second run. the difference between their ratios
narrows appreciably.
If we now return to the behavior of market shares under internal financing (Figure
4), one perceives that a reversal has taken place between firms 1 and 2 for market
leadership. This is due to the fact that, although firm 1 has a cost advantage due to its
younger capital stock, its failure to expand sufficiently due to a lack of internal
finance gives it a delivery delay disadvantage. Thus we see that the combination of
the ability to internally finance investment, and the relationship between capacity
and delivery delay. both enter crucially into the determination of optimum
replacement policy.
7. PROSPECfS FOR RJRTIIER RESEARCH
The above model is the first step in a research program aimed at modelling structural
change in historical time as an ongoing process, critically dependent on
microeconomic diversity and expectational dynamics deriving from fundamental
uncertainty. The next stage is to allow for true choice of best-practice technique and
learning-by-doing effects associated with a given technological trajectory (see Dosi.
Orsenigo and Silverberg, 1986). It is also intended to close the model in one and two
sectoral versions along the lines of a previous paper (Silverberg 1984) by
incorporating an unemployment-nominal wage growth relation.The possibility of
empirical analysis with this kind of non-steady-state vintage model (however, at an
aggregate level without self-organizational dynamics) has already been demonstrated
by Soete and Dosi (1983) and McIntosh (1986). It is hoped that in the near future
appropriate methods and data can be found to permit empirical analysis at the
disaggregated - market share and strategic decision making - level as well.
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Chapter 7
Technological Vintages and Substitution
Processes
B. JOHANSSON
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Structural Adjustments and Invariances in Industrial Sectors
An important aspect of Schumpeter's (1934) vision of the process of economic
development is that early initiators receive a premium for being forerunners. This
"extra profit" to innovators has the form of a temporary monopoly, based on specific
knowledge that they do not share with their competitors - or only share with a few of
them.
Assuming that such innovations occur continuously over time, or in time intervals
with varying periods of imitation, one should expect productivity and profits to be
unevenly distributed over the firms in a sector. High profit and productivity levels
would then be associated with the leaders and the lower levels with the followers.
In Sweden and Norway, information is available about profit and productivity
distributions over individual production units (establishments) with a fine sector
specification within the manufacturing industry. This type of data indeed confirms
that the economic reward to production units are "Schumpeter distributed", and that
such distributions have a characteristic form (see Johansson and Marksj1i, 1984;
Johansson and Str1imqvist, 1981).
For each given sector, not only the general form, but also the specific parameters of
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such distributions remain time invariant over long intervals. This property, which
has been examined and documented in detail for the period 1968-1984, is the result of
ongoing dynamic processes. The current essay outlines some preliminary models in
an attempt to explain the observed patterns. The focus is on the exit and entry of
production techniques and products in a sector. An earlier attempt to model these
processes can be found in Johansson and Holmberg (1982).
Innovations and utilization of technological knowledge in a sector appear in two
distinct forms; each establishment may renew its production technique. but it may
also adjust its old technique and develop new products. The effects of introducing new
products are analyzed within a framework related to Lancaster (1971). The
substitution between old and new products is compared and combined with the
dynamic substitution between old and new production techniques. In summary, the
study deals with dynamic processes which generate specific distributions of process
and product vintages associated with the observed profit and productivity
distributions.
1.2 Outline of the Study
In section 2, the above-mentioned form of observed profit distributions is described
and basic model elements are introduced. The representation of process (technique)
and product vintages are formally introduced.
Section 3 deals with the entry and exit of process vintages. Different assumptions
about the entry and exit dynamics generate different forms of the profit distribution
in a sector. This section concentrates on the assessment of such distribution effects of
small variations in assumptions.
Section 4 describes how product change with logistic substitution processes may help
to expl ain the steepness of empirically observed profit distributions. In the absence
of product evolution, technical change will generate profit distributions which are
too flat.
The paper ends with a summary describing the research directions which are pointed
out in this tentative investigation.
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2. PRODUCT AND PROCESS VINTAGES
2.1 The Form of Productivity and Profit Distributions
It is an intriguing fact that the distribution of productivity among establishments in
an industrial sector displays a shape which is approximately invariant over periods
of considerable length. Moreover. the general form of such distributions may be
fitted with rather good precision to a curve of logistic type.
To make the above statements more concrete. consider a sector with individual
production units i = 1.2..... Let Pi be the price of unit i's production. Xi' and let ci be
its unit cost of production. Then we may define
1T i = Pi - ci (2.1)
(2.2)
where 1T denotes gross profit per unit output and ll. the productivity. given that L
represents an appropriate factor of production. e.g.. labour input.
Imagine now that we arrange all units in descending order according to the size of 1T i
and ll.i' respectively. Let. in each case, 1Ti+l < 1Ti and ll.i+l < ll.i.We may then form the
following two cumulative distributions Z(1T i) and z(ll. i):
Z(1T k)= I x/x
i:!k
Z(ll.k) = I x/x
i~k
(2.3)
(2.4)
where x = I iX i denotes total production in the sector. The distribution in (2.3) is
illustrated in Figure 2.1. The associated distribution in (2.4) will have a similar form
and will be a scale transformation of the first. Under modest assumptions. the
1T -ranking of units will be equivalent with the ll. -ranking. and then we may write
1T i= ex. ll. i+E i' where E is a randomly distributed error term.
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Production level
x
Figure 2.1 Logistic distribution of gross profits over production capacity
The invariance of productivity distributions has been reported in Johansson and
Marksjl> (1984). In that case the productivity was defined as
where Hi denotes non-labour variable input costs and Li the number of employees in
production unit i. Over a range of sectors and economic regions, the following
relationship was shown to fit observed data in a statistically acceptable way:
(2.5)
where a2 > 0 translates the Il. -curve as time, t. increases. The coefficient al > 0
describes how the logarithm of the share of total employment with Il. > it decreases as
il increases.
The result in (2.5) illustrates a considerable structural invariance. This paper aims to
describe the processes which bring about this property. Another observation in
Johansson and Marksjl> (1984) is that the variation in TT /Pi is smal1 between pairs of
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years t and t+l, and with fixed price evaluations, this variation is even smaller. These
observations fonn a basis for treating the profitability and productivity differentials
as reflections of a vintage distribution. We also attempt to establish that such
differentials in an industry represent a combination of (i) production technique
vintages and (ii) product vintages.
2.2 Representation of Process Vintages
In the sequel we will assume that if a vintage index is attached to each production
unit in a sector, this index will represent a combination of the unit's process vintage
and product vintage. In this subsection, we assume that all units produce a similar
type of product and concentrate on production process vintages or differentials as
regards the production techniques applied in the sector.
Given the assumption above, the relation between a production unit's profit, 1T, and its
process vintage T, may be schematically described in the following way:
1T(T) =p - c(T)
C(T) = TC
(2.6)
where C is a constant, p denotes unit price and C (T) unit costs given technique T. We
may assume that the best practice technique at time t. T'" (t), is improved over time so
that T '" (t) > T'" (t+ /::,. ). If all investments are made with the current best practice at
each time, the T -index will indeed also function as a vintage index.
A production unit applying technique T also has a production capacity x( T), which
constrains current output so that x(T) ~ X(T ). Assume now that demand, Y, is given as
a function of time, t, and price
Y = Y(p,t)
and define excess demand. y. as
(2.7)
y(t) Y(p,t) - x(t) (2.8)
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One may also use (2.7) and (2.8) in respecifications of (2.6) to obtain the following
expressions (for each given point in time):
1T (1" .y) =p(y) - C (1" .y)
c(1" .y) =1"c(y).
At a later stage y is used to generate dynamic adjustments.
2.3 Product Attributes and Product Vintages
(2.6')
In this subsection. we present a framework within which we may distinguish
between old and new products. and the way in which new product vintages substitute
older vintages.
First. we introduce the concept of a product group I. In this group we identify a
product type by the amount 8/ of attribute j = 1.....m contained in one unit of the
product. Product is then characterized by the vector ei = (81i •...•8im)ERlm.Every
product in group I satisfies e/ i:;; 0 for all and eik > 0 for at least one k.
Following Lancaster (1971). we assume that the demand for products is derived from
customers' demand for attributes. We identify customer groups g = 1.2..... and for each
group we introduce a mapping B8 such that
(2.9)
where GI is the space of product vectors xI = {Xj} e G I' and where B8 describes how
customer group g may combine different products jel to obtain a vector 8 = B(xI) of
attributes.
We also assume that each customer group has preferences. defined by a preference
function u8 :
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At each point in time we may identify group g's budget mIg that constrains its
purchases of products je I. Demand may then be derived from the following decision
problem
max ug(Bg(xI»
subject to
m~ ~ I Plj
jeI
to obtain a demand function for each
where p = {Pj} • jeI and m = {mg}.
According to (2.12) the introduction of a new product type
(2. II)
(2.12)
may cause a process
such that Yi > 0 as the result of Pi < Pj for all j F i, and m> O. Naturally. such a
change implies that other products are substituted partially or completely. as
analyzed in section 4. There we also show that if a new product k satisfies ek= >. ei
with >-. > I, the product vintages k and
vintages.
may be modelled as two different process
3. ENlRY AND EXIT OF PROCESS VINTAGES
3.1 Substitution Between Production Techniques
The change of a sector's vintage structure is generated by (i) entry and (ii) exit of
production techniques. The first process is caused by two types of investments. New
capacities embodying a new technique may be created, and existing capacities may be
improved, by changing the technique from TOto T. Let q(T 0-T; t) denote the annual
cost per unit capacity, associated with an investment that changes the technique
from TOto T. For a new production unit, the same cost is denoted by q(T; t). With this
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notation a profit-motivated investment criterion can be formulated as follows:
(3.1)
where ,. 0 = ,. (to) and ,. * =,. (t.) represents vintages associated with time to and t.,
respectively. In fact, (3.1) should also apply for TT (,. ,,.0) where ,.* > ,. > ,.0, a result
which obtains if capacity ~ x (,.*) is added to an existing capacity x(,. 0).
In established vintage analysis (Salter, 1960; Johansen, 1972 etc.), one assumes that
old capacities with technique ,. 0 are removed at a time such that TT ( ,. O,t) = O.
Following observations reported in Strl>mquist (1983), we assume here that capacity
removal is a gradual phenomenon with an increased removal frequency as process
techniques become economically obsolete. This exit process is described by an exit
function e such that
e(t) = e(TT (,. ,t» ~ 0
ad aTT < o. (3.2)
Given these preliminaries, let us study a case in which the sector has only one type of
product, in which the price path p(t) is given, and y ~ 0 at all points in time.
Employing these assumptions we may express e as functions of,. and 1. Next, consider
a division of the total production capacity into shares, <7 k(O) at time t = 0, such that
L<7 k(O) = 1; at time t the technique is denoted by "k(t).
The removal in technique class k is ekxk = e ("k)xk' Suppose, as an initial example,
that capacity with the new technique ,. * is introduced into each class as a proportion
of expected change in market-clearing capacity, expressed by
v= «y, 0 ~ « ~ 1, (3.3)
if Y > 0 and v o otherwise. The capacity change in xk is then described by
(3.4)
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for O'k = O'k(O). When y and Ek are approximately constant, (3.4) yields
xk(t) :::: xk(O) exp{-Ekt} + (a.YO'k/Ek)(l-exprEkt)) so that x(t) = L xk(t) approaches a.y/E
and Ek approaches E = E(T*).
Naturally. the process in (3.3)-(3.4) generates a change such that xk(t)/x(t)
approaches 0' k(0) and T k (t) = T * for all k as t expands. The result is a flat technique
distribution.
The above solution represents an extreme case which corresponds to a technically
stagnating sector. However, the cases observed in (2.5) imply an unchanged relative
position of the various technique classes k. Such a change process becomes closer if
(3.4) is exchanged for
'0 °x k = -E(Tk)X k(t)
~*k = - xOk
xk(t) = xO k(t) + x*k(t)
(3.5)
where xO k (t) and x*k(t) denotes the capacities within class k employing technique
TOk = Tk (0) and T*, respectively. For class k = 1,...•N-I (classes established before t=O)
Tk(t) will gradually approach T*; Tk(t) = T* +(TOk - T*) exp (-Ekt). provided that
E(Tk) = Ek·
At t = 0 we let N denote the new class which is introduced according to the following
process:
(3.6)
{
> 0 ifn(T*,y) > q(T*)
a.(T*)
= 0 otherwise
where q(T*) denotes the current capital cost associated with investment in capacity
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of vintage l' * .
If we assume y ~ 0 in (3.3), we need only add e (1' * ,t) = 0 to obtain
T
x*N(T) =f a. (T * ,t)y(t)dt.
o
Where ct.{1'*,t) = Ci. and y is constant. this yields a smooth increase of x*N/x =
(3.7)
X*N(t) / (x*N(t) + x(O». Since each other class substitutes technique 1'k and replaces it
with l' *. the long term result is a flat profit curve.
However, (3.5) and (3.6) still do not produce a profit pattern of the kind described in
(2.5) and Figure 2.1. In order to model a process which may generate such a structure,
it is also necessary to consider technical change as an ongoing process in the sense
that the best practice technique evolves as time goes by. A simple way of describing
this is to assume that the best practice is improved at successive points in time in such
a way that we obtain l'* (0) > 1'*(ta) > 1'*(tb) etc. at 0 < ta < tb . The l' * -values may be
selected as points on the path l' * (t) = l' * * + 4> exp {->. t}, >. > O. for the different dates of
technical innovation. where l' * * denotes a lower bound for the best practice, given
by physical constraints on the given production process.
First, we denote the best practice class at time by N(t) and apply formula (3.6) to the
development of x*N(l)' Second, we change (3.5) to read
Xk =-e (1' k)xk(t)
i *k =8kCi. (1'*)x *N(1'* (t->'N),t->'N)o'k
o ~ 8k < 1 ; >'N ~ 0
(3.5')
The formulation in (3.5') reflects the assumption that technical renewal in
established production units occurs as imitation of the technique applied in units of
vintage N(t->. N)' The parameter >. N then has the nature of an imitation lag and 8 k
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represents the intensity of technical adoption.
At time t i1:; tb' the development of vintage N(ta), ta < tb is switched over from process
(3.6) to (3.5'). Combining (3.6) and (3.5'), we may consider variations in the steepness
of the distribution curve in Figure 2.1. Let Z(T) denote the proportion of capacities
employing techniques T ~ T. We may measure steepness as the size of al > 0 in the
equation
which approximates the actual pattern, or simply as the ratio
I 1T(T)X(T) / I 1T(T)X(T).
T~T T>T
(3.8)
(3.9)
Remark 1. Assume that the change pattern is generated by (3.6) together with
(3.5'), and that new techniques are initiated at successive dates 0 < ta < tb< ....
Then the following conditions obviously cause increased steepness, as measured
by (3.8) or (3.9), of the profit distribution curve, provided that cx.(T"') > 0:
(i) A high level of excess demand, y > 0, and a low or zero rate of exit, e (T '" (t», for
the best practice technique, T '" (t);
(ii) a low imitation intensity 8 k and a high imitation lag Xk together with a low rate
We may also conclude that a flatter, less steep, distribution curve is generated if the
conditions (i)-(ii) in the remark are reversed. This leads to the following remark
which characterizes the ultimate effects of technical change.
Remark 2. Consider the three different change processes described by (3.4); (3.5)
and (3.6); (3.5'), (3.6) and T '" (t) = T"'''' + ~ exp {-X t}. In the long term all three
processes lead to flat profit distributions.
Hence, from a technical change or vintage renewal perspective, we may conclude
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that a gradual reduction of steepness of the profit distribution (for an industry
characterized by a given product type) reflects that the industry is ageing
tec hn 0 10 gi c all y.
3.2 Adjustment Mechanisms of Technical Change
The introduction of new vintages is stimulated by a positive excess demand, y = Y-x, as
described in (3.6). Excess demand is increased over time if Y(p,t) grows. Such an
increase may be exogenously driven by time, e.g., by the emergence of new customer
groups. In particular, we have assumed that Y' = aYI ap < 0, which means that a
gradual change p < 0 will generate a continuing growth in demand. Setting Y
(a y I ap)p we can see that p < 0 stimulates a positive excess demand, since y = y - x.
First consider the long term process of price changes. Observe first that we have
assumed that T· (t) = T·· + + exp {-X t} which yields
;.. = -X + exp{-M}. (3.10)
Observe next, that from (2.6) we have 1T (p, T) = P - T c. Moreover, from (3.1) we have
that technique T· is introduced only if 1T. - q(T·) =q~ O. Hence, observing that ir· =
P+ X+ exp {-X t} C we may formulate the following conclusion:
Remark 3. Given (2.6), (3.1) and (3.10), the following price adjustment satisfies
the investment criterion for the successively available best practice:
p= q-X+ exp{-Xt) c.
For q := 0, the price will be reduced at a gradually retarded pace until technical
change terminates.
From (3.6) and (3.5') we may approximate the exit process with E(p) such that
N(t)
E(p) = L ek(p)xk
k=1
where Ek(P) = e(1T(p,Tk». From (2.6) and (3.2) we may derive aelap < 0 so that
(3.11 )
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where ek(p) = e(1T(p,Tk»' From (2.6) and (3.2) we may derive ae/ ap < 0 so that
aE/ap < O. (3.12)
Remark 4. The price adjustment in Remark 3 satisfies the investment criterion
and creates investment opportunities by intensifying the exit process due to
(3.12). The resulting change process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
We may observe that the statement in Remark 4, and the corresponding description
in Figure 3.1, constitute open statements, Le., the system is not closed. Without
entering any penetrating analysis of the dynamics, we outline the nature of the
"short term" price adjustments that must complete the "long term" change pattern,
which is described in Remark 3.
7'" = ->-.~ exp{->-.t} <0
1
I €k (p) > 0 I IY = (aY / ap)p > 0
Figure 3.1 Technology-induced price adjustments
Let us write max {O,y} = F N(y), p
{ >OifY>Y~Of(y) = 0 if y = Y
< 0 otherwise
f = aflay > O.
f(y). and assume tentatively that
(3.13 )
Returning to (2.8) we observe that y(p,t) Y(p,t) - x(t). Using (3.6), (3.5') and (3.11)
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we may write (for zero imitation lag)
y= Y'I> - a.F N(y) - I eka.x"'N O'k+E(P)
k<N
(3.14)
where Y' = aY/ ap < 0 and aY / at = O. The condition y = 0 may be selected as one kind of
equilibrium. We may also consider a situation with both y = 0 and I> = 0 as an
equilibrium. The strongest equilibrium property obtains when we combine y = 0 with
the technology-induced price adjustment in Remark 3.
Remark 5. At any given state, let H = a.F N(y) + x"'N I Bka.O'k' Then it follows from
(3.14) that the equilibrium condition y= 0 is generated by a price adjustment
process
I> = [H - E(p)] ! Y'.
·We may conclude that this is a more complicated adjustment mechanism than the
one in (3.13).
To verify whether the last statement is true, we may note that the equilibrium price
adjustment in the remark is f:(y,x 1' ... ,X N-1 ,x '" N) -+ I> which reacts not only to y but to
the entire vintage pattern.
Remark 6. From (3.14) we may conclude that a situation with y p = 0 obtains if
(i) Y = O,aY / at = 0, EN(P) = 0, and if each Bk is a function of p such that Bk(p)
Part (i) in the remark means that capacity which is removed from old vintages is also
replaced by exactly the same amount of best practice. Observe first that I> = 0 if
(H-E(p» = O. Next, we observe that O'kx"'N = O''''Nxk' From y = 0 and EN(P) = 0 it follows
that i"'N = a.y = O. Hence, H - E(p) = 0 if for each k, Bk(p)a.O''''N = Ek(P) which implies
that each xk=O. This together with ay / at = 0, ~"'N = P= 0 implies that O''''N = x"'N!x is
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constant.
Part (ii) makes use of the fact that if ek(p,x*N)o"'N xk« + «yxk/x - Ek(P)xk = 0 for each
k, then H - E(p) in Remark 5 will be zero. Hence, y = p = 0, and y may remain positive
to generate a growth in x*N.
The two different conditions in Remark 6 both require that the imitation intensity,
e k(P), is balanced against the rate of exit, Ek(P). With condition (ii) it also follows that
a steady growth in demand, together with a slow exit rate for old vintages, will
correspond to a low imitation intensity, and all this will induce an increased
steepness of the profit distribution.
4. ENlRY AND EXIT OF PRODUCTS
4.1 Product Substitution
Subsection 2.3 constitutes the starting-point of the following analysis describing how
a new product may gradually acquire an increased market share.
First, consider the mapping B8 in (2.9). In order to obtain a simple analytical
structure, we assume here that B8 = B is the same for all customer groups g, and that B
is an irreducible matrix built up by a non-negative attribute vector e i for each
product type i. Bence, we may specify (2.9) in the following form
(2.9')
where z ER m I is the attribute vector a customer obtains by using (purchasing) given
amounts of each product as specified in the product vector XI. Next, assume that the
preference functions are well behaved: u8 is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and
differentiable with all first order derivatives positive. Given this assumption,
together with assumption about B in (2.9'), we may conclude that the demand
functions in (2.12) are upper semi-continuous (Berge, 1959). In addition, each
Yi-function is continuous if there is no product i EI whose attribute vector is a linear
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combination of some other attribute vectors in the product group (see, e.g. Johansson,
1978). In this case, we can describe the solutions to (2.11) as
Xig = II- ig(P )mg/Pi
x· = I ,X,g1 g 1 (4.1)
where II- ig is a continuous function of prices and expresses the share of group g's
budget (for market I), which is allocated to the purchase of product i (compare with
Batten and Johansson, 1985). Hence, II- i-values represent market shares. Summing
over customer groups (industrial sectors, households etc.) we may write II- i(p)m/Pi=
I g II-ig(p)mg/Pi for m = I m g and describe the change in II-i as
(4.2)
where ki may vary over time. If ki remains constant, (4.2) equals Verhulst-Pearl's
equation which describes a logistic growth path of II- i (or logistic decline pattern).
The process in (4.2) is generated by changes in attribute vectors and/or in relative
prices. If these changes are "steady over time", ki may remain constant.
The conditions given by (2.11), (2.9') and the associated assumptions about Band ug
imply that each II- ig increases as Pi is reduced relative to other prices in the
commodity group I. With this property we may consider the following description of
the development path of II- i when the market consists of only two products, 1 and 2:
(4.3)
or In xI/x2 = aD + alt + b(PI/P2) - In(PI/P2)' where an is a constant, al ~ 0, b ~ 0, and
denotes time. Such a function describes the introduction of new products and
usually performs better than just In II- 1/11- 2 = aD + al t, which is the standard
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introduction equation. If price changes are the only driving force, we have al O.
Fonnula (4.3) corresponds to a case in which ki in (4.2) satisfies k l = kl (PI.P2)'
4.2 Properties of the Substitution Process
The vector 8 i = (8 i l ,.... 8 im) describes the amount of attributes obtained from one unit
of product i. From (4.1) we can see that customer group
attributes by combining products
obtains the following
(4.4)
and zi(p)g = 8 i m g/Pi is the attribute amount that obtains if the whole budget mg is
allocated to product i. Given these elaborations. we may illustrate the connection
between product and process innovation.
Remark 7. Let 8 > 0 and assume that products 1 and 2 belong to the same product
group (8 1~ R mI and 8 2 ~ R mI)' Then a reduction of PI relative to P2 made possible
by technical change in the production of product 1 is equivalent with a product
improvement of 1. such that 8 1 is changed to e1 = X8 I. X > 1, while prices are
unchanged.
The proof of the above statement is straightforward. If PI is reduced to PI' then zl(p)I
> z I (p)g. where Pj= Pj except for j = 1. If 8 1 is changed to e1. zl (p)g > z I (p)g where
zl(p)g= X8 1m g/PI = 8 1mg/PI if X/PI= lIPI' This completes the proof.
Hence. if a process improvement allowing for a price reduction requires the same
efforts as a product quality increase. then the two forms of technological change are
equivalent.
We may observe that if the price of one commodity. I. is reduced sufficiently. product
1 with 8 1 > 0 will push another product 2 out from the market by reaching a point
'"p I such that
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This brings us to a generalized case of product superiority.
Remark 8. If product l's vector e 1 is a linear combination of e2, ... ,ek, then our
earlier assumptions leading to (4.1) imply that there is a price P*l and a small
scalar E > 0 such that P*l +E makes IJ. g l(. ..P*l +E) = 0 and such that P*l-E brings
about IJ.g l(. ..P*l- E) = 0 for all i = 2,... ,k, and IJ. g l (. ..P*l- E) > O.
Observe first that the IJ. i-functions in (4.1) are solutions to (2.11). Remark 8 tells us
that with linear dependence the IJ. i-functions have discontinuity points which should
generate discontinuities of the Yi-functions describing commodity demand. The
statement follows from the linearity of the B operator and the nature of preference
functions ug which imply that at P*l
IJ.g(P2 ,···,Pk)ei/Pi
i
and the equality sign changes to ">" for P*l - E and to "<" for P*l + E.
Remark 8 is important indeed if we recognize that product 1 may represent a new or
improved product entering the market of an industry. Then it remains to ask the
question: should we expect new (and superior) products to capture all buyers in a
customer· group in one shot? Observations indicate that we should expect a smooth
logistic introduction curve. With our current setting this may be obtained by the
following assumption. When a superior product 1 attracts a fraction of a customer
group 1, we assume that the information about the new product's attributes is spread
in an ordinary diffusion process. Let mg be the budget of the group of active buyers
at a point in time, and let Mg be the potential budget of all customers in group g. Then
we obtain
(4.5)
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and PI x I will develop accordingly as will II. I as a fraction of the total market.
4.3 Product Substitution and Profit Distributions
The supenonty of a new product, as described in preceding sections, makes it possible
for the product to gradually squeeze out other products at a price that guarantees
high profits. At the same time, earlier product vintages will be sold at gradually
reduced prices as long as they have not left the market. In particular, the possibility
of repetitively introducing new and adjusted products means that the process of
improving production techniques may be repeated over and over again, and this will
prolong the periods during which we can observe the profit distribution of logistic
shape in each industry and industrial subsector as is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
We shall describe this relation between product substitution and profit distributions
diagramatically. In figure 4.1 we describe the growing share of a new product (J I =
x IlL iXi. Between time ta and tb this share has increased from (] I (ta) to (] I (tb ).
L-__--+ ---\ • Time
Fiiure 4,1 Introduction of a new product
In Figure 4.2a and 4.2b we illustrate the effects on the profit distribution of the
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development described in Figure 4.1. We should also observe that during the gradual
increase of 0 l' the production technique will also be improved successively in new
capacities introduced to produce product 1.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
~-~
1
Figure 4.2 Effects on the profit distribution of product substitution
We may now finally comment on the reason for specifying different customer
groups. By recognizing that different groups use a product for different functions, it
becomes natural to assume that they evaluate the attributes of a product differently.
Hence, they may have distinctly different preferences. This helps to explain why
"superior" products usually do not conquer the entire market; they are only superior
with regard to certain customer groups but not to others.
5. CONCLUSION
In section 4 we noticed the existence of discontinuities which could be the source of
dramatic changes in the industrial structure. Such phenomena need thorough
investigations. However, one also needs to inquire why we are able to observe clear
regularities and invariances in the process of industrial change.
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The above remarks are also relevant for the exercises in section 3. It is quite clear
that the self-regulating price adjustments in (3.13) and Remark 5, together with (3.5)
and (3.6) will produce fluctuations or cycles with cyclic variation in p, x*N and E(p).
In particular,
. .
the combination of the technology-induced price path p = q-
A 4> exp {-At} C and the excess demand-induced price mechanism in (3.13) together
with Remark 5 constitute competing price mechanisms; any interaction between the
two will produce oscillations along the time axis. Such phenomena need to be
examined with a stronger apparatus than the one used in this outline.
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Chapter 8
Log-Linear Relative Dynamics:
Unification of Theories
M.SONIS
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade there has been an increasing tendency towards the theoretical
unification of different branches of the social sciences. One field of interest in this
universal process is the unification of four different theories - innovation diffusion
theory, economic utility theory, urban/regional relative dynamics and ecological
competition theory - which had previously developed independently without much
interaction. This paper aims to review briefly the progress made to date, and to
demonstrate the mutual interdependence of the above-mentioned theories. We shall
also describe the nature of the ongoing research in this area.
Innovation diffusion theory, which originates from cultural anthropology (Steward
1963), obtained its essential push from Hligerstrand's pioneering work on the
modelling of diffusion processes (Hligerstrand 1952). Hligerstrand constructed a
theoretical framework based on the complementarity of the contagion and
hierarchical effects, and on the important notion of a "mean information field" for
adopters of an innovation. But the analytical description of the diffusion process -
based on the Verhulst (1838) logistic differential equation - has been very poor until
now, something scarcely realized by investigators (see Brown 1981). Important
progress came with the consideration of the dynamics among competitive (i.e.,
exchangeable and mutually exclusive) innovations in time and space (Sonis 1981,
1983a, 1983b).
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The derivation of the system of log-linear differential equations of the innovation
diffusion process permitted a deeper understanding of the mechanism of an
innovation spread: the description of different types of competition between
innovations; the study of the asymptotical behaviour of solutions which resulted in
the derivation of the competitive exclusion principle; and the introduction of the
influence of an active environment, which smooths out the extreme action of the
competitive exclusion of innovations, leading to a more balanced distribution of
innovations between adopters.
The innovation diffusion process overshadows the process of the individual's choice,
which is the main determinant of the speed of innovation spread. While the innova-
tion diffusion theory concentrates on the behaviour of alternative innovations
(macro viewpoint), the models of individual choice are connected with the
description and explanation of the behaviour of individuals (micro viewpoint). The
interconnections between the choice behaviour of individuals and the competitive
behaviour of alternative innovations ougbt to present dual, mutually complementary
sides of human activities. Analytically, this duality lies in the fact that the system of
log-linear differential equations of the diffusion process has solutions which may be
constructed as the choice probabilities for dynamic individual choice models (Sonis
1984a).
Futhermore, the dynamic extensions of the well-known multinomial Logit and Dogit
models correspond to a totally antagonistic competition between alternatives, Le. to
the simplest case of competition. The analytical similarity between the static Logit
and Dogit models (Domencich and McFadden 1975, Gaudry and Dagenais 1979) and
their dynamic counterparts (Sonis 1983c) allows for the use of the same type of
statistical evaluation methods in the static and dynamic cases. Conceptually, however,
the models are different. The random utility choice Logit and Dogit models are based
on the principle of individual utility maximization, while their dynamic counterparts
are based on a more realistic accounting of an individual's expectations of future
gains, on the incorporation of interactions, imitation and learning processes among
adopters, and on the intervention of external forces of an active environment which
changes the accessibility of alternatives for the adopters.
In the field of urban/regional dynamics. Hudson (1970, 1972) appears to have been
the first to use interaction models for studying population growth and migration in a
two-region urban system. Curry (1981) examined the structure of labor occupations
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under the effects of geographical competition for recruits with the formal use of the
ecological competition theory. Recently Dendrinos outlined a new urban/regional
dynamics based on a detailed elaboration of interconnections between theoretical
urban dynamics, ecological competition theory and bifurcation theory (in a series of
papers, resulting in the book "Urban Evolution" by Dendrinos and Mullally 1985).
The interpretation of innovation diffusion theory in terms of interregional
competition describes the behaviour of a homogeneous "regional resource" (which
in reality can be population, income, production, taxes etc ... ) relatively distributed
and redistributed among several regions. In this scheme interaction among regions
describes the input of each region into the relative growth of the others, whereas the
competitive exclusion of regions explains the relative regional growth and decline
(Sonis 1984b). The competitive exclusion of multiregional dynamics is balanced by
the action of external interventions. such as the introduction of national policies or
regional development programmes, governmental restrictions on regional autonomy,
fiscal and institutional decentralization etc.... The presence of external interventions
in regional dynamics generates environmental niches which support and preserve
the special type of regional behaviour within an interregional system.
The most interesting fact is that innovation diffusion theory is analytically similar to
Volterra's treatment of multi-species "conservative" ecological associations (Scudo
and Ziegler 1978). Volterra constructed the conservative ecological dynamics in a
manner similar to classical mechanics: the absolute multi-species population growth
is caused by a non-zero "self-growth" of each species and by the multi-species
interaction. in such a way that the value of total interaction is equal to zero. The main
mathematical property underlying Volterra's conservative ecological dynamics is
that such dynamics can be derived from Hamilton's variational principle; I.e., that
ecological evolution corresponds in fact to a constant value of a quantity Volterra
called "vital action". Thus, Volterra's conservative ecological association can be
handled with much the same canonical treatment as the classical mechanics of
material systems. But biologists soon realized that Volterra's absolute growth
conservative ecological dynamics. while being of great mathematical interest. had
severe limitations as a representation of nature: for an equilibrium to exist the
ecological association must contain an even number of different species (which is
difficult to accept from an ecological viewpoint).
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Consideration of relative rather than absolute growth, a problem Volterra never
addressed, immediately removes the peculiarities in the behaviour of the
multi-species ecological association. The relative growth (such as in the innovation
diffusion theory or in relative urban/regional dynamics) means a zero self-growth
of each species and also the automatic fulfilment of Volterra's conservation condition
for the ecological multi-species association. This in tum implies the derivation of
relative ecological dynamics from the variational principle of the stationarity of
cumulative entropy similar to Volterra's "action" in absolute growth conservative
ecological associations (Dendrinos and Sonis 1986). Thus, Volterra's fifty year old
studies lend new insights into the construction of a new theory of relative dynamics.
The following is a summary of this paper. In section 2, a review of the mathematical
theory of innovation diffusion process is presented. Special attention is given to the
substantial interpretation of the analytical properties of the mathematical model.
This also has the advantage of demonstrating how previously unnoticed properties of
familiar models can be revealed when new methods are applied to them. In section 3,
new dynamic individual choice models are derived, as dynamic extensions and
generalizations of the static multmomial Logit and Dogit models. An important aspect
is the exchange of the principle of utility maximization for a more realistic
assumption of interaction among individuals. In section 4, an application of the
above-mentioned theories to interregional dynamics is demonstrated. Interregional
competition is described as a result of a collision between the action of the entropy
maximization principle and the entropy minimization principle for the relative
distribution of a "regional resource" among regions; the former presents the
competitive exclusion of regions due to competition, while the latter presents the
process of regional equalization due to the action of external interventions. Finally,
in section 5, the connections between Volterra's "conservative" ecological associa-
tions and innovation diffusion dynamics are revealed. As a result, the derivation of
the differential equations of relative ecological dynamics is obtained, based on the
variational principle of the stationarity of cumulative entropy.
2. INNOVATION SPREAD
To start with, consider a set of N exchangeable, mutually exclusive innovations whose
dynamics are governed by a system of log-linear differential equations
dy.(t) N
_1__ =Yi(t) 2: aijYj(t).
dt j=1
N
2:y.(t) = 1.
. 1 JJ=
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i = 1,2...•N. (1)
(2)
Here Y = (y 1.y 2.· .. 'YN) is the vector of relative proportions of adopters of each type
from the set of N innovations. and the interaction matrix A = (aij) describes the
influence of each innovation on the relative change of all other innovations. The
derivation of the system (1), (2) is based on the analysis of information flows between
adopters of different innovations. which generate social interaction between
individual behaviour of adopters (Sonis 1981). Due to condition (2) of relative growth.
the interaction matrix A = (aij) must be antisymmetric:
One can interpret this antisymmetry in the following way; each pair of innovations i
and j participates in an antagonistic zero-sum game. with the interaction coefficients
aij being the payoff (expectation of gain) for the ith innovation. This interpretation
immediately implies the competitive exclusion principle. If the kth innovation is a
"winner" in all antagonistic games against all other innovations such that
(3)
then in the long run all adopters will accept only the kth innovation. Thus. in the
long run. competitive exclusion will result in the final distribution of adopters of the
form
Yk = I; Yj = 0, j-"=k.
which corresponds to the competitive exclusion vector Ek (0 .....0.1.0, ....0).
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These heuristic considerations are justified by a local stability analysis of the
dynamic equilibrium. It is possible to prove that the anti symmetry of the interaction
matrix A implies the existence of competitive exclusion equilibrium states Ek•
k=I.2,....N and that condition (3) - the strong positivity of the kth row of the matrix A -
is the condition for asymptotical stability of a competitive exclusion equilibrium
(Sonis 1983a).
Although this asymptotical behaviour is quite simple, the behaviour of a solution far
from the equilibrium is considerably complicated. as it depends on the structure of
the interaction among innovations. The simplest type of interaction among
innovations is given by the interaction potentials ak' k= I .2....N. so that the interaction
between each pair of innovations i and j is equal to the difference between their
potentials:
The existence of interaction potentials implies that the total interaction for each
closed chain of innovations i.j.k,....m.i is equal to zero:
aij + ajk + ... + lImi = O.
This means that each subset m of N innovations participates in a non-cooperative
antagonistic zero-sum game. i.e., competition among innovations is totaIly
antagonistic. Moreover. the existence of the interaction potentials leads to the explicit
solution of the system (1).(2):
Yi(t) = Yi(O) exp (ait)/L yj(O) exp (ajt),
j
i=I,2.....N. (4)
In general. when interaction potentials do not exist, the structure of competition
corresponds to a different type of cooperative game; moreover. the complete analysis
of competition among innovations is based on a breakdown of general competition
into totaIly antagonistic competitions among smaIler subsets of innovations (Sonis
1984a).
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It is important to underline that in reality the competitive exclusion of innovations is
usually smoothed out by the action of an active social and physical environment. This
changes the behaviour of innovations and their adopters implicitly, by filtering and
directing or intensifying the information flows between adopters and innovations;
and explicitly, by physical, social, cultural restrictions and prohibitions, or support
and stimulation. The active environment presents the external forces which
change the accessibility of the innovations and so changes the distribution of
innovations among adopters. The action of such external perturbations can be
presented with the help of a stochastic matrix S = (Sjj)' whose coefficients Sjj are the
probabilities for the adopter of the ith innovation to reject this innovation, and
instead adopt the jth innovation under pressure from the active environment.
Therefore the transformation U(t) = Y(t) S converts the competitive exclusion
dynamics Y(t) into the more balanced dynamics U(t) influenced by the action of
external interventions. Moreover, this transformation simultaneously transfers the
competitive exclusion equilibrium states Ek into the balanced equilibrium states EkS
which are the vector-rows of the matrix S.
In the case of the existence of interaction potentials, the totally antagonistic
dynamics (4) are transformed into balanced dynamics of the type
N N
Uj(t) = 2:: SOjCOexp (aot) / 2:: Cexp (aot). (5)
0IJJ J .IJ JJ= J=
Thus, the influence of external forces by means of the stochastic redistributional
matrix opens up the way for the construction of new innovation diffusion models.
This is achieved by multiplying the adopter's distribution of some original model by
stochastic redistributional matrices representing various types of active environ-
ments.
The above-mentioned properties of innovation diffusion dynamics (1),(2) can be
transferred to the more general model:
tJy/tJr = Yj 2:: YrtJ/tJr(Vjj) (6)
j
I
.1
!I
I:
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where the matrix V = (vij) presents the cumulative influence of the ith innovation on
the adoption of the jth innovation. Here the cumulative interaction Vij between
innovations and depends on changeable characteristics in space and time
attributes of these innovations, and various socio-economic characteristics of the
adopters; aI ar denotes the directional derivative in the arbitrary direction r in
the space of alI explanatory variables and space-time parameters. The transferred
properties are: antisymmetry of the cumulative interaction matrix V, the existence of
competitive exclusion equilibria Ek • and the antagonistic games interpretation of
various types of competition. In the case of the existence of cumulative interaction
potentials Vi' such that Vij = Vi - Vj' system (6) obtains the explicit solution
o , 0
Yi = Yi exp vii L. Yj exp Vj
j
under an initial distribution of adopters o 0 0 0Y = (Yl, YZ· .. ·• YN)'
(7)
This solution provides
the basis for constructing a dynamic extension of the Logit model of random utility
choice (see section 3).
The general (non log-linear) innovation diffusion models
2:: y. = 1
. J
J
i=1.2 .....N. (8)
where the non-linear functions Fri can also be transformed into the form (Sonis
1983c):
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alar (Yj) = Yj 2; Yj alar [Vj(Yl.Y2'···.YN) -v/Yl.Y2·· .. 'YN)]
J
2:\= 1.
j
(9)
With the help of cumulative interaction potentials
general innovation diffusion explains many diffusion phenomena and gives a much
more realistic description of the innovation spread.
3. DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
The interconnection between innovation diffusion theory and individual choice
behaviour models is based on the interpretation of the distribution of adopters among
innovations as an individual's probabilities of alternative choices (innovations).
From this viewpoint. the choice decisions are not static but evolve over time. and the
individual's choice is essentially influenced by the interaction between individual
behaviours. This section sets out to derive the dynamic extensions and generalizations
of the well-known static multinomial Logit and Dogit models of random utility choice.
The dynamic extension of the Logit model appears in the case of the innovation
diffusion process, and it is associated with the existence of cumulative interaction
potentials. In this case. the system of differential equations describing the dynamics
of probabilities of individual choice between N alternatives, takes the form
ay./iJr = y. " y. (av·/ar -av·/ar)I IL;- J I J'
J
LY' = 1
. J
J
with the explicit solution (7).
i=I.2.....N, (10)
By analogy with the static multinomial Logit model (Domencich and McFadden 1975),
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one may interpret the cumulative interaction potentials vi as the "systematic"
components of individual utilities. Furthermore, the interactions Vij = vi - Vj are the
utilities of transition from the alternative i to j, and av / ar are the dynamic
marginal utilities, which represent the expectations of future gain.
Expression (10) means that the probability Yi increases if
LYj (av/ar-av/ar) > O.
j
This means that the individual compares the alternative i with all other alternatives j,
not by comparing the utilities vi and Vj only, but also by comparing the dynamic
marginal utilities av / ar and av / ar. Moreover, the consideration of expected
transitional utilities only is not sufficient. The individual observes the choice of
other individuals and takes into account how many individuals are using the other
alternatives. Thus, the term y/ av / ar - av/ ar) gives the measure of transitional
expected growth in utility, and the degree of influence of adopters of alternative j on
the decision to change from alternative i to j.
Such :l description of individual choice behaviour necessitates exchanging the
principle of individual utility maximization (which is the logical basis for the
derivation of the static Logit model), for a more appropriate choice principle which
optimizes the sum of dynamic marginal utilities weighted by the distribution of the
alternatives among individuals. Thus, an individual cannot be considered as an
egoistic "homo economicus" choosing a suitable alternative on the basis of a principle
of utility maximization, but rather as a partially altruistic creature, whose imitative
and learning behaviour corresponds to the influence and interaction of other
individuals. (It is interesting to note that the incorporation into the static Logit model
of time, social interaction and utility maximization, transforms it to the mathematical-
ly intractable dynamic model (see De Palma and Lefevre, 1983, p. 108)). This
conceptualization of individual choice behaviour is also found in a wider frame of
general choice models of the type (6), (8) and (9) (Sonis 1983c).
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As pointed out in the Introduction, external interventions (the active social and
physical environment) alter individual choice behaviour by changing the
accessibility of the alternatives. The stochastic redistributional matrix S = (Sjj)'
describing the intervention of external forces upon individual choice behaviour,
allows for the following interpretation: Sjj is the probability of an individual
rejecting alternative i and instead adopting alternative j under the influence of
external forces.
Introduction of external interventions into the dynamic individual choice models of
the types (6), (8), (9), (10) through the transformation U = YS generates new dynamic
extensions of the individual choice models, co.r~sponding to different types of
external interventions.
For example, we obtain a redistributional stochastic matrix S of the special form
(1 +sl )/s s2/s
sl/s (1+s2/s
S=
sl/s s2/s
where s = ~ Sj ,transforms the dynamic Logit model (10) - or (7) - into the dynamic
J
extension of the static Dogit model (Gaudry and Dagenais 1979):
Uj = Cj exp (Vj) + Sj 2: Cj exp (Vj)/ (1+~ Sj) ~ Cj exp (Vj)'j J J
(11)
We can now use an interesting interpretation of this choice behaviour proposed by
Ben Akiva for the static Digit model (Ben Akiva 1977). The choice probabilities (11)
can be presented as
u· =s·/(1 + 2: s·) + (1/1+2: s·)C· exp (v·)/ 2: CJ. exp (vJ.);J I.J .J1 1.
J J J
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here the first component (sill + ~ Sj) is that part of the choice
J
probabilities u·1
which represents the "captivity" of decision-makers with a choice of the
alternative i, while the second component of ui represents the "discretionary" choice
of the alterr...ltive from all other alternatives.
It is important to stress that the transition from one choice model to another with the
help of non-stable stochastic matrices is very useful operationally, because it opens
the path for constructing new choice models.
4. MULTIREGIONAL GROWTII AND DECLINE
In this section the main results of mathematical innovation theory are briefly
reformulated in tenns of interregional competition (Sonis 1984b). The refonnulation
is restricted because it presents the dynamics of only one homogeneous "regional
resource" or "relative regional population'" distributed among N regions. In reality
this "relative resource" can be population, labor. capital. income. total national
product. governmental expenditures, taxes etc ... ; and interregional competition is the
result of interaction among different types of "relative populations". The
construction of the multiregional multiple resources' relative dynamics is the task
for future studies.
Assume that some relative population is distributed and redistributed among N
regions according to the log-linear system of differential equations
dy/dt = Yi ~ aijYj (A I)
J
2: Yj = I. (A2)
j
describing the interregional dynamic redistribution of the proportions
y = (yl.y2 •...• yN) of a relative population in each region. The anti symmetric
interaction matrix A (aij) describes the "input" of each region into the relative
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growth of all other regions, and the coefficients aij can be interpreted as a regional
reward or as a regional burden on the ith region due to the interaction with the jth
region. If the ith region is in a preferable position with respect to all other regions.
aij > 0 for all jPi,
then competitive exclusion of regions occurs; Le., in the long run all relative
population will concentrate within the ith region. Thus, spatial competitive exclusion
explains the regional disparities and regional growth and decline as a result of
interregional competition. In the case where negative coefficients exist in each row
of the interaction matrix A, then regional cycles appear.
By looking at the empirical evidence (see, for example, Dendrinos and Mullally 1985)
one may find that the equilibrium patterns of multi regional growth do not
necessarily confirm the presence of competitive exclusion or regional cycles:
balanced final distributions of relative population do exist. This evidence requires the
introduction of unbalanced regional external interventions into the models of
interregional competition. As possible candidates of external interventions into
multi regional competition, one may consider various governmental restrictions on
regional autonomy: the introduction of national policies and regional development
programmes; conditional grants and interregional compensation funds; institutional
fiscal centralization or decentralization etc... The action of external forces can be
presented with the help of stochastic matrices S = (sij)' describing the processes of the
redistribution of relative population among regions due to this action. These
redistribution processes act independently from interregional competitive
interaction; their mlXlllg and superposition with regional peculiarities generate
regional niches which support and preserve the special type of behaviour of regions.
The entropy of the spatial distribution of relative population
h =-2:: y.ln y.
. J J
J
can be used as an indicator of regional disparities. Spatial competitive exclusion is
equivalent to entropy minimization, while the process of regional equalization.
corresponding to the principles of social justice. leads to entropy maximization; one
can claim that the collision between the minimization and maximization of entropy
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reflects the nature of human progress. The surprising and important feature of
cumulative temporal entropy H in regional dynamics. where
T
H = f h dt
o
is considered in section 5.
One could expect that the above-mentioned properties of multi regional competitive
dynamics which apply to one type of relative population could be transferred to the
case of multiple population multiregional dynamics. The following model is proposed
(Sonis 1985) for the description of the multiregional dynamics of two types of relative
resources - the relative distribution of labor Yt = (ylt. y 2t .....yNt) and the relative
distribution of capital Zt = (zlt.z2t•...•zNt) between N regions - in discrete time:
N
yj.t+l= Uj(Yt·Zt)Zjt I L Uj(Yt'ZJZjt
j=l
N
Zj.t+ 1 = Vj(Yt'Zt)y it I L Vj(Yt'ZJyjt
j=1
i = 1,2•...•N.
(12)
where functions U j , Vi are strictly positive utility functions which represent the
cumulative per capita regional utilities, corresponding to the socio-economic
characteristics of the population of each region. and the attributes of the regions
themselves.
Model (12) is a generalization of the dynamic extension of the multinomial Logit
model (7) for the case of two different relative resources. Equations (12) present a
new model of relative growth of two different interacting resources, where the
spatial regional competitive exclusion principle holds. The equilibrium states (Y"',Z"')
for this model are the states Y· = Z·
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Ekwhere Ek = (0.....0.1.0.....0), k=I.2•...N. This
demonstrates the important fact that the action of demographic and economic forces
imply total concentration of the labor and capital within only one (kth) region. It
must be noted here that the results and the interpretations of sections 2 and 3 also
hold for these relative dynamics.
5. RELATIVE ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
The mathematical basis for the description of evolution of the population of N species.
competing for the same resource. was constructed by Volterra in the early decades of
this century. Volterra considered the absolute population growth of the multispecies'
ecological association to be influenced by the multiple species interaction in the form
(Scudo and Ziegler 1978):
N
dx/dt = xi(ai + L: cil/bi)'
j=1
i = 1.2.....N. (13)
where xl.x2 •...• xN are the amounts of each type of species. ai is the rate of
"self-growth". b i is an "average weight" of species and Cij are the interaction
coefficients.
The key notion of Volterra's elaboration is the notion of a "conservative ecological
association" for which
(14)
There is no need for this restriction of antisymmetry to be imposed on relative
ecological associations possessing total zero growth:
L: xi = P = const. > O.
i
(15)
181
Indeed, let us consider the relative ecological dynamics with total zero growth
(2),05). (Volterra avoided the consideration of this particular case of ecological
dynamics.) The introduction of new variables Yj = x/P and new interaction
coefficients ajj = aj + PCj/b j result in the innovation diffusion dynamics 0),(2).
Moreover,condition (2) for relative growth is equivalent to Volterra's conservation
condition
L;: ~ ajjYjYj = 0
1 J
because
L L ajjYjYj = L Yj(L ajjYj) = L dy/dt = d/dt(L Yj) =o.
j i j i j
Therefore, it is possible to interpret the relative ecological dynamics as a special case
of Volterra's conservative ecological association, with a zero self-growth (aj = 0) and a
zero aggregative (multiregional) growth (P = consL). The immediate consequence of
such an interpretation is the possibility to employ Volterra's analytical methods and
results in relative ecological dynamics (and at the same time avoid the peculiarities of
absolute growth conservative ecological associations).
Only one important fact related to this will be mentioned here: the derivation of the
differential equations (1),(2) of relative dynamics from the variational principle of
the Hamilton type (Dendrinos and Sonis 1986).
Let us consider the cumulative proportions of relative population
t
Y jet) = f Yj(t) dt
o
(the analogue of Volterra's "quantities of life"), and the integral of cumulative action
T
f (-2 L yjln Yj + L L ajjYiYj) dt.
o i i j
(16)
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The analogue of Hamilton's principle of a stationary cumulative action means that the
first variation of action in (16) vanishes. giving rise to the system of Euler
differential equations; for integral (16) the Euler conditions coincide with the system
(1),(2) representing the log-linear relative dynamics. The most important fact is that
the stationary value of cumulative action (16) turns out to be the cumulative entropy
T
J (- L Yj In Yi) dt
o j
for the relative log-linear dynamics over the time horizon T. This is of particular
interest to regional analysis. since entropy over space evolves to a minimum in the
asymptotically stable equilibrium states (competitive exclusion). However. over time
the cumulative action (16), which includes the accumulation of the spatial entropy
and the interactions. merges into the stationary value (weak maximum) of cumulative
entropy.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that four different theoretical frameworks, which up to now
have been developed in an independent manner (namely innovation diffusion,
individual utility theory, urban/regional relative dynamics, and the mathematical
theory of ecological competition) have the same conceptual basis: log-linear relative
dynamics.
There were two objectives in this paper. The first objective was to demonstrate the
mutual interdependence and complementarity of these conceptual frameworks. The
second objective was to present the most significant implications of the unification of
the different theories to date: the presentation of the innovation spread as
competition among antagonistic innovations; the duality between the
behaviour of innovations and the individual's choice; the derivation
counterparts of the multinomial Logit and Dogit choice models
generalizations; the description of regional growth and decline as
multiregional competition; the construction of relative ecological
competitive
of dynamic
and their
a result of
dynamics, a
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problem ecologists had never addressed; and, finally, the derivation of a system of
log-linear equations for relative dynamics on the basis of the variational principle of
stationarity in cumulative entropy in relative population distributions.
One may conclude that the unifying view-point of the log-linear relative dynamics
presents a new way of looking at old problems and leads to essentially new results.
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Chapter 9
The Schumpeter Clock
G. HAAG, W. WEIDLICH & G. MENSCH
1. INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental fact that the non-equilibrium behaviour of an economy consists
of long-term and short-term cycles (Keynes 1973; Hicks 1956) and fluctuating
components. As a first approximation, the long- and short-term phenomena can be
treated separately (Figure 1). In this contribution, we shall focus on short-term
motions of the economy which manifest themselves in the macroeconomic variables.
We aim to provide a partial theory for the non-equilibrium motion of an industrial
system of nations or regions.
The model differs from other existing models of industrial fluctuations in many of its
design principles (Goodwin 1950; Chang and Smyth 1950). It is called "the Schumpeter
Clock" here according to a proposal from Goodwin (1951), since its moving parts,
driving mechanism and control devices are typically Schumpeterian and not, as in
the case of other models, typically neo-classical or neo-keynesian. This post-
Schumpeterian mathematical theory of short-term cycles is based on microeconomic
concepts of the Schumpeterian variety (Schumpeter 1961). It refers to the
functioning of the Schumpeter Goods Sector, which is essentially comprised of
industry, and those parts of agriculture and services which are operating similarly to
industrial organizations. Furthermore, this economic theory refers to dynamic
change in major statistical units such as whole nations or regions, and is thus
oriented towards the institutional user of applied macroeconomic theory.
The model is primarily designed to take into account hard-driving, microeconomic
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Figure 1 (a, b) Typical graphs of the configuration potential V(x,/; ,le)
(c, d) The associated configuration driving forces K(x,/; .le)
189
forces and powerful supply side checks and balances, which combine to create
short-term oscillations. The soft-driving macroeconomic forces, and the weak demand
side checks and balances, are assumed to be mediated through microeconomic
behaviour. In particular, the model operationalizes the Schumpeterian notion of the
Prime Mover, i.e., innovators and imitators, who create and propagate microeconomic
differences. The heterogeneity among products and production processes constitutes
the force field for the creative and destructive energies which hold the economic
process in motion. (In this sense, Schumpeter's Process of Creative Destruction can
also be understood as the Process of Monopolistic Competition. E.H. Chamberlin has
shown that this concept of the product as an economic variable leads Toward a More
General Theory of value (1957)).
Differences among products come into play at the disaggregate levels (firms,
markets) of the economic system. The creation of such differences - leading to
competitive advantages among rival producers - is the objective of the strategic
investments of entrepreneurs. We classify strategic investments I(t) according to
their respective competition purposes as expansionary E(t) and rationaljzin~ R(t).
These investments move the extensive and intensive frontiers of the economy.
The link between the newly introduced macroeconomic investment structure index
and the microeconomic investor's confj~uration index can be made by introducing
methods out of the field of synergetics (Weidlich and Haag, 1982). The investment
structure index is a measure for the composition of the aggregate strategic
investment, namely, of its expansionary (E) and rationalizing (R) shares. The
investors' configuration describes all investors' propensities as either expansionary
or rationalizing, as they make their strategic investments predominantly either for
extensifying or for intensifying purposes; and the investors' configuration index
describes the expansionary bias, or rationalization bias, prevalent in the combined
population of investors in anyone period of time. Because of the tight relationship
between the investors' configuration index and the investment structure index,
short-term shifts in bias for either expansionary or rationalizing investments
translate directly into swings in the composition of total realized investment in the
whole economy. E-type investments extend the capacity of firms, industries, and the
economy as a whole. R-type investments have ambivalent macroeconomic effects. As
they intensify cost factors, rationalizing investment projects have contractionary
ramifications for the supply side of the economy on the whole. Thus, micro-shifts in
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individual investment propensities combine in generating up- and down-swings of
the economy.
The main argument for the cyclicity of industrial (short-term) development
presented here is derived from the notion of a dynamics of the shifts between
differentiation (innovation) and conformative behaviour (imitation). Over the years,
the majority of industrial investors repeatedly shift from a predominantly
expansionary investment portfolio to a rationalization bias, with innovators and
pioneering entrepreneurs in search of monopoly profits taking the lead in the
anticyclical redirection of investment strate~ies. This "band-waggon" effect results
in industrial fluctuations.
In the following sections, equations of motion, which quantify the dynamics of
economic change, will be set up and solved. The model simultaneously connects the
relevant micro-economic and macro-economic concepts, although it is certainly
partial, with its focus on the theory of industrial fluctuations, and in its abstraction of
the impact of other substantive areas of economic theory.
According to Gold's managerial decision coefficient model, there
principal option types; those directed at either increasing sales
decreasing the cost level C, in return-on-investment (r.oj.)
are only two
volume S, or
S-C
r.oj =---
output
output
capacity
capacity
fixed investment
(1)
Thus, both expansionary (E-type) and rationalizing (R-type) investment can increase
the r.oj. by increasing the profits (S-C).
Accordingly, the total volume of strate~ic investment (Kalecki 1935)
I(t) = E(t) + R(t) (2)
is defined as all fixed capital investment, replacement deducted, which is considered
to be tactical, where
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E(t) is the volume of exoansionary investment at time t and
R(t) is the volume of rationalizing investment at time t. (3)
We propose that there are considerable fluctuations in the volume of expansionary
and rationalizing investment as a result of entrepreneurial innovation and imitation
activities. The proportional distribution of the shares of E(t) and R(t) in I(t) shifts
with time. As these fluctuations take place around long term average paths (EO(t) and
RO(t» of the expansionary and rationalizing investment, it is first appropriate to
decompose E(t) and (R(t)
E(t) = EO(t) + B(t) \
R(t) = RO(t) - B(t) f (4)
where the oscillating shift B(t) around the average values EO and RO is of interest.
While the long term behaviour of EO and Ro displays positive semidefinite quantities
by definition, B(t) can only vary within the range
-EO < B(t) < RO.
An investment structure index is now defined as
Z(t) = [E(t) - R(t)] / [E(t) + R(t)] = [E(t) - R(t)] / I(t)
(5)
(6)
where Z(t) varies within -1<Z(t)< + 1. Inserting (4) into (6), Z(t) decomposes into
Z(t) = Zo(t) + z(t) = (Eo - Ro) / I(t) + 2 B(t) / I(t). (7)
The performance of the Schumpeter Clock will be demonstrated by observing the
non-equilibrium motion of the investment structure index Z(t), or preferably, its
fluctuating part z(t), for the industrial sector in the Federal Republic of Germany
during the period 1956-1979. This will be then explained by using micro-
economically determined and supply side factor reinforced shifts of bias in the
overall investment activities.
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In principle, an industrial firm may plan and/or undertake any number of projects
at a given time t, but since the "investor" is defined as the decision-making unit, one
project per firm will be assumed. The total number of investment projects is large,
say 2N3> I, for it is convenient - but not decisive - for the equations to have an even
number of projects. For simplicity, it will also be assumed that all projects have the
same financial volume This assumption has no effect on the mean value considera-
tions of this chapter; differences in the size of projects would only influence the
variances of the model parameters.
A fictitious "neutral" investor who behaves according to the average long term
investment trend will be considered first. His investment project of volume i = 1/2N is
composed of expansionary investment eO and rationalizing investment rO as follows:
i :::: I/2N =eO + rO where eO = EO/2N, (8)
Real investors, however, behave differently to the neutral investor: there are~
investors who favour the expansionary investment type rather than the average
trend. Their projects of financial volume are constructed as follows:
where
and rE = rO - b, with b > O. (9)
Evidently b is the surplus of expansionary investment in comparison with the
neutral case.
On the other hand, £R>.:-~tY~Pll'el<-...Jil.lJnuy~eo.ils.1Jto",r~s favour the rationalizing investment type rather
than the average trend. The E/R type shares of their projects are such that
where
rR =rO + b, again with b >0. (0)
b is now the surplus in rationalizing investment with respect to the neutral case. For
simplicity, the same value for b in (9. 10) will be taken.
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At a given point in time nE (t) E-type investors and nR (t) R-type investors, whose
total number is 2N, where:
(11)
are assumed.
The two numbers in the vector (E(t) , R(t)} characterize the investment structure at
time according to investment volume, and the two numbers
characterize the investors' strategic investment activities at time t (by head count).
(nE(t) ,nR(t)} is denoted as the jnyestors' confiiuratjon.
The integer
n(t) where -N ~ n(t) ~ N (12)
increases or decreases by one if the investors' configuration changes according to
transitions
(13a)
or
(13b)
i.e. if an R-type investor becomes an E-type investor or vice versa. Multiple unit
motions (band-wagon effects) within the investors' configuration are also possible,
for instance
(14a)
n -+ n+d.
Such transitions may indicate series of synchronized pro d uc t variations or
innovations, as often observed and described by the heuri:;tic regularity usually
called the product life cycle. Similarly,
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(14b)
n ... n-d
indicates series of synchronized process improvements or process rationalizations.
Instead of n(t), a normalized variable, the investors' confil:uration index, can be
employed so that
(15)
with
-1 ~ x(t) ~ 1.
The relation between the investors' configuration index (15) and the investment
structure index (6), characterizing strategic investment, now follows unambiguously
by combining the postulated equations. The total expansionary investment E(t) and
the total rationalizing investment R(t) at time are given by
E(t) = nE(t) eE + nR(t) eR
R(t) = nE(t) rE + nR (t) rR .
Inserting (8-10) as well as (11, 12, 15) it follows that
E(t) = [nE(t) + nR(t)] eO + [nE(t) - nR(t)] b
= 2 NeO + 2 n(t)b =EO + 2 Nb x(t)
and
R(t) = [nE(t) + nR(t)] rO - [nE(t) - nR (t)] b
=2 NrO - 2 n(t)b =Ro - 2 Nb x(t)
Z(t) = (EO - Ro) / I(t) + [4 Nb / I(t)] x(t) = Zo + z(t)
or
z(t) = [4 Nb / I(t)] x(t) = g x(t) with g(t) = [4 N(t)b(t)] / I(t).
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
The result (21) shows that the fluctuating part z(t) of the investment structure index
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Z(t) is proportional to the investors' configuration index x(t). Thus. oscillations of
the investors' configuration will show up in oscillations of the investment structure
index. The variable g(t) provides the link between the normalized x(t) and the
non-normalized z(t).
The discussion of the investors' strategic choice set indicated that the model is
consistent with the traditional profit seeking hypothesis. The investigation of the
investors' configuration reveals that the model is also consistent with the rational
expectation hypothesis. "Rational" expectations are model based, and the life cycle
model and progress function model are frequently used by investors to form
expectations about the timing of their rivals' next improvements, (Barzel 1968;
Kamien and Schwartz 1972) Le. of the current best practice frontier.
Rosenberg (1976) also pointed out the rationality of speeding-up or delaying product
or process innovations under conditions of rivalry. This is done in the expectation of
breakthroughs and rapid successions of product or process innovations, which hit
the market as a series of capacity expanding or cost reducing investments. Also, in
the "awareness context" (Glaser and Strauss 1964) of industrial investors "a firm must
incur some positive expense just to maintain a constant level of production cost or
efficiency" (Flaherty 1980).
This is especially true in times of cost inflation when the goal is one of "reducing cost
in total, not particular costs such as labour costs or capital costs" (Salter 1960). This
micro-economic theory of macro-economic contractions also suggests that - in times
of cost inflation in which industrial firms try to combat a strong rationalization bias
in their overall investment activities - heavy investment does not create higher
employment, as the Phillips curve would suggest, but "stagflation".
2. TIIE EQUATIONS OF MOTIONS FOR TIIE INVESTORS' CONFIGURATION
It will be assumed that short term industrial investment cycles come about through
dynamic interaction between industrial investors, or between two interrelated
components of investment behaviour: a) the decision behaviour of managers and
entrepreneurs who are making strategic choices about the kind of industrial
investments to be implemented, and b) the actual total volume and composition of
rea!jzed
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investments. As these components are embodied in the investors'
configuration. changes in the numbers of investors undertaking
expansionary or rationalizing investments can be taken as a proxy for the real
socio-economic causes of the time path of all industrial activity. Changes in the
investors' configuration (nE (t), nR (t) I result in changes in the rate and direction of
industrial investment, as indicated by the investment structure index Z(t). These
changes come about as investors change their propensities for E- and R-type
investments in view of market opportunities, the revealed preferences of other
investors, and their supply side conditions.
Thus, changes in the industrial economy can be formulated as equations of motions of
these two components of investment behaviour. The eQuation of motion for the
investors' configuration and the eQuation of motion for the investors' propensities,
as presented in the next two sections, constitute essential parts of the Schumpeter
Clock model being presented.
Is has been shown that the transition from one investors' configuration {nE,nR I to
another can be a single unit motion connected with a product innovation (13a) or a
process innovation (13b) of one investor. It could also be a multiple unit motion (l4a
and b) which is most often an imitation process. As innovation is always, and
imitation is sometimes, investment under uncertainty, it is doubtful that a
deterministic modelling of the motion of the investors' configuration will succeed.
But since all investment is risky, the stochastic approach U. appropriate. Therefore
the well founded master equation formulation will be adopted.
The micro-economic approach to changes in the investors' configuration
adopted incorporates the notion of individual transition probabilities (per unit of
time) for investors turning from an R-type investment to an E-type investment, and
vice versa. These individual transition probabilities are denoted by:
PE +- R[nE' nR] ;;; p t (n) = probability per unit time for turning from
E.-type to Ii-type investment
PR +-E [nE' nR] ;;; p.l. (n) = probability per unit time for turning from
Ii-type to E.-type investment.
(22)
(23)
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The individual transition probabilities yield the total probabilities for changes of the
entire investors' configuration. The transition
takes place with the total transition probability
wf(n) = nR pf(n) (N-n)pf (n) (24)
as there are nR investors who could tum from R-type to E-type investment with
individual probability pf (n). Analogously. the transition
takes place with the total transition probability
w.\. (n) = nE p.\. (n) (N+n) p.\. (n) (25)
as there are nE investors who could tum from E-type to R-type investment with
individual probability p.\. (n). These transition probabilities (24, 25) of single unit
motions of the investors' configuration
formulating the master equation.
{nE' nR } are the fundamental inputs for
The master equation describes the motion of the probability distribution over the
investors' configuration. This distribution function is denoted as
P[nE' nR ;t] ;;; P(n;t) for -N ~ n ~ N.
By definition, the value of this function of n and
(26)
is the probability that at time
the investors' configuration {nE , nR } is realized; the configuration relevant variable
of the function P(n;t) is n=(nE - nR)!2. Because one of the configurations {n} is
always realized, the sum of the probabilities has to be I:
N2: P(n;t) = 1.
n=-N
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(27)
The master equation is derived by a simple probability balance consideration: the
probability P(n;t) of the configuration n can increase by means of transitions from
either one of the neighbouring configurations (n-I) or (n+I) into configuration n,
while P(n;t) may simultaneously decrease by transitions from configuration n into
these neighbouring configurations. The transition probabilities per time unit for
these processes have already been introduced in (24, 25). Incorporating them into
the balance consideration immediately leads to the master equation
dP(n;t) I dt = [wt(n-I)P(n-I;t) + wJ.(n+I)P(n+I;t)]
-[wt (n) P(n;t) + wJ. (n) P(n;t) ] .
(28)
The master equation (28) represents 2N + 1 coupled linear difference differential
equations for P(n;t) with n = -N, - N + 1•...•N - I.N. which are not easily solved in
the general case when N is large. However, if it is assumed that the P(n;t) are
sharply peaked and uni-modal around their mean values < n > t. then a set of closed
equations of motion for the mean values can be derived. These are defined by
N
<n>1 = 2: nP(n;t)
n=-N
(29)
Taking the time derivative of (29) and inserting the master equation (28) in the rhs,
one obtains
N
d < n > 1 I dt = 2:
n=-N
N
n [dP(n;t)] I dt = 2:
n=-N
[wt (n) - wJ. (n)] P(n;t). (30)
The rhs of (30) is the mean value < w t (n) - wJ. (n» 1 of wt (n) - wJ.(n). Equation (30)
is not a closed equation for the mean value < n> 1 because the full distribution P(n;t)
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has to be known in order to calculate d < n > t/dt. But under the assumption that P(n;t)
remains sharply peaked and uni-modal around its mean value, an approximate closed
equation of motion for the mean value < n > t can be obtained as
The mean value equation for x, the investors' configuration index, upon transition
to variable x = nIN, (see (15) in (31» then reads:
d<x>t I dt = K(<x>t)
K«x>t) = lIN [wt«n>t)-wJ.«n>t)] =
(I-<x>t)pt(N <x>t) - (1+<x>t)pJ.(N <x>t)·
(32)
(33)
From this point on the clumsy mean value brackets will be omitted and x(t) written
for < x> l' thus (32) is
dx(t)/dt K(x(t». (34)
According to (33), K depends on the actual configuration x(t) of all the actors
(investors) in the system at time t, and the transition probabilities for change of this
configuration pt (x) and pJ. (x), which in tum depend upon all investors'
propensities, which shall be parametrized by 6 and IC. Thus the driving force K, see
(33), may be written as a function of x, 6 and IC as
K(x;6,1e) = (l-x)pt (x;6,1e) - (1 +x)pJ. (x;6 ,Ie). (35)
A fairly general constructive specification of these transition probabilities which
has already been shown to be sufficiently flexible takes the form:
pt(x;6,1e) = 'II exp(6+1CX)
pJ.(x;6,1C) = 'II exp[-(6 +ICX)]
(Weidlich and Haag, 1983).
(36)
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The technical parameter v is a frequency which relates, according to (49), the
abstract dimensionless time T in formal modelling to real time in empirical work,
when the model is being applied to real economic data. The trend parameter S is
referred to as The Alternator. It initiates the reversal of strategic bias. To see this,
first assume an increasingly positive value of 6 in (36). It increases the value of pt,
whereas the value of p.l. is decreased. Therefore, a positive alternator favours
individual strategy change over to E-type investment, and it disfavours transitions to
R-type investment. The inverse holds for negative 6. In our model the alternator is
viewed as a function of time 6 (t). A dynamic equation of motion for the alternator
shall be set up in section 3. It alternates between positive and negative values over
time, and its oscillations produce periodic shifts of the probabilistic decision
behaviour of investors. In other words, the alternator governs the propensity to
switch the strategic direction of innovation.
The trend parameter Ie represents the propensity to imitate. Thus, it is referred to as
The Coordinator. It amplifies the strategic shifts. To see this, let us first focus upon a
situation with nE > n R or x> O. This means that the majority of firms are currently
investing with expansionary bias. Then, according to (36), the transition probability
p t of an R-type investor to switch over to E-type investment is larger than the
transition probability p.l. of an E-type investor to change from E-type to R-type
investment. The converse is true in a situation where nE < n R' or x< O. In both cases,
however, the transition probability for change to the investment type of the majority
is larger than that for a change to the minority type. Hence, the incumbent majority
is stabilized and even extended by the effect of Ie. This trend increases for
increasingly positive Ie. In other words, the coordinator represents the investors'
inclination to conform to the behaviour of the majority of firms at the time. The
coordination effect manifests itself as a synchronization effect of investments of the
same type undertaken by a majority of investors. In general, the effects of the
alternator and the coordinator superpose and thus determine the transition
probabilities at any point in time. Since 6 and x depend on time, the transition
probabilities of investors are themselves functions of time. They simultaneously
~ strategic changes, and depend on the effects of the changes which manifest
themselves in the economic data.
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Inserting (36) in (35) and using the standard definitions of the hyperbolic sine and
cosine, a specific expression for the driving force
K(x;5,IC) = 2v[sinh(5+1CX) -x cosh(5+lex)] (37)
is obtained, which in turn yields an explicit form for the mean value equation of
motion of the investors' configuration index
dx(t) I dt = K(x;5 ,Ie)
by using (37) on the rhs of (38).
(38)
The dynamic behaviour of x can also be described in terms of a "potential" which
stands in close relation to the driving force K of x such that
K(x;5,1e) = -aV(x; 5,IC) I ax, (39)
which may be regarded as being the pace maker of the Schumpeter Clock.
Integrating the force (37) yields the "confj~uration development potential"
V(x; 5,1e) = (2v/1e 2) [leX sinh(5+lex) - (l+IC) cosh(5+lex)]. (40)
In the upper part of Figure I, numerical values for V(x; 5 ,Ie) are depicted:
(a) for 5 = 0 and different values of Ie
(b) for Ie = 1,5 and different of values 5,
whereas in the lower part of Figures lc and d, the quantified driving forces K(x; 5,1e)
associated with the cases a and b, respectively, are shown. Comparing Figure la with
c, and b with d for the same sets of parameters Ie, 5 it is seen that the force K(x; 5 ,Ie )
drives x into the minima of the potential V(x; 5, Ie). In case a with Ie = 1.5 for
instance, the motion ends at the positive minimum x = x+ (expansionary bias of the
investors' configuration index x) or at the negative minimum at x = x_ (rationaliza-
tion bias of x). In case b with 5 = 0.3> 5 C' the potential has one minimum only at x = x+
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and the motion ends with the strong expansionary bias x = x+.
It may be supposed that the motion of the investors' configuration index x always
ends at a stable (expansionary or rationalizing) bias and that no Schumpeter Clock
begins to tick. But this is only true as long as 6 and IC are kept constant with time. In
section 3, however, an equation of motion for the alternator 6 (t) will be set up. In
becoming a dynamic yariable, the alternator 6 (t) shifts and transforms the whole
shape of the configuration development potential V(x; 6,1C) and of the driving force
K(x; 6,1C). Hence x may never come to rest; in fact a periodicity in the motion of x(t)
can result from the coupling of the motion of 6 (t) with that of x(t), and so
oscillatory shifts in the variable x in the course of this coupled motion have to be
expected. In Figure Ib it can be seen that for given IC the shape of the potential
varies from a two minima to a one minimum form as 6 grows from 0 to 6 > 6 c' The
transition takes place at a critical value 6 =6 c given by
for which the left hand minimum of the potential disappears at
Because of the symmetry of the potential
V(-I x 1,-1 61, IC) = V(I x I, I 6 I, IC),
(42)
(43)
a similar transition takes place for 6 = -I 6 I for which the right hand miminum
disappears at x = I xcI. If x(t) is considered to start at the left minimum of V(x;6 < 6 'clC)
- Le. with a rationalizing bias - and if 6 (t) moves from 6 < 6 c to values 6> 6 c so that
the left minimum of V disappears, x(t) will quickly swing to the remaining
right-hand minimum of V(x; 6> 6 c,lC) at x> 0 (expansionary bias). This in tum can
induce the motion of the alternator 6(t) to negative values 6(t)< - 16 c l • leading to a
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sudden downswing of x(t) towards a rationalizing bias, and so on. It can be seen that
the coupled dynamics of x(t) and 6 (t) can, in principle, explain the upswings and
downswings of x(t). In the next section the function of a time dependent alternator
shall be explained in economic terms. and its equation of motion will be established.
3. THE EQUATION OF MOTION FOR THE INVESTORS' PROPENSITIES
The alternator 6 , which is the investors' strategic choice parameter in the force
K(x;6.1C), and the variable for which an equation of motion is going to be introduced,
plays the role of a "trend setting function".
If most investors tend to maximize profits at a given point in time by expanding their
business operations so that x(t» O. then some innovators or pioneers (trend-setters)
will try to improve their market position by adopting a non-conformist strategy in an
attempt to capture quasi-rents due to differentiation. When an upswing is well under
way due to expansionary investments undertaken by a majority of investors, these
trend setters tend to redirect their effort and start pushing back the cost frontier by
means of cost reducing investments. They thereby force others to imitate and also to
undertake rationalizing investments in the expectation of further cost reductions
along the progress function, descriptive of the least cost combination in the branch
of industry under observation.
At other times when a downswing is well under way due to the contractionary effects
of rationalizing investments undertaken by a majority of investors. the trend setters
start moving towards the quality section of the best practice frontier, introducing
better products and implementing investment plans for expanding their facilities.
Thereby, others are forced to imitate this expansionary and quality updating
behaviour, thus creating the synchronization to be observed in the occurrence of
business cycles. Since Adam Smith, economists have viewed these entrepreneurial
actions as one of the main sources of the wealth of nations. The equation of motion
for the alternator 6 (t). which describes the differentiation activities of
entrepreneurs in various fields of industrial investment in aggregate terms, should
generate switches under the circumstances stipulated above. A suitable specification
of this dynamic behaviour is
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d6(t)/dt = 11-[6 0 - 6(t)] expH3x(t)] -11-[6 0 + 6(t)] exp[/3x(t)]
with 11->0, /3>0 and 6 0 >0.
(44)
The mathematical implication of (44) is such that: for x = 0, 6(t) relaxes towards 6 =
0; but for x(t» 0 the rhs of (44) represents a strong restoring force so that 6 (t)
moves towards -6 o' The negative 6 in tum leads to a force K(x; 6 ,Ie) - see (37)-
driving x to negative values. Alternatively, starting from x(t)< 0, the rhs of (44)
yields a restoring force for a change in 6 (t) towards + 6 0 ; the positive 6, in tum,
produces a force K(x; 6 ,Ie) driving x to positive values again. It can be seen that (44)
correctly describes the alternating dynamics of the strategic choice parameter 6 (t)
in terms of a non-conformist reaction to the investors' configuration index x(t).
In order to achieve the alternating effects, parameter /3, the trend reyersal speed
parameter, has to be much larger than unity. The strategic flexibility parameter u.
describes the flexibility of the investors in turning their strategies from
expansionary to rationalizing, and vice versa, whereas the strategjc choice amplitude
6 0 is an operative scaling constant.
Using the definitions of hyperbolic functions, the general form of the equation of
motion for 6 is obtained from (44) as
d6(t)/ d) = -211- 6 0 sinh[/3x(t)] - 211- 6(t) cosh[/3x(t)] . (45)
Introducing 6 1, a strategy bjas parameter, which is positive if the entire trend period
is heavily biased towards expansion (as the 1950's were), or negative when biased
towards rationalization (as the 1970's were), (45) can be modified and generalized to a
complete equation of motion for the alternator. This is both stable enough to hold the
ongoing trend over considerable periods of inertia, and flexible enough to change
expeditiously with the investors' propensities:
d6(t)/dt =-211- 60 sinh[/3x(t)] -211-[6(t)-6 1] cos~[/3x(t)] . (46)
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Analogous to K(x; 6.le) • L(x; 6.13) is denoted as the strategy reformulation driving
force by writing the equation of motion for the alternator in the form:
d6(t)1 dt = L(x; 6.13) (47)
with
(48)
and denoting the parameters as follows:
13: trend reversal speed parameter.
IL: strategic flexibility parameter.
60: strategic choice amplitude.
6( strategy bias parameter.
4. TIIE CLOSED SET OF EQUATIONS OF MOTION
Collecting the equations of motion for the investors' configuration index x(t) (38),
and the equation of motion for the alternator 6 (t) (47), then introducing scaled time
T as
T =2vt
and y. a scaled strategic flexibility parameter. as
y = ILlv.
scaled forms of the equations of motion
dX(T)1dT = K(x; 6.le)
d6(t)/dT = L(x; 6,13)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
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are obtained with the (scaled) driving force K as
K(x; 5,1e) = sinh(5+lex) - x cosh(5+lex) ;;; [tanh(5+lCx) - x] cosh(5+lCx) (53)
and the (scaled) strategy reformulation driving force L as
L(x; 5,~)=-y[50sinh(~x)+(5-51) cosh(~x)]
=-y[5 0 tanh(~x) + (5-5 1)] cosh(~x). (54)
It is worthwhile to note that the central equations of the model (51, 52) are invariant
against
(55)
This invariance condition also shows up in the symmetry condition (43) of the
potential V(x; 5 ,IC).
5. STRUCfURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM OF EQUAnONS
The first part of the analysis examines how many singular points P( 6 ,x) of the
equations of motion exist. Singular points are defined as points in the 5-x plane
where the motion comes to rest, i.e. where
and
dx/d Tip = K(iS) = 0
d5/dTlp = L(x,a ) = O.
(56)
(57)
Inserting (53) and (54) into (56) and (57), respectively, it can be seen that the
coordinates of a singular point P( 6, x) have to satisfy the two transcendental equa-
tions simultaneously
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F I( 6. x) =[tanh( 6 + ICX)-X] =0 (58)
These equations are easily solved graphically: the functions F I (6 .x) = 0 and F2 (6 .x)=O
can be represented in the 6-x plane and their intersection points, which are the
singular points of the differential equations (51, 52), can be determined. Further-
more. it follows from the definitions that the graph of (58) is the locus of all
horizontal - and the graph of (59) the locus of all vertical-fluxlines of the equation
(51, 52). Restricting the analysis for the moment to the slightly simplified case of
v"anishing strategic choice bias, Le. for 61= O. Figure 2 shows a typical plot of (59)
and three typical plots a), b) and c) of (58). This figure co n firms that one, three or
even five singular points can exist.
The marginal case b) with three singular points. is characterized by the fact that (58,
59) hold good at the singular points P+(6+,x+) and P-<6_.xJ = 0 and F(6.x) = 0 agree
thus the condition
(F2)
(dx/d6 )
Pt
(60)
where (dx/d 6 )(F2) and (dx/d 6 )(F2) are the derivatives taken along the curves
F 1(6 .x) = 0 and F2(6.x) = O. is also satisfied. A straight-forward evaluation of (60) leads
to the equivalent implicit condition
- 2 -2IC = 6 0 13[1-( 6/6 0 ) ] + l/(l-x ) (61)
which also has to be fulfilled by the parameters IC • 6 0 and 13 for this marginal case.
In (61) the solutions 6 + ,x+ or 6 _ ::: 6+ , x_ = -x+ of (58. 59) have to be inserted for 6
and x with 6 1 =O.
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F2(6,x) =_0_
(a) F 1(6 ,x) = 0
(b) F 1(6,x) = 0
(c) F 1(6 ,i) = 0
for small Ie (one equilibrium point -- the origin)
in the marginal case (3 equilibrium points)
for very large Ie (5 equilibrium points)
Typical graphs of the transcendental functions
F1(6,x) = 0 and F2(6,x) = 0
The two-dimensional domain of parameters Ie, 6 0 and f3 satisfying (61), for which
there exist three singular points in the 6-x plane, will be denoted by °2(3). The
two-dimensional surface °2(3) separates the three dimensional domain °3 (5) of the
parameters Ie , 6 0 f3 - for which .t:iY..l:.. singular points exist - from the three
dimensional domain 03 (1). for which only ~ singular point (namely the origin
6" = 0, i = 0) exists.
To discover the types of paths traversed by X(T) and 6 (T) it is also relevant to know
their behaviour in the vicinity of the singular points. Therefore a !inear stability
analysis will be performed in order to see whether the singular points are~ or
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unstable stationary points. With this objective, the behaviour with time of the
solutions in a small neighbourhood of a singular point P( '6 ,i), is investigated by
introducing deviations " (T) and ~ (T) from 6 and i, so that:
(62)
The equation of motion (51, 52) can now be linearized with respect to ~ (T) and " (T ).
This leads to the following, which are valid only in the vicinity of P( 6, i):
d~(T)/dT = a1~ + b1"
d,,(T)/dT = -a2 ~ - b2 "
with the coefficients
a 1 = cosh-
1( S + lex) [Ie - cosh2(S + lei)]
a2 = y 13 6 0 cosh-1(l3x)
b 1 = cosh-
1( S + lei)
b2 =y cosh(l3x)
(63)
(64)
(65)
where a2' b1, b2> 0, and al is unrestricted. According to standard methods, (63, 64)
can be solved using
~(T) = ~(O) exp(>'T)
,,(T) = ,,(0) exp(>'T)
where the eigenvalues
} (66)
>. have to fulfill the determinant condition
(67)
This quadratic equation yields the eigenvalues
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(68)
The singular point is a stable focus if the eigenvalues >. I and >. Z both have negative
real parts, since then both ~ (1") and 1') (1" ) approach zero with time. On the other
hand, the singular point is unstable if the real part of at least one eigenvalue is
posi ti ve.
Of great interest is the stability of the singular point Po( 60 = 0, xo = 0) which is,
however, slightly shifted from the origin for a non-vanishing strategic choice bias
6 1, With 6 1 =0, S = 0 and i = 0, the parameters aI' aZ and bZ assume the simple
forms:
al = Ie - I, b I = I,
bZ ="1, (69)
which leads to the eigenvalues
(70)
It is reasonable - and confirmed by the calculations presented in section 6 - to assume
relative large values for the trend reversal parameter 13 and the strategic choice
amplitude 6 0, Thus
(71 )
can be assumed. In this case the eigenvalues (70) become conjugate-complex and can
be written as
(72)
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From (72) it follows immediately that a stable focus exists at the origin of the 6-x
plane under the condition
,,-1-')' < a or "<1+')' (73)
and that the origin becomes an unstable focus if condition
,,-1-')' > a or
is fulfilled.
">1+')' (74)
Finally, the solutions of the equations of motion (51, 52) have to be investigated. A
complete survey of all the possible types of solution to the equations dependent on the
parameters ", 6 0.6 l' 13 and ')' will not, however, be made. The immediate aim is to
derive sufficient conditions for those parameters which lead to the existence of an
asymptotically periodic type of solution; this is the type of solution which has been
anticipated qualitatively in terms of the investment cycle, and in which the main
interest lies. In other words, it is necessary for the substantial aspects of the model
being considered to derive an existence theorem for solutions approachin~ a "limit
~ under certain conditions of the parameters ", 6 O. 6 l' 13 and ')'.
A limit cycle C(t) is defined as a closed trajectory, Le. a periodic solution to the
equations of motion, with the property that there exists a domain Dc around C(t). so
that all trajectories starting within Dc approach C(t) as 1-+ 00. Dc can be denoted as
the "domain of attraction'" and C(t) as an "attractor". Before the existence theorem is
stated, the famous Poincare-Bendixon theorem should be formulated in a - in context
- relevant version:
Consider two autonomous first order differential equations for the variables 6 ( T ) and
X(T), and suppose that a finite domain Dc exists in the 6-x plane such that:
a) no singular points are situated in Dc
b) all trajectories 6 (T), X(T) starting inside or on the boundary of Dc at time T = 0
remain in Dc for 0< T < 00. In this case (at least one) limit cycle must exist within Dc
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and all trajectories in Dc either.ll.I.l<., or approach as T-+ 00 a limit cycle.
Suppose that the parameters IC , 6 0, ~, -y , 6 1 = 0 satisfy the conditions
i.e. the origin is the only singular point
2) (IC-I+-y)2 < 4-y~60
3) IC > 1 + -yo
(75)
These imply that the eigenvalues X1 and X2 belonging to P( 6 = 0, x = 0) are
conjugate-complex with a positive real part, so the one singular point P(O,O) is an
unstable focus. Dc' of the 6-x plane is bounded internally by an infinitesimally small
elliptical core enclosing the origin and externally by the straight lines 6 = 6 0, x = I,
6 = -6 0 and x = -1 (Figure 3). It fulfills the premise of the Poincare-Bendixon theorem
that: a) there are no singular points situated in Dc' and b) all trajectories starting
from the boundary of Dc enter Dc and remain in Dc.
Premise a) follows from condition 1) of (75), according to which the origin is the
only sin~ular point.
Premise b) follows from the fact that according to conditions 2) and 3) of (75), the
origin is an unstable focus with all trajectories spiraling out of it and therefore
enterin ~ the core from its interior boundary Cj • Also, on the exterior boundary Ce:
dx/dT = [tanh(6+1C) -1] cosh(6+1C) < 0
dx/dT = [tanh(6-1C) +1] cosh(6-1C) > 0
for x = 1
for x = -1 (76)
d6/d T = --y [6 0 tanh(~x) + 60] cosh(~x) > 0
d6/dT = --y [6 0 tanh(~x) - 60] cosh(~x) > 0
for 6 = 60
for 6 = 60
(77)
and (76, 77) show that all trajectories crossing Ce are directed inward into Dc. From
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the Poincare-Bendixon theorem, it now follows that within a limit cycle. i.e. a
periodic solution of the equations of motion, C(t) must exist, and that all other
solutions starting from any point within Dc approach this limit cycle. Dc is a
domain of attraction for C(t). Assumptions 1-3) are sufficient but not necessary
conditions for the existence of a limit cycle. This means that there could also exist
limit cycle solutions under more general conditions for the parameters IC, 6 0 , 6 1, f3
and "I. On the other hand, it can be shown that there are initially quasi-cyclic
trajectories which break down into a stable solution after some oscillations.
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Fi&ure 3 Domain Dc with interior boundary Cj and exterior boundary Ceo All trajec-
tories enter Dc and remain in Dc as the flux lines at the boundaries show.
If assumption 3) of the existence theorem is changed into
1C<1+"I (78)
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the case for which the origin is the only singular point and is a stable focus is
obtained. The main importance of these two different types of solution lies in the
implied proof that whether or not an economy tends towards a stationary state, or
undergoes non-equilibrium oscillations, depends in a sensitive way on the decision
psychology of the entrepreneurs as expressed by the decision psychology parameters
exist. Ie, So' Sl' 13 and 'Y. In particular "critical values" of these parameters exist.
Crossing these critical thresholds elicits a transition from one type of solution into
the other. (See Ie = 1.6, which crosses the marginal case with a critical threshold value
of the coordinator Ie c = 1.5).
In Figure 4 a parameter combination is chosen for which the origin S = 0, x= 0 is the
only singular point, and a stable focus of the damping out of cyclic behaviour. This
phenomenon which troubles disequilibrium models in situations of zero-growth, is
but a special case among many others in the non-equilibrium model being discussed.
Sustained cycles occur for a parameter combination which satisfies the assumptions
of the limit cycle existence theorem. Figures 5a and 5b exhibit the limit cycle. Again,
the origin is the only singular point which, however, has now become an unstable
focus of the motion of the economy.
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Figure 5 (a) Trajectories in the 6 -x plane for one unstable focus at Pe(0,0) and one
limit cycle for Ie = 1.6, 60=0.5, 6 1 = 0, 13 =4 and Il. = 0.5. These ful-
fill the condition (75) of the limit cycle existence theorem.
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Figure 5 (b) Path of X(T) ( ) and 6 (T) ( no) for the parameters of (a). The
motion is periodic and traverses the limit cycle.
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6. CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN TIlE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BElWEEN 1956 AND 1978
It has just been demonstrated numerically by means of parametrical variation of
some of the influential factors in the model, that theoretical solutions can represent a
whole range of types of economic motion. A variety of periodic, symmetric and
asymmetric oscillations, and also some vanishing, accelerated and decelerated
fluctuations that approach an existing mean value trend line, or diverge towards a
new, higher or lower trend line, have been demonstrated. And it is exactly this
variety of possible types of motion which has to be explained when theory is
compared with the variety of economic motions observable empirically. It has
therefore been shown that by incorporating the micro-economic strategic
investment decisions of entrepreneurs into the model, macro-economic fluctuations
can be interpreted, and that the influence of macro-economic change on the micro-
economic level of entrepreneurship can be explained.
In devising a test for the model, with data for a real economy, two restrictions apply.
The first restriction is spatial. The non-availability of time series on industrial
strategic investments (expansionary and rationalizing) in some countries, narrows
down the choice of national economies to which the model can be readily applied. But
even in countries such as United States of America - where data are available, but
only for one type of strategic investment (expansionary) and not for the other
rationalizing type (the latter is reported with tactical investments or replacement) -
some relevant empirical regularities could be predicted using the model. For example,
modernization expenditures (Feldstein and Foot 1971) vary over time, while
replacement itself may be regarded as a constant proportion of capital stock:
(Jorgenson (1963), Jorgenson and Stephanson (1967». On the other hand, the
fluctuations in replacement and modernization expenditures are less pronounced
than the fluctuations in expansionary investment, which, according to Eisner (1978),
explain almost 80% of the variation in annual capital expenditures in the United
States' business sector. Consequently, it can be predicted, using statistical methods,
that the explanatory power of an investment analysis falls under the 80% line
suggested by Eisner if the analysis mixes expansionary investment with investment
for modernization and replacement, since the analysis of "strategic" investment
would be "contamined" with some "tactical" investment, namely for replacements.
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Conversely, the explanatory power of an analysis of industrial investment in plant
and equipment in the United States would probably exceed 80% if the analysis were
restricted to "strategic" investment proper, i.e. expansionary and rationalizing
investment (the latter now being buried under "modernization and replacement").
The availability of pertinent data is one of the reasons for the choice of the Federal
Republic of Germany as the test unit for analysis.
The second restriction upon the application of the model as it stands in temporal.
Times of discontinuity have been excluded from the test as these represent changes
in economic regime, or phase transitions. Although such transitions can be handled
by the model, additional theory (long term economic theory) would have to be
incorporated - for instance. in the form of an equation of motion for the coordinator
- in order to handle discontinuities systematically. It is well known that differential
equation models of only three coupled dynamic variables (e.g. the Lorenz model)
already possess "strange attractor" solutions side by side with those of the limit cycle
type. Though fully deterministic, such solutions could represent quasi-chaotic
economic motion. These questions of long term economic theory and mode
architecture, and how they relate to possible phase transitions in times of
discontinuity, will not be discussed further here (see, however, Mensch, Weidlich,
Haag, 1987).
For the period 1955-1980 data are available on expansionary and rationalizing
industrial investment in the Federal Republic of Germany, and moreover, this period
appears to be void of a major discontinuity. Nevertheless, this period certainly does
not build a continuum. In terms of economic policy and government regulation, it
can be divided into two main sub-periods each of about eleven years. The first four or
five years of the second sub-period can clearly be designated as "interventionistic".
Investment activity was therefore under the influence of the "regulator" 6 1 to
varying degrees, differing during the three periods 1955-1965, 1967-1971 and
1973-1980. The increasing g(t) mainly reflects the general increase in the total
number of investment projects. Furthermore, the technological base of German
industry changed and matured during these years, in more or less the way suggested
and modelled by Utterback and Abernathy (1975), as well as Mensch (1979), and
Mensch, Kaasch, Kleinknecht, Schnopp (1980).
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According to their findings. industries develop in terms of technology and market
structure. by going through stages which depend on the age of the technology and
other related factors in the particular industry concerned. The following regularity
holds for the post-war growth industries in most western countries: the 1950s were
dominated by product innovation in diversifying industry: the 1960s by process
innovation in concentrating industry. and the 1970s by pseudo-innovations in nearly
all industries; the 1980s are expected to be dominated by a cluster of basic innovations
in some key industries. Therefore it can be maintained that these patterns in the rate
and direction of innovation have created. and have been the consequence of, a high
degree of conformity in strategic behaviour (namely, in the timing of innovation,
synchronization of investment and imitation of business tactics) in the first
sub-period under consideration. In the second sub-period. on the contrary, there
appears to have been a low degree of conformity. This alteration is reflected in the
relative values of the "coordinator" Ie chosen in modelling the three periods .
Similarly. in the three periods the value of the "accelerator" V was chosen to be
"small". "medium" and "large", because it reflected
product life cycles as major industries advanced out of
effects (true product innovation) to minor
pseudo-innovation) which did not last very long.
the shortening of successive
a phase of large improvement
improvement effects (mere
In Table 1 the chosen values of the parameters are listed for the reader. who may
wish to replicate the empirical analysis that follows; the investment data for the
Federal Republic of Germany is given in Table 2.
Table 1 Model Parameters for the Economy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Period 60 6 1 g Ie V
1955-1965 0.13 10 0.5 -0.3 0.2 1.5 0.145
1967-1971 0.13 10 0.5 +0.3 0.5 1.5 0.225
1973-1980 0.13 10 0.5 -0.3 0.7 0.7 0.400
The original data were collected by a German institute for economic research (The
IFO-Institute in Munich) by means of questionnaires sent to a (representative)
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sample of German industrial corporations. They have been econometrically corrected
for a stronger rationalization bias (Mensch et.al. 1980), so that the regression line of
Figure 6a, which depicts the data, possesses a smaller intercept and a steeper descent
than it would have in the original data version, which incorporates an expansionary
bias. Figure 6b shows the investment structure data z(t), which is the investment
structure index Z(t) cleaned of the linear trend. Weidlich and Haag (1982) have
shown that the trend deviation pattern is robust, Le. insensitive to the form of the
trend functions. Also, since the investment structure index without trend is to be
used, the difference in built-in biases between the original data version and the
Mensch version should have no effect on the matching of the observed trend
deviations with the theoretical values calculated from the model.
Table 2 Investment Data for the Federal Republic of Germany 1956-78
Year R-investment E-Investment Z = (E-R)/ (E+R)
[109 DM] [109 DM]
1956 16.4 11.4 -0.183
1957 15.9 10.8 -0.197
1958 16.6 8.2 -0.342
1959 17.7 10.2 -0.274
1960 22.2 12.6 -0.282
1961 24.2 13.6 -0.282
1962 24.2 11.2 -.0369
1963 22.4 10.6 -0.360
1964 23.5 11.2 -0.360
1965 26.1 13.0 -0.342
1966 25.9 11.6 -0.388
1967 23.0 7.2 -0.527
1968 22.3 10.4 -0.369
1969 30.0 21.6 -0.162
1970 34.9 23.2 -0.205
1971 34.4 18.6 -0.298
1972 31.3 12.4 -0.439
1973 30.5 13.8 -0.379
1974 28.5 10.2 -0.471
1975 25.9 6.2 -0.626
1976 26.5 6.8 -0.626
1977 27.5 6.6 -0.613
1978 28.9 7.0 -0.613
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Figure 6a Investment structure index Z(t) = Zo + z(t) in the Federal Republic of
Germany 1956-1978 (data by IFO). A linear time dependence of the long-
term component ZO(t) (------) is assumed.
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Fi~ure 6b Short-term investment structure index z(t).
The long-term trend component ZO(t) of Figure 6a has been subtracted.
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Figure 7 shows the result of the empirical analysis, which consisted of a piecewise
application of the model to the set of parameters specified in Table I, for the three
periods 1955-1971, 1967-1971 and 1973-1980.
From the mid-fifties through the mid-sixties the matching external conditions chosen
correspond to those implying the existence of a limit cycle as indicated by the limit
cycle existence theorem. During these years, the Federal Republic was still enjoying
its "economic miracle", which was nurtured by both post-war reconstruction of plant,
equipment and infrastructure, and by a high rate of product innovation in a number
of growing international industries. A strong expansionary bias and bias
reinforcement (IC = 1.5), however, led to a strongly non-sinusoidal distortion of the
periodic motion of the investment structure index. Again, as in the case of the United
States, the fluctuation in expansionary investment explains most of the variation in
the economic indicators of aggregate change. Even in the expansionary phase.
industrial investors changed quickly to rationalizing investment after a relatively
short expansionary boom, and they only reverted slowly in the direction of
expansionary investment, even after a relatively long period of rationalization. Thus,
the effects of entrepreneurial decision processes, as reflected by the path of z(t) in
Figure 7, reveal a persistent, and perhaps growing concern for rationalization and
productivity advancement (even in the period 1955-65 when the economy expanded
at a high rate). On the other hand, preparations for the "quantum leaps" which
occurred were time-consuming. The development of new or better products, and the
planning of new or bigger plants to produce them, took place during the preceding
periods of growth in the business cycle.
During the period 1955-65, the strategic choice parameter 6 (t), the "alternator",
stayed only briefly in the rationalization mode and switched back quickly into the
expansionary mode as soon as rationalization investment strategy had taken effect.
From the mid-sixties onwards, however, the alternator took a different course,
staying mostly in the rationalization mode, and only rarely and briefly switching
over to ti,~ expansionary mode. The drop in the propensity to finance extended plant
and equipment, as well as the research and development work which leads to growing
business, is seen to occur as early as 1966 to 1967. As process innovation was the gist
of the rationalization atmosphere that prevailed from about 1965 on, a confirmation
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(--- ) and of the alternator 6 (t) (------) for appropriate choices of
trend parameters in comparison with the observed investment structure
data, West Gennan Industry 1956-1978.
224
of the Utterback-Abernathy model of product and process innovation has been
obtained with the use of German statistics. This indicates a fairly general switch-over
from product innovation to process innovation at about that time. Furthermore, as
already suggested by Mensch (1979), the seventies was a period of relatively weak
propensity to innovate both products and processing in comparison to the previous
years, and the time-path of the alternator found to fit the observed investment
behaviour does indeed portray the predominance of pseudo-innovation during
the 1970s.
During the late sixties , after the neo-liberal incumbant government fell, the newly
formed "Grand Coalition" in the Federal Republic of Germany resorted to a massive
expansionary policy programme. Its effect on the investment structure index is
clearly visible as an all-time peak in 1969/1970, called "Schiller Effect", after Schiller,
the accomplished Keynes economist who became both minister of finance and of
economic affairs. This irregularity in economic conditions has been adjusted for by
temporarily boosting the "regulator" 6 1. After the Schiller period, the regulator had
to be returned to its initial level in ord~r to achieve the fit depicted in Figure 7 for
the period after 1972. This may indicate more than the simple necessity to alter the
regulator in order to model unusual periods. It may lend further evidence to the not
unusual view that forceful demand management only forces industrial firms to
consider the supply side limits to growth more quickly.
Although some economists argue that the oil shock caused the "slumpflation" after
the hyperboom around 1970 (Freeman, Soete and Townsend (1982», an evolutionary
explanation may be more appropriate. For the period after 1971, it was not possible to
fit the observed motion of the investment structure index (net of trend) with model
data on the basis of parameters which satisfy the conditions of the limit cycle
existence theorem. The matching values of the "inflator" g - which could not be set
lower with the given price developments and of the "accelerator" '1/ - which
reflects the short-ended product life cycles of pseudo-innovations - fit together only
by using a "coordinator" value Ie below unity, which is in the realm of damped
fluctuations. Marketing managers speak of "a fluttering cycle" in reference to this
quasi-stationary state, in which the low amplitude and high frequency of the branch
cycles do not create either an upswing or a true downswing in macro-economic
aggregate.
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Obviously this is a state of high micro-economic friction and loss of activity, which
already carries the seeds for a transition into another cyclic stage in which the
investors' interaction parameter Ie would exceed the critical value Ie. Needless to say,
the economy need not necessarily resume its cyclic motion with an upswing from the
current intermediate level of investment activities.
This model is not designed to predict the investment structure index. But it can be
used for diagnostic purposes. If the data are meaningful and the model is reasonable,
(as the authors believe), then industry in the Federal Republic is in a state of
de-phasing (asynchronization of micro-economic developments for the diverse
firms, industrial branches and sectors). Thus, it is getting "ready" for a phase
transition, and preparing itself structurally for the breakthrough of a whole set of
basic innovations. Whether this will in fact take place, could only be answered by
further investigations which encompass many more factors than the short-term
business cycle theory presented here.
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Chapter 10
Complex Dynamics In Continuous Models of the
Business Cycle
T. PUU
1. IN1RODUCTION
The golden age of economic dynamics was the 1950s, when so many models - in the
form of difference, differential, and integral equations - were formulated. The
modelled processes were essentially nonlinear. Unfortunately, the results for the
nonlinear models were obtained by outright calculation with the means then
available, or - as it is nowadays called - by simulation. Of course, only small sets of
initial conditions could be dealt with in that manner. Accordingly, the results had a
more or less ad hoc character.
By contrast, the physical theory for linear oscillators and its well developed
mathematical tools provided a rich body of systematic knowledge, and the temptation
to work with linear accelerators and multipliers must have been great. After all, the
method of linearisation had worked well in physics and it was satisfying to obtain
explicit solutions in the shape of sinusoid motion or exponential growth.
However, there is a methodological snag in this. Linearisation is a first approximation
that can remain valid only in sufficiently small intervals for the variables.
Accordingly, the complete model cannot itself produce changes that force the
variables outside these intervals, or it will destroy its own assumptions. This is
precisely the case with explosive cycles and exponential growth. Moreover, standing
cycles or zero growth in linear models can only occur when the parameters stand in
a very specific relation in a structurally unstable model, bound to change
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qualitatively at the slightest penurbation (see Arnold, 1983).
Accordingly, the only thing that linear models can decently produce is a progressive
decay of any initial movement and a return to eternal equilibrium. One can then ask
in what sense the model is dynamic, as it is only capable of modelling the decay of
change introduced exogeneously. These facts must have been obvious to Hicks (1950)
when he introduced the concepts of "floor" and "ceiling", and to Goodwin (1951)
when he made the accelerator nonlinear. These, unfortunately, were exceptions to
the mainstream of linear modelling.
Hicks combined numerical results from calculations using his difference equation
model with intuitive reasoning of great insight. Goodwin, working with a continuous
time model, actually employed the Poincare-Bendixon theorem to demonstrate the
existence of a limit cycle.
The penurbation methods - developed in the 1950s and 1960s to deal with nonlinear
oscillatory systems when computation capacity was severely limited - would have
been useful for models of the Hicks-Goodwin type, but they never diffused to the
economics profession. Concerning these methods see Stoker (1950), Hayashi (1964),
Jordan and Smith (1977), and Kevorkian and Cole (1981).
Today the whole field of topological dynamics has experienced an explosive
development and fascinating phenomena such as bifurcations, catastrophes, strange
attractors, turbulence, and chaos have been studied. Some of these concepts have
disseminanated through the general public, such as the ignenious four volume set of
non-mathematical "canoons" by Abraham and Shaw (1982-85).
Reconsidering economic macrodynamics in this new light seems to be an interesting
task, particularly in the area of muliplier-accelerator models of the business cycle.
However, there still remains a choice of representation in discrete or in continuous
time. In general, discrete modelling is needed whenever actual computation or
empirical implementation is involved, whereas continuous formulations tend to be
superior for general theoretical reasoning. Primarily, however, the choice is one of
convenience. It seems to have been purely accidental that growth was modelled in
continuous time and business cycles in discrete time. Accordingly. we should feel free
to choose the most convenient representation.
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A useful continuous representation of a multiplier-accelerator process is the one due
to Phillips (1954). We take its formulation from Allen (1956). Denote income by Y,
investments by I, the propensity to save by s and the accelerator by v. Denote any so
called "autonomous" expenditures by A. Then we have
Y = >-.(A + 1- sY),
i = IC(vY - I)
(I)
(2)
where >-. and IC denote two adjustment speeds. Provided these speeds are infinite and A
is constant, we obtain the Harrod (1948) model of balanced growth with its familiar
solution Y = A/s + (Yo - A/s) exp [(s/v)t].
With finite adjustment speeds the appropriate procedure is to differentiate (1) once
more and then substitute from (1)-(2) to eliminate investments. In this way
(3)
is obtained. Depending on the sign of the coefficient of the Y term, the solution of the
homogeneous equation - obtained by deleting the autonomous terms - is an explosive
or damped harmonic oscillation with the exponential rate of damping a. = (>-'ICv-IC->-'s)/2
and the frequency Ul = ';(>-' IC s-a. 2). Due to the principle of superposition, the solution
may be added to any particular solution for (3). When A is independent of time, the
constant value A/s is such a particular solution.
2. NONLINEAR INVESTMENT FUNCTION
Hicks (1950) assumed that the linear accelerator vY is in action until the process hits
either of two linear constraints: the floor, when income decreases faster than capital
due to natural depreciation; or the ceiling, when income increases faster than other
essential inputs, which, unlike capital, are not endogeneous to the model. Goodwin
(1951) assumed that the response of investments to income changes, being governed
by the accelerator around the origin, tapers off asymptotically with large income
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changes.
A fonnalization would be to replace vY by vf(Y) where f(O) = 0, f(O) = 1 and Lim f(Y) =
+a, -b as Y -+ ± 00. A simple smooth function with these properties, employed by the
author in Puu (1986), is tanh (Y), where a = b= I, or its truncated Taylor series Y-
Y3/3.
We shall temporarily disregard the autonomous expenditures and record the resulting
nonlinear equation in its homogeneous fonn. In passing, note that as long as the
nonlinearity is confined to the Y tenn alone, the superposition principle still holds.
The homogeneous equation
(4)
is known as Lienard's equation. It has been shown to possess a limit cycle solution
under the assumptions concerning the investment function stated; see Jordan and
Smith (1977). There is even a constructive geometrical method for drawing the orbit;
see Stoker (1950) or Hayashi (1964). The conclusion remains valid even if the savings
function had been nonlinear as well, provided savings increase with increasing
income, as is generally assumed.
3. EXISTENCE OF A LIMIT CYCLE
It is instructive to see the reason for the existence of a limit cycle solution. To this
end, we multiply (4) by Y obtaining
1 d
(5)
2 dt
The parenthesis on the left hand side is an energy integral of Lyapunov type.
Equation (5) tells us when the system is gaining or losing energy. Suppose that the
rate of change of income is very close to zero. If the system is thus approaching its
equilibrium income, which, because of the homogeneous fonn (4) must itself be zero,
then the energy must become zero. However, suppose that
XIeV > Ie + Xs.
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(6)
As we have assumed that f(O) = I, there is a neighbourhood of the origin where f(Y) Y
is approximately equal to Y2, and so, according to (6), the right hand side of (5) is
positive. The conclusion is that if change is close to extinction then the system is
gaining energy, either in terms of an increasing kinetic energy Y2, or in terms of an
increasing potential energy y2, the latter being defined in terms of the deviation
from equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, Y is very large, either positive or negative, then the first term
on the right hand side of (5) is approximately linear in Y, with f(Y) Y always positive.
This is due to the assumption that always -b < f(Y) < a. The second term, being
negative, is still quadratic, and accordingly bound to dominate for Y sufficiently
large. Accordingly, the system is damped for large rates of change.
The combination of damping at large rates of change and antidamping at small rates
of change usually leads to limit cycles. We can deal with the existence problem
formally. First, let
Next define E sufficiently small for
(8)
to hold. When f is a smooth function with f '(0) = I this can always be done whenever
(6) is fulfilled. Consider the points in the Y, Y plane satisfying (7) for this value of E.
Then the right hand side of (5) is positive. and we conclude from (5) that E is
increasing over time. In other words, any trajectory crossing the elliptic boundary
defined by (7) is outward and never enters the interior of this ellipse again.
Let us now consider large values of E instead. Using definition (7) in equation (5), and
by subtracting 6 E from both sides we obtain
(9)
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For a sufficiently large E the right hand side of (9) obviously has to be negative due to
the fact the f( Y) is bounded. Accordingly we get
d/dt In E < 2l; (10)
for sufficiently large E. Now, l; can be made as small as we wish, and as the limit
decreases to zero we see that E has to decrease with time. By choosing l; sufficiently
small and E sufficiently large we see that the trajectory does not escape the ellipse
defined in the phase plane by (7). Accordingly, there is an elliptic annulus in the
phase plane from which no trajectory escapes.
Due to the Poincare-Bendixon theorem the system then moves to a limit cycle, as
there are no equilibrium points within this annulus. For a stringent proof of
existence along different lines and for somewhat more specific f-functions the
reader is referred to Jordan and Smith (1977).
4. APPROXIMAnON OF THE LIMIT CYCLE
In Figure I, the limit cycle for a particular case is illustrated along with trajectories
starting from the neighbourhood of the origin and spiralling to the cycle. The
function used was f(Y) = Y - y 3/3, and the parameters were chosen so that X = 2,
Ie = I, s = 0.5, v = 1.5. Accordingly, (4) becomes
y+y=y_Y3. (11)
The computation was obtained by a four point Runge-Kutta method. However, in the
literature on perturbation methods referred to in the introduction, there are explicit
calculation methods for successive approximations of a periodic solution once we
know that it exists. Formally, the methods only work when the nonlinearity is small,
but in practice quite good results are obtained with nonlinearities as large as in (11),
or in any instance of the more general formulation (4). We only need more terms, as
the relaxation oscillations occurring with large nonlinearities usually have
important higher harmonics.
Figure
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Limit cycle and some trajectories.
In an earlier publication, Puu (1986), the author used the two-timing method to
obtain a first approximation, not only of the final limit cycle, but of the transient
approach to it as well. Here we confine ourselves to the final limit cycle. The
perturbation method used is the following. First we rewrite (11) so that the right
hand side is multiplied by a "small" parameter t. Thus
(12)
We try to find a sOlution in the form of a power series
(13a)
where
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(J 3b)
We substitute (13a-b) in (12), so obtaining an equation expressed as a power series in
S equated to zero. We then equate all the coefficients to zero separately, obtaining a
series of differential equations which can be solved in sequence. The first ones are
and
Yo +Yo = 0, (14a-d)
obtained for powers 0 through 3 of S. Strictly, the series (13) converges for S~ I, but
quite good approximations can be obtained with S as large as in our case (11). The
calculations obviously become very complicated with ascending numbers of terms, so
we will try to find a four-term approximation.
Formally. we have to settle the question of initial conditions. We are free to choose the
origin of the time scale so that the rate of change of income is then zero. Accordingly
and
Y(O) =O.
(15)
(16)
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We note that we are not free to choose the initial amplitudes a priori. They must be
chosen so that the composite periodic movement has the amplitude of the limit cycle.
Approximating the limit cycle implies that we assume that we are on it already.
In the solution process, we always use the knowledge that the movement is periodic.
and so we eliminate all terms which may result in non-periodic solutions. In order to
leave sufficient freedom for adjustment of the basic period, the frequency is not
fixed. but remains adjustable according to (13). Only the first unitary frequency has
been fixed as it corresponds to the solution of the nonperturbed equation Y+ Y = O.
Periodicity also implies that (15)-(16) may be written
Yi(O) = O.
(17)
(18)
The first approximation (14a) is equal to the nonperturbed linear equation and so has
a solution in terms of sin T and cos T. The initial conditions (17)-( 18) settle it to
Yo = aa cos T. (19)
At the present stage aO is still underdetermined. From (19), we can readily calculate
YO =-aa sin T, YO =- aa cos T, and YO 3 =(3 sin T - sin 3T )/4 and substitute in the right
hand side of equation (14b). The latter then becomes:
(20)
This linear equation can be solved easily. In the general solution the cos T and sin T
terms would give rise to solution terms of the form T cos T and T sin T, which grow
unboundedly and hence are nonperiodic. (Such terms first appeared in Astronomy
and were called secular terms). As they violate the periodicity assumption. we have to
make the coefficients of the cos T and sin T terms equal to zero. Discarding the trivial
possibility that aO =0, we obtain wI =0 and aO =2/-/3.
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By the periodicity assumption we have simultaneously estimated aO and lil l' and this
will hold in all the following steps of constructing the solution. We note that (19)
becomes YO = 2/</3 cos 7, or
Yo = 1.1547 cos 7,
that (20) is simplified to
y 1 + Y1 =-2/</27 sin 37,
and that 7 = t in approximation number I, lil 1 being zero.
(21)
(22)
The next step can be discussed more briefly. The general solution to (22), now without
secular tenns, is
Y 1 = al cos 7 + b1 sin 7 + 1/</432 sin 37, (23)
where from the initial conditions (16) we immediately get b 1 = -1/</48. Again, al is
still not detennined until we have calculated the right hand side of (l4c) and equated
to zero the coefficients that would cause secular tenns to appear in the solution for
Y 2' At the same time lil 2 will be detennined.
Carrying this out, we find a1 = 0, lil 2 = -1/16. Accordingly, (23) becomes
Y 1 = -0.1443 sin 7 + 0.0481 sin 37. (24)
We note that at this stage 7
that 7 = 15/16 t.
We carry out two more steps:
t, but at the next stage periodicity has to be corrected so
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y 2 = 0.0812 cos T + 0.0361 cos 3T - 0.0060 cos 5T.
y 3 = 0.0135 cos T + 0.0720 sin T
- 0.0139 sin 3T - 0.0050 sin 5T - 0.008 sin 7T.
(25)
(26)
We also obtain that (J) 3 = 0, so we need not make any correction of the basic period, still
having T = 15/16 t. We find - comparing (21), (24), (25), and (26) - that the corrections
of the amplitudes of the lower harmonics become smaller and smaller, as do the
coefficients of the higher harmonics which are added at each stage. Accordingly. we
can be confident that the series converges to the actual limit cycle, even though we
have t = 1. Of course, the convergence would have been much faster if the nonlinear
perturbation had been really small. For t = lour approximate solution is simply the
sum YO + Y1 + Y 2+ Y 3.
In Figure 2 we illustrate the resulting approximated limit cycle in the phase plane,
along with the limit cycle found by numerical methods and depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 2 Limit cycle with four-term approximation
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Details and general justifications of the perturbation method can be found in
Kevorkian and Cole (1981). We should add that equations of the type (11) (called
Rayleigh equations from Lord Rayleigh's early studies of bowed string instruments)
are closely related to the van der Pol equations by mere differentiation and have thus
been studied extensively in mathematics applied to electrical engineering. See Stoker
(1950) and Hayashi (1964).
5. EXlENSION TO A lWO-REGION MODEL
In an earlier publication, Puu (1986), the author tried to show that really interesting
phenomena occur when models of the business cycle are put in a spatial setting with
interregional trade. This necessarily leads to a partial differential equation, which is
not difficult to solve when the equation is linear. See Puu (1982), Beckmann and Puu
(1985). However, the theory for nonlinear partial differential equations is far from
well developed. so one needs to proceed with mere simulation, which necessarily
becomes time consuming. An intermediate step would be to deal with two regions
only. For the case of one big and one small country. where the influence is
essentially unidirectional, we then deal with the case of a forced oscillator and have
recourse to some interesting general studies.
Let us now consider what happens in an open economy. Then exports and imports
must enter equation (1) and all the subsequent equations. Of course, we deal with two
countries and a pair of coupled oscillators governed by equations like
(27)
(28)
where Z denotes the income of the second country. The indices on the propensities to
save and to import refer to the countries. For simplicity, we can let all the other
structural constants be the same in the two countries.
Now, suppose that the second country is very large compared to the first one.
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Accordingly m 1 and m2 are small and so is Y compared to Z. Thus. without any
complications drop the ml Y term in equation (28) which thus becomes autonomous.
whereas (27) is complicated by a forcing term. Let us next suppose that the
investment function is vet - '1 3/3). and that the first approximation to the solution
given by (19) is valid. Then in general
(29)
where 00 2 = V [AIC (s2 + m2)] and Y is governed by the differential equation
(30)
This is still a Rayleigh equation. but now it contains a forcing term of frequency
00 2 = V (AIC (s2 + m2)], its own free frequency being 00 1 = V (AIC (s 1 + ml )]. It is well
known that in the case of an oscillator with a forcing term. there is nothing new if
the forcing frequency is similar to the free frequency. Then the forced system still
becomes a limit cycle. If the forcing frequency is substantially different. the
phenomena of frequency entrainment. quasiperiodicity. and chaos may set in.
To simplify things. let sl = 3/8. ml = 1/8. v = 3/2. A = 4/3. and IC
A =m2A2' B =m2B2' and 00 =002' Then
Y + Y = '1 - '1 3 + A cos (oot) + B sin (oot).
3/2. Moreover. define
(31)
Obviously the natural frequency is unitary. It is easy to make projections for this
system by using the same four-point Runge-Kutta method as before.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the range of possibilities as the driving frequency ranges
from 00 = 1.0 to 3.6 with a step of 0.2. V(A 2 + B2) being equal to unity all the time. We
can see how the system first produces limit cycles of the natural period of decreasing
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Figure 3 Behavior of forced nonlinear oscillator at various frequencies of the
forcing term
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amplitude as the driving frequency deviates more and more from the natural one.
Finally, the system falls into a complex movement that covers a space of non-zero
area measure. Still increasing the driving frequency, a hole opens up, until we
finally get new limit cycles with harmonic entrainment around the driving
frequency of 3. Further increasing the frequency, the system again falls into
quasiperiodic or chaotic movement. We see that around the driving frequency of 2
there is decidedly no limit cycle, at least with the assumed unitary amplitude of the
driving force.
Figure 4 shows what happens if we change the driving force amplitude from I to 1.2
and 1.5 respectively, keeping the frequency constant at 2. In the first case, a
harmonic response seems to be superposed on the natural cycle; in the second, the
natural frequency has been completely suppressed and the system has been
entrained at the driving frequency. We conclude that variations in both frequency
and amplitude of the periodic driving force can produce various kinds of complex
combination cycles, as well as chaotic motion.
In the cases illustrated up to now we have dealt with driving frequencies equal to, or
greater than unity. For integral frequencies, 2 and 3, we have seen that for suitable
amplitudes there may be combination cycles of the natural and the driving
frequencies. Another range of phenomena is revealed if we study the response to
fractional driving frequencies, 1/2 and 1/3, illustrated in Figure 5 and 6. We find that
entrainment can occur at these subharmonic frequencies as well. We can also see the
very complicated limit cycles that remind us of the period doublings on the road to
turbulence. See Feigenbaum (1983) and Abraham and Shaw (1982-85).
We shall now conclude this discussion of illustrative cases and proceed to discuss the
matter in more systematic terms.
6. THE FORCED NONLINEAR OSCILLATOR
We shall use perturbation techniques to study the behaviour of (31), rewriting it
thus:
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Figure 4 Various amplitudes (1.2 and 1.5) and frequency 2 of the forcing term
Figure 5 Various amplitudes (1.05/bottom/ to 1.25/top/ step 0.10) and driving
frequency 1(2 of the forcing term
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y + Y l;(Y - y3) + A cos (wt) + B sin (wt) (32)
The size of l; is now a little more troublesome than it was before, because we are
forced to work with the basic periodic solution alone, even though we know from
(24)-(26) that the higher odd harmonics are by no means negligible. However,
Hayashi (1964) has worked through the cases with large nonlinearities by means of
an analog computer and he has been able to confirm that the results obtained for
small nonlinearities still hold in a qualitative way, though not numerically, for the
relaxation case.
For the case of harmonic response we try to find a solution to (32) of the form
. Y =a(t) cos wt + b(t) sin wt (33)
where the coefficients are now slowly varying functions of time. This assumption of
slow variation is the basis of a set of approximations. Second derivatives ii and 'J) are
deleted, as are all powers and products of the first derivatives a and b. Likewise,
products of the small quantities a and b with the "small" quantity l; are deleted.
Finally as only the harmonic balance of the basic harmonic motion is studied, all
terms involving cos 3w t and sin 3w t are left out. Under these assumptions we get
l;Y = -l;wa sin wt + l;wb cos wt,
y = -w 2(a cos w t + b sin w t) - 2 asin w t + 2 bcos W t.
(34)
(35)
(36)
On substitution of (33)-(36) into (32), and equating the coefficients of cos w t and sin
w t to zero separately, as we must in order that (32) be identically satisfied by our
attempted solution, we obtain the two equations:
(37)
(38)
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Various amplitudes (l.65/bottom/ to l.80/top/ step 0.05) and driving
frequency 1/3 of the forcing term
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These are differential equations for the slowly varying amplitudes a and b. They are
best studied by a series of transformations of variables and coefficients which are
standard in the study of forced oscillators since the original work by van der Pol.
Andronov and Witt. See Stoker (1950) or Hayashi (1964). Let« =v3wa/2 and
~ = V3w b/2. We note that the new variables are ratios of a and b respectively to the
natural amplitude of the equation without forcing terms. as found in (21). Moreover,
they have been multiplied by the forcing frequency, which is not a common practice
in the study of van der Pol's equation. but which simplifies matters greatly as we deal
with an equation derived by differentiation of his own equation. The amplitudes of
the forcing terms are likewise related to the amplitude of the natural basic
oscillations by defming F = -A v3/2 and G = -B v3/2. Finally. we introduce the symbol
o for the "detuning",
o = (I-w 2)/w (39)
and define a new time scale T = t/2 to get rid of the multipliers of the left hand sides
of (37)-(38).
We obtain
. 2~ =-0« + (I-p )~-F
where
(40)
(41)
(42)
Let us keep in mind that P. unlike o. is no constant, but the radius vector of a point in
solution space for «. ~. Accordingly. the differential equations (40)-(41) are
nonlinear, containing cubic terms in the right hand sides.
According to van der Pol's original reasoning, harmonic entrainment according to
the attempted solution (33) is correlated with equilibrium points for the differential
equations (40)-(41). as determined by the algebraic equations
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(43)
(44)
By squaring both sides of (43) and (44) and incorporating definition (42) we get the
handy expression
(45)
Obviously, it determines the amplitude p for which a., 13 and, accordingly, the
amplitudes a and b are in equilibrium. The solution to (45) may have from one to
three real roots, depending on the detuning (dependent on frequency) and forcing
amplitude constants. We will study the possibilities in more detail later after making
some general comments.
In Figure 7 we show p 2 as a function of 0 for various values of F2 + 0 2. These are the
response curves to the forced oscillation. The figure also contains other curves which
will be explained later. In the diagram we find the amplitude of the harmonically
entrained oscillation, provided it can arise, I.e., if the corresponding equilibrium of
(43)-(44) is stable.
Fi~ure 7 Response curves and stability region of the forced nonlinear oscillator
Harmonic entrainment is thus correlated with a stable equilibrium point for
(40)-(41). We can now intuitively understand how a complex movement can arise.
I
11
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Suppose that there is just one real root to (45) which is unstable. As the system
(40)-(41) is obviously damped for large values of 0'. and ~, we can suspect that there is
a limit cycle. Accordingly, the coefficients of the cyclic movement as assumed in (33)
may themselves change cyclically. As there is no reason whatever why the
frequency of the change of the coefficients should be in a rational relationship to w,
we may expect space-filling orbits to be quite a common occurrence.
We shall now study the stability of the possible stationary states of the system
(40)-(41). For this reason, we linearize the system around a supposed equilibrium
state, and define the new variables ~ and T\ as the deviations of 0'. and ~ from their
closest equilibrium values. In this way we get
~ = (1 - 30'.2 - ~2)~ - (20'.~ - 0)T\, (46)
where, of course 0'. and ~ are evaluated at the equilibrium point. The stability of
equilibrium can now, according to Poincare, be decided on the basis of the trace, the
determinant, and the discriminant of these linear equations.
For the system (46)-(47) we obviously get
and
6. =T~-4 Det =4(p2 + 0)(p2 - 0).
(48)
(49)
(50)
The classification of equilibrium points is as follows. If Det < 0 then the point is a
saddle point, having one stable and one unstable direction in the ~,T\ - or 0'., ~-pl ane.
Consequently, the point is unstable. If Det > 0 then we have two cases, depending on
the sign of the trace. When Tr < 0 we deal with a stable node or spiral; when Tr > 0 we
deal with an unstable node or spiral. The sign of the discriminant just differentiates
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between nodes and spirals, depending on whether it is negative or positive. The most
important conclusion is that for stability we must have Det > 0 and Tr< O. See Jordan
and Smith (1977).
The latter condition obviously implies that p 2 must be greater than 1/2. This border
line between stability and instability is drawn as the horizontal straight line in
Figure 7. Along with the straight line, there is an ellipse in the Figure. representing
the locus of zeros for the determinant. Inside this ellipse. the determinant is negative.
and we deal with saddles. Accordingly, the stable equilibrium points must be outside
the ellipse and above the horizontal line. The diagram is due to Stoker (1950). Finally.
there is a wedge representing the locus of points with p 4 = (J 2, Le., points where the
discriminant is zero. Above the wedge we deal with nodes (or saddles inside the
ellipse), below it we deal with spirals.
The reader conversant with catastrophe theory may recognize that the pattern of
response curves looks like a representation of a catastrophe surface of the cusp
variety. For certain (J there are three values of p2. the middle one always being inside
the ellipse and hence unstable. So. if the "control parameters", (J and F2 + G 2, are
changed appropriately. we may experience sudden jumps of the "slow" amplitudes.
irreversible processes. and other phenomena associated with the cusp catastrophe.
See Gilmore (1981) or Poston and Stewart (1978).
There are also global characteristics which we may find for the non-linear equations
(40)-(41). First, we note that for c(. ~ sufficiently large, the third order terms will
dominate, because (J and F, G are bounded. Obviously it. and ~ will have signs opposite
to C( and ~ respectively, and the system is damped. Accordingly. if we draw a closed
curve sufficiently large to contain all the equilibrium points, then the sum of the
indices of the equilibrium points must be unitary, as follows from the Poincare Index
Theorem. See Henle (1979) or Firby and Gardiner (1982). We recall that in our list of
equilibrium points the index of a saddle is -I, that of a node or spiral 1 (whether
stable or unstable).
However. from (43)-(44) and (45) we can see that the number of singularities is at
most three, because (45) furnishes a third degree equation in p 2. It is helpful to
calculate the discriminant D of this cubic equation. We get
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(51 )
For D > 0 we have only one real root, for D < 0 we have three. With one equilibrium
point, Le. one root, we conclude that it must be a node or spiral according to the index
theorem. With three roots, we have as the only possibility two nodes (or spirals) and
one saddle.
Suppose we have just one singularity. We see that this case occurs with small driving
forces, as then D > 0 according to (51). From (45) we see that it is then likely for p 2 to
be small, which according to (49) means that the equilibrium point is an unstable
node. However, as the system was damped at infinity it is likely that the amplitudes a
and b in (33) themselves undergo a (slow) cyclic movement. When the two
frequencies are incommensurable. then we get a spacefilling trajectory. That this
occurs with small driving forces coincides with our findings from numerical
solutions.
As another interesting possibility. suppose we have three equilibrium points, one
stable node, one unstable node, and one saddle point. Then we may find that the
trajectories of slowly changing amplitudes start at an unstable node, pass closely by
the saddle, and finally end up at the stable node. As the a,b-system is passing the
saddle it goes extremely slowly, being close to an equilibrium, and so the solution (33)
may seem to settle down to a limit cycle with constant a and b. but finally it leaves the
neighbourhood of the saddle point and starts settling down to the final stable
equilibrium of (40)-(41), or limit cycle of (33).
A surprisingly rich set of possibilities can thus be found for the forced nonlinear
oscillator, including quasiperiodicity, transitory limit cycles, and harmonic
entrainment to the driving frequency. If we admit changes of the driving frequency
and force, we can expect things like sudden collapses of limit cycles which have
undergone continuous modifications only, and hysteresis.
We have limited the discussion to the case of harmonic entrainment and the
phenomena around it. The discussion can also be extended to subharmonic
entrainment. We shall not enter this matter. Reference should be made to Hayashi
(1964) at this point.
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7. COUPLED OSCilLATORS IN GENERAL
The case of the forced oscillator was arrived at by the simplifying assumption that the
transmission of business cycles via trade was unidirectional, as in the case of a small
open economy linked to the world market. However, it is certainly of interest to look
at the more general case where no import propensities are zero. We can by no means
be sure that even a weak coupling' both ways does not alter the results substantially.
For simplicity of algebra let us assume that >'ICV - IC - >'sl = >'ICV - IC - >'s2 = 1, and >'ICV =3.
Moreover, put >'1C(sl+ml)=w I 2, >'1C(s2+m2)=w22, and >'lCml= \.1.1' >' lCm 2=\.I.2·
Then (27)-(28) become
(52)
(53)
provided we again use the specification f(x) = x - x3 /3. The assumptions making the
coefficients of the linear and cubic terms in the first derivatives unitary have no
significance. They do not change the results from a qualitative point of view, and
they simplify the algebra considerably. To let the -accelerator terms be equal, of
course. is a special case. but presently we wish to isolate the influences of the
coupling amplitudes \.I. i and the natural frequencies w i which were found to be
crucial in the case of the forced oscillator.
In Figures 8 and 9 we show the results of numerical projection by a four-point
Runge-Kuua method for the system (52)-(53). In both cases \.I. 1 = \.I. 2 = I, whereas
w 1 = 1, w 2 = 2 in the first case and w 1 = 1, w 2 = 3 in the second. We have arranged the
phase portraits in the second and fourth quadrants in each picture. and placed a
Lissajou figure. showing the coupling between the oscillators, in the first quadrant.
We shall now try to analyze the case with perturbation methods along the same lines
that the forced oscillator was treated. So, we try to find a periodic solution with some
I
Ii
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unknown periodicity (I) for both Y and Z, introducing slowly varying phases
and amplitudes in terms of time dependent coefficients of the sine and cosine terms.
We try to find solutions of the form
Y = al (t) cos (I) t + b i (t) sin (I) t,
Z = a2(t) cos (l)t + b2(t) sin (l)t,
(54)
(55)
and again use the approximations deleting all terms of second order and higher as in
the case of (33) above. The equivalents of equations (37)-(38) are then
iE-------------+-------------~ y
Fil:ure 8 Phase portraits of two coupled nonlinear oscillators with frequencies 1:2
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z
i~---------+----------~Y
Y
Fi~re 9 Phase portraits of two coupled nonlinear oscillators with frequencies 1:3.
2 81 = [1- 3/4 w2(a12+b 12)] a1 + (w 12 - w 2)!W b1-1.l.1 b2
2 b1=_(w 12-w2>!CIla l + [1 - 3/4 w2(a1 2 +b 12)] b1 + 1.l.1 a2
2 a2 = [1 - 3/4 w2(a22 + b22)] a2 + (w2 2_ ( 2)!w b2 -1.l.2 b1
2 b2=-«(.I)22- (2)!w a2 + [1 - 3/4 w2(a22 + b22)] b2 + 1.l.2 a1'
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
These expressions can also be simplified considerably by a change of notation. We
define T = 1/2. «i = 'l/3wajl2. and!3i = 'l/3wb/2. Moreover. let
and
P.2 = «.2 + (.1.21 1 ""1' (60)
(61)
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With this notation
· 20'.1 = (1- p 1 ) 0'.1 + ° 1 l31 - 111 l32
· 2l31 =-01 0'.1 +(1-Pl ) l3 1 + 111 0'.2
• 20'.2=(l-P2 )0'.2 +02l32-112l31
· 2l32 =-020'.2 + (1- P2 ) l32 + 112 0'.1·
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
Equations (62)-(63) and (64)-(65) are very similar to (40)-(41), except that the given
forcing terms are replaced by linear coupling. The new equations are again of the
third order, which means that for sufficiently large values of the variables the third
order terms dominate. Accordingly, taking a sufficiently large hypersphere in the
four-dimensional phase space of the system (62)-(65), we find that all trajectories
point almost radially inwards. So the system is definitely damped at large values of
the variables.
Inside such a hypersphere there may be up to six equilibrium points of the system,
where the ai and bi in (54)-(55) are constant and there is a solution in terms of
syncronized limit cycles for the variables Y and Z. Some of them may be unstable
saddles or unstable nodes or spirals, and account for transitory limit cycles of Y and Z;
some may be stable and lead to final limit cycles. Of course, we can also have a single
unstable equilibrium which, in view of the damping at large amplitudes, would lead to
a limit cycle for ai' bi. Again, if its frequency is incommensurable with (J), we can
expect quasiperiodicity. Thus, the results conform with those we found by simulation.
Synchronized cycles as well as drifting ones are possible for the coupled oscillators.
To push formal analysis a little funher we equate (62)-(65) to zero, move the coupling
terms to the other side of the equality signs, square and add the equations thus
obtained pairwise. So,
[(1-P1 2)2 + 01 2 ] P1 2 = 111 2 P2 2
[(1-P22 )2 +022] P2 2 =112 2P 12
(66)
(67)
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corresponding to (45) are obtained. Substituting for one of the p i 2 from the other
obviously yields a sixth degree equation for the squared amplitude, which
demonstrates the assertion above.
We can also see how this relates to our previous discussion of the forced oscillator
case. Suppose I.L 2 = 0 Then (67) is independent of (66) and we find that - except for
the trivial case where Z is at rest, i.e., p 2 = 0 - the only solution is 0 2 = 0, P 2 = I. As
there is no detuning we can see from (61) that (&) = (&) 2 and we find from the definitions
of «2' 13 2 that a2 2 + b2
2 =4/3. which corresponds to the natural amplitude. The right
hand side of (66) is then constant and the analysis for this equation can follow the
lines indicated for the forced oscillator.
Finally, we can study the stability of (62)-(65) around an equilibrium point by
linearization . Defining ~i' 11 i as the deviations from equilibrium of « i' 13 i we find
l1 = (l - 3«1 2 -1312) ~1 - (2«1131 - 01) 111 -1.L1 112
~ 1 = -(2« 1131 + 01) ~ 1 + (l - « 12 - 31312) 111 + I.L 1 ~2
l2 = (l - 3«l-13l) ~2 - (2«2132 - 02) 112 -1.L2111
~2 = -(2«2 13 2 + 02) ~2 + (l - «22 - 31322) 112 + 1.L2 ~1·
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
The stability around any equilibrium of the system (62)-(65) can now be studied by
calculating the eigenvalues of the matrix of the linearized system (68)-(71). The use
of stability criteria is straightforward, but a little messy, as we deal with a four by
four matrix.
So far we have fol1owed the same routes as in the case of the forced oscillator, where
the forcing frequency was given a priori. According to (61) we get a pair of detuning
coefficients 0 l' O 2 for each choice of (&). and (66)-(67) then determine the amplitudes
P 1 and p 2. It is likely that the investigations of stability would render whole intervals
of (&) and the other variables as possible solutions. Thus, we may have missed some
additional piece of information.
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As a matter of fact, the system (62)-(65) is not quite like (40)-(41) as the fonner is
homogenous, but the latter is not. Inspection reveals that (62)-(65) has a zero
solution, «1 = f3 1 = « 2 = 13 2 O. To investigate its stability we could evaluate the
eigenvalues of (68)-(71), but it is instructive to deal with the stability problem
directly in tenns of a suitable Lyapunov function.
To this end let us multiply (68)-(71) by the expressions 1I-2~I' -1I-2"'I,-lI-l~2,11-1"'12
respectively and add. Then we get
This saddle dynamic for the amplitudes of the linearized system indicates that the
origin is unstable. The amplitude which dominates initially will grow beyond any
limit with the passage of time. Accordingly, we are not interested in the origin - i.e. a
zero solution for (62)-65) - except when instability at the origin combined with
damping for large amplitudes leads to a limit cycle.
How do we obtain a nonzero equilibrium for the system (62)-(65)1 Due to a basic
theorem in linear algebra, there is a condition for the system to possess such an
equilibrium, namely that the matrix of (62)-(65) have a zero detenninant. It does not
matter that P 1 and P 2 are themselves dependent on the variables « i and 13 j' A
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a nonzero stationary solution
is still that the coefficient matrix, where (l-p 1 2 ) and (l-p 22) are treated as constants,
has a zero detenninant. Calculating this detenninant and equating it to zero yields
(1-PI 2 )2(l-P2 2)2 + 022(l-PI 2 )2 + 01 2 (l-P2 2 )2 + (11-111-2- 01 0 2)2 =
-211-111-2(l-Pl 2 )(l-P22 ), (73)
which is a new expression independent of (66) and (67). It may thus be of some help
for the detennination of the resonance frequency (j) •
Let us next multiply both sides of (66) and (67) and cancel the nonzero P j 2 .
Multiplying out the parentheses we get
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Subtracting (74) from (73)
(75)
is obtained. Finally, substitution from (75) into (74) yields
(76)
These two expressions are useful. We can immediately see that substitution from (75)
into (76) yields
(77)
Subtracting (75) twice from (76) we also get
(78)
Equations (77)-(78) easily determine the amplitudes once the detuning coefficients
are known. To determine these we have to consider that we have not used all the
information contained in (66)-(67). From (77) we can see that the squares of the LHS
terms are equal. Accordingly from (66) and (67) we have
o 2 p 4/ 11 2_ 0 2 p 4/ 11 21 1 "'1 - 2 2 "'2'
or, in view of the fact that 0 1 and 02 have equal signs
It is now obvious that (77), (78), and (79) together with (61) determine the detuning
constants, the amplitudes and the common frequency of the two coupled oscillators.
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8. CONQ.USION
The more general spatial differential equation studied in Puu (1986), namely
where V 2 Y = a 2Y/ax 2 + a 2Y/ay2 is the Laplacian operator and x, yare the euclidean
two-space coordinates, is much more difficult to analyse. The literature available on
nonlinear partial differential equations is not encouraging. For a one-dimensional
space. the case of s = 0 has been studied in connection with wind-induced oscillations
in overhead lines. See Myerscough (1973. 1975). Preliminary simulations which the
author has made with nonzero s indicate that the results obtained are of some
relevance for our case. Anyhow, the case of continuous space is likely to introduce
new interesting phenomena. some of them associated with the influence of boundary
conditions.
Except for formal elegance, the author prefers continuous processes in time and
space to discrete ones, due to the fact that discrete formulations are much more likely
to produce abrupt and chaotic solutions. Accordingly. it is not very surprising to find
them in discrete processes, and their occurrence may sometimes be associated with
non-realistic features of the modelling in difference equations of low order.
As an example. let us consider the most elegant theory of population growth and
diffusion due to Hotelling (1921). Only the section concerning the growth process
concerns us here. If P denotes population. the process is formulated as P = K(S-P)P,
where K is some constant and S is the "saturation level" of population. The process is
modelled after Malthusian principles where population first grows almost
exponentially. due to natural multiplication. As the saturation size is approached, the
means of living become more scarce and the process goes asymptotically to the
saturation limit. The solution is the well known logistic curve and there is nothing
mysterious about it.
On the other hand, the discrete counterpart of this process Pt = K(S-Pt_1)P t_1 is
known as a prototype for chaos; see Feigenbaum (1983). Although the findings are
most interesting. one may question the realism of this momentary mating for all
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individuals at completely regular intervals. It seems like the hog-cycle model in
elementary economics, where all pig-owners make a decision at Christmas
concerning the supply one year ahead. It is well known from oligopoly theory that
any distribution over time of the responses of the individual agents tends to smooth
out the most abrupt results of low order difference equations. In general, therefore, a
continuous process more closely mimics reality.
The contention made here is that the complex dynamics described above is more
interesting than the corresponding phenomena in discrete business cycle models.
The latter can slip into the theoretical construction process due to bad modelling
principles.
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Chapter 11
Generalizations of Goodwin's Growth Cycle Model
J. GLOMBOWSKl and M. KRUGER
1. INTRODUCTION
Goodwin's application of the predator-prey model from mathematical biology to
theoretical economics has stimulated a considerable stream of follow-up work,
including some of our own 1). Of course, Goodwin was quite aware that his model was
"starkly schematized and hence quite unrealistic" (Goodwin 1972, p. 442). While this
statement provided ample opportunity for extensions and generalizations, the main
stimulus for modifications should be based, at least in our view, on the basic
cycle-generating mechanism of the model. In contrast to many earlier contributions
by Goodwin to business cycle theory, this mechanism is not a Keynesian, but rather a
Marxian one. This is because real wage increases are positively related to
employment: whenever the rate of employment exceeds (falls short of) its 'normal'
level, wage rises (declines) increase (decrease) the wage share in net product. On the
other hand, accumulation and labour demand fall below (rise above) their 'normal'
level, whenever the profit share does. This idea can be traced back to the 'general law
of capitalist accumulation' (Marx 1974, pp. 574-606) which has also been discussed in
more recent Marxist works (Bauer 1986, Sweezy 1942, Itoh 1980). However, it was not
given a mathematical formulation until Goodwin combined the Marxian idea with
Volterra's (1931) predator-prey model from mathematical biology.2)
This employment-distribution mechanism can be seen as an important aspect of
cyclical capital accumulation, but some other relevant aspects are missing. The model
contains neither international economic relations, nor money and asset markets, and
it ignores the economic role of the state, as do many real business cycle models. But it
also neglects some typical Keynesian topics like product market disequilibria, and the
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divergence between real and money wages. The Marxian ideas of non-neutral
technical progress and the social determination of labour productivity are also
omitted.
This paper aims to analyse the economic effects of the latter aspects within a model of
capital accumulation along Marxian lines. We shall consider the employment-
distribution mechanism as the cycle-generating factor, and our modified system
provides us with a kind of sensitivity test of the original model. Moreover, the
modifications may make Goodwin's system more realistic. We shall focus upon four
particular modifications:
(1) Production will not be determined by the size of the capital stock and a fixed
capital-output-ratio, but rather by an adjustment mechanism with respect to excess
demand.
(2) Work intensity may decline as the degree of employment rises, indicating an
increase of workers' resistance in the labour process as their position vis a vis the
capitalists is strengthened.
(3) Technical progress in the form of Harrod-neutrality is allowed to vary in speed,
Le., it shows simultaneous and identical changes in the growth rates of labour
productivity and capital intensity. Additionally, technical progress may become
non-neutral.
(4) Variations in the real wage rate result from assumptions concerning both money
wage formation and price setting behaviour.
None of these modifications are new. The production adjustment mechanism has been
used in Post-Keynesian business cycle theory, e.g. by Phillips (1954) and Bergstrom
(1967). Variations in work intensity, induced by labour market conditions, have been
emphasized by Radical economists (cf. Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf 1983). Non-neutral
technical progress occurs in Kaldor's growth theory as temporary deviations from
the equilibrium point on the technical progress function (Kaldor 1957, p. 267), while
permanent non-neutrality - in the form of a rising organic composition of capital - is
a central theme in Marx (Marx 1974, p. 582ff.). Keynes emphasized the distinction
between real wages and money wages in general, and the possibility of their inverse
movement (Keynes 1973, p. 9ff.). Since then, the use of nominal wage functions,
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(such as the augmented Phillips-curve), together with price-setting assumptions,
(e.g. the mark-up hypothesis), has become familiar. We shall proceed along the lines
suggested by Solow and Stiglitz (1968).
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 the general version of the model,
employing all modifications simultaneously. is introduced. Section 3 is devotea to a
simplified case which gives rise to a Goodwin-type solution. Le., a closed solution
curve of the wage share in income and the rate of employment in the phase space.
While the assumption of neutral technical progress is preserved. the effects of a
varying speed of technical progress and of variations in work intensity are
considered in section 4. Section 5 deals with non-neutral technical progess under
simplified assumptions. while the general model is taken up again in section 6.
Finally, the results are summarized and further possible modifications are suggested.
2. TIlE GENERAL MODEL
In formulating the general model, we have to introduce a large set of equations.
variables and parameters. Although this may appear cumbersome, it seems to be
unavoidable in order to clarify our main assumptions. All equations will be given en
bloc first and, subsequently, will be discussed in some detail. While the symbols are
defined immediately after the equations, for convenience the reader will also find a
list of symbols in the Appendix. The model is formulated in continuous time. Time
derivatives are denoted by a dot, e.g. dx/dt == X, while growth rates will be indicated by
a hat, e.g. x/x == i.
The general version of the model consists of the following nineteen equations:
P=O'K
r =P/y
Y=8P
L=h8r
v = K!Y
y = Y/L
(P/f)=1L1 + 1L2(K/f)
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
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w = w/p (2.8)
A = w/y (2.9)
(K/r)=vl +v2 A (2.10)
13 = L/A (2.11 )
A=n (2.12)
h = -'Y 1 + 'Y2 13 = iP(I3) (2.13)
w= -al + a2 13 + a3 p (2.14)
if = -b i + b2 8 + b3 w (2.15)
II = (1-A) Y (2.16)
K=cII (2.17)
S = sw>-Y + s1T1I (2.18)
Y= 6(K-S) (2.19)
Equation (2.1) postulates a technical relation between the capital stock (K) and
maximum net production (P) obtainable it in the absence of a labour shonage. We
might call (l the 'technical capital productivity'. As we shall see later, it is assumed to
be a variable. (2.2) is a second technical assumption. It relates maximum net
production to labour requirements (r), necessary to obtain maximum production
under conditions of maximum work intensity. We might call 'Y the 'technical labour
productivity'. It will also be considered as a variable. Our model allows for changes in
capacity utilization and work intensity. Therefore, 'technical' and 'actual' factor
productivities will generally differ. Equation (2.3) defines the rate of capacity
utilization (8) as the share of actual net output (Y) in maximum net output. If capacity
utilization falls shon of its maximum, only a pan of the available capital stock is used
and - under constant returns to scale - only 8 r units of labour are required to
produce Y under conditions of maximum work intensity. Now let h be a labour
inefficiency index which is equal to 1 if work intensity is at its maximum, and rises in
proportion to decreases in work intensity. As equation (2.4) shows, the actual
necessary labour input or employment (L), is linked to labour input under full
capacity utilization and maximum work intensity by the rate of capacity utilization
and the labour inefficiency index. Equations (2.5) and (2.6) describe the standard
definitions of the (actual) capital coefficient (v) and (actual) labour productivity (y).
Figure 1 provides a schematic account of the relations between the variables
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introduced so far.
(J---.~
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Figure 1 Relations between variables involved in the technical progress function
For the sake of clarity, let us state the relations between the 'technical' and the
'actual' versions of the capital coefficient, labour productivity, and capital intensity.
Taking the definitions into account it follows that:
K K 1
v=-=-y p e
Y P 1
y=-=- -
L r h
K K 1
L r he
(2.20)
(2.21)
(2.22)
These distinctions are quite useful. Consider (2.7). which is a modified version of
Kaldor's technical progress function in its linear form: the growth rate of technical
capital productivity is assumed to depend linearly on the growth rate of technical
capital intensity. Kaldor defined his original function in terms of the growth rates of
I
I
1,1
I:
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A
the actual variables, Le., (Y/ L) and (K/L). Now, applying (2.21), (2.22), and (2.7), we
can show that our assumptions imply, in Kaldor's variables, the technical progress
function
A A A
(2.23)
Therefore Kaldor's function does not seem to be well-defined in accumulation models
which include variable capacity utilization and work intensity. Unless these
variables are kept constant, his function is subject to permanent shifts. Now these
problems can be avoided if the economic hypothesis underlying the technical
progress function is expressed in terms of technical variables as in (2.7).
Equation (2.8) defines the real wage rate (w) as the fraction of the money wage rate
(w) and the price level (p). The wage share in net product (X) is then defined as the
fraction of the real wage rate and actual labour productivity, as in (2.9). A
'mechanization function' is introduced in (2.10). According to this function, the
growth rate of technical capital intensity is related to income distribution in the
sense that mechanization is encouraged by a high wage share, i.e., high labour costs
per unit of net product.
The technical progress function and the mechanization function are both depicted in
Figure 2. According to the assumptions about the four parameters Il. 1 ' Il. 2' V 1 and V 2 '
one can distinguish various cases. Consider for instance:
In this case technical capital productivity (1 will remain constant. However, this
assumption leaves room for different speeds of technical progress because the
growth rates of technical labour productivity and technical capital intensity, which
are equal, may become higher or lower, depending on the level of the wage share.
Technical progress would occur at a constant rate only if, in addition, V 2 = O.
Another interesting case is
Figure 2
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pjr
Technical progre&8 fundion
pjr = 1'1 + 1'2(KjrJ
1'1 = 0, 1'2 = 1
1'1 > 0 , 0 < 1'2 < 1
1'1 = 0, 0 < 1'2 < 1
o Kjr
Mechanization runcLion
Kjr = vI + v2A
Vl > a
11, > 0
The technical progress function and the mechanization function
In this situation technical capital productivity «(1) is bound to fall steadily. An
exception is the special case v 1 = 0 in combination with a vanishing wage share. Type
(b) as a technical progress function could be labelled 'Marxian', because it reproduces
the Marxian assumption of the permanent rise of the technical composition of
capital.
Finally. we may consider the specification
(c) 1J.1>O. O<1J.2<1,
which can be called 'Kaldorian' as it provides for the possibility of a constant
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technical productivity in equilibrium. An appropriate positive steady-state wage
share would exist, while fluctuations of income distribution around its equilibrium
value would give rise to phases of non-neutral technical progress of either capital
saving or labour saving type.
The rate of employment (13) is defined in (2.11). It is the fraction of actual labour
requirements (employment) to labour supply (A). As may readily be seen. we apply
in (2.12) the standard assumption of constant growth (with the rate n) for the supply
side of labour. The rate of employment affects work intensity in a way described by
(2.13). The labour inefficiency index will rise whenever the rate of employment is
'high' (13 > Y 1/ Y 2) and h will decline if 13 < Y 1/ Y 2' This assumption tries to reflect the
influence of the employment situation on workers' capability to resist work pressure
by various means of restrictive practices. As the growth rate of the labour
inefficiency index increases with rising employment, the rise of actual productivity
would lag behind that of technical labour productivity in a boom. This negative effect
on productivity could be compensated for by a reduction of labour hoarding in the
course of a boom. However, in the present model we have decided to neglect this
significant effect. 3)
A rising rate of employment is also assumed to affect wage increases. While Goodwin
stipulated a real wage growth/employment relation, equation (2.14) indicates that the
growth rate of nominal wages (.;.) depends on the rate of employment. Moreover, the
inflation rate (p) is assumed to contribute to wage increases too, because workers try
(and succeed) to get partial compensation for price increases. On the other hand, the
inflation rate is thought to depend on wage increases as well as on capacity
utilization, cf. (2.15). It is assumed that capitalists react to rising costs and rising
demand by raising the prices of their products.
Profits (II) are defined as residual, i.e., non-wage income; see (2.16). Therefore, we
implicitly define income such that it is equal to the net product.4 ) In addition we
assume that a constant share (c) of profits is invested, Le.• transformed into capital
(K), cf. (2.17). Savings (S) are described by Kaldor's saving function, stated as (2.18),
where Sw and sll ' 0 < Sw < sll < 1, denote the specific saving ratios out of wages and
profits, respectively. Savings and investment plans are uncoordinated. which means
that their planned volumes may differ. The realized values may also differ because we
assume that planned investment can be realized, if necessary, by making use of the
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stock of investment goods. As our definition of the capital stock does not include
unplanned inventories, the standard ex post identity between savings and investment
does not apply. Differences between savings and investment are equivalent to
differences between net production (=income) and demand. Equation (2.19) describes
a rather standard adjustment principle. Production will be adjusted to either excess
demand (K > S) or to excess supply (K < S). The constant parameter 5 may be called
the 'production adjustment coefficient'.
It will shed some light on the character of our model and its variation from the
original Goodwin model to specify the parameter restrictions under which our model
would be transformed into its original form:
(l) For c = s'TT = 1 and Sw = 0, Goodwin's identity of profits, savings and investment
would be restored. The production adjustment equation (2.10) would have to be
omitted, and capacity utilization (8) should also be equal to one in order to determine
the actual production level (Y) by its maximum (P).
(2) Work intensity must be kept constant. Therefore both parameters y 1 and y 2 have
to be equal to zero, cf. (2.13); moreover, the labour inefficiency index must be fixed at
a certain level, e.g. h = 1.
(3) Technical progress must become Harrod-neutral and proceed with a constant
rate of growth. Thus 111 > 0, 11 2 = 0 (cf. (2.10» and Il. 1 = 0, Il. 2 = 1 (cf. (2.7». In other
words, the technical capital intensity would grow with an exogenously given rate and
the technical progress function would be identical with the 450 -line.
(4) Finally, the restriction b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 would provide for a constant price level;
cf. equation (2.15). The rate of employment (13) would once again determine real wage
rather than money wage changes.
Our general parameter restrictions given below can be seen to allow for a revival of
Goodwin's assumptions with one exception: The production adjustment mechanism -
and thus later the variability of capacity utilization - is preserved. The other
possibilities for simplifications will be used in various combinations in the later
sections. Throughout the paper, unless stronger restrictions are explicitly imposed,
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we apply the following set of parameter restrictions:
111 ~ O. 1 ~ 112 > 0
VI ~ 0 • V2 > 0
n ~ 0
al > O. a2 > O. 1 ~ a3 ~ 0
b i ~ O. b2 ~ O. 1~ b3 ~ 0
> c > 0
6 > 0
> a3b3
g: =C-(S1T-SW) >0.
(2.24)
(2.25)
(2.26)
(2.27)
(2.28)
(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.31)
(2.32)
(2.33)
(2.34)
Only the last two restrictions need some explanation. We assume (2.33) to preclude the
wage - price spiral running into hyperinflation. By (2.34) it is assumed that a rise in
the profit share (II IY) will induce an increase of the investment share ahead of the
savings ratio. From (2.16) to (2.18) we get
which in turn implies
(2.35)
d (KIY - SlY)
d (illY)
cf. (2.34).
> 0 (2.36)
It should be emphasized that "underconsumptionist" thinking would rather postulate
the opposite; i.e. that a rising wage share would stimulate demand and expansion of
production. Our present assumption seems to fit 'profit squeeze' versions of Marxist
cycle theory more closely. 5)
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We can now take two steps to reduce the model to a system of only four equations. The
first step consists of the transformation of the original functions into equations
containing growth rates. From (2.6), (2.11), and (2.12) we obtain
~=Y-y-n
while (2.9) implies
(2.31)
(2.38)
The growth rate of actual production (Y) is found from (2.16)-(2.19) to be a function f
of the wage share:
yo = 6[g(1-A)-SW] = f(A). (2.39)
Note that, as a consequence of (2.34), the growth rate of production declines as the
wage share rises.
Next, we shall express the growth rate of actual labour productivity by means of the
variables affecting it. From (2.21) we get
y = (P/r) - h (2.40)
This equation demonstrates that the growth rate of technical labour productivity has
to be corrected by changes in work intensity to obtain actual productivity. Now h is a
function of the rate of employment, and P / r can be shown - from the technical
progress function and the mechanization function - to be a function u of the wage
share
(2.41 )
Consider the growth rate of the real wage rate which appears in (2.38). It follows
from its definition, as well as from the price and money wage functions, (2.14) and
(2.15), that real wage growth depends on the rate of employment (13) and capacity
utilization (8). We find that
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(2.42)
where ~ 1(13) and ~ 2 (e) are the following simple expressions:
(2.43 )
and
(2.44)
Unfortunately, capacity utilization cannot be expressed directly in terms of the wage
share and/or the rate of employment. Its growth rate, however, follows from (2.20) as
the difference of the growth rates of the technical and the actual capital coefficients:
(2.45)
From the technical progress function and the mechanization function, KIP is found
to be a function 'if of >. :
(2.46)
(2.5) implies
(2.47)
Finally, the growth rate of the capital stock is derived from (2.16), (2.17), and (2.5) as
a function z of the wage share and the actual capital coefficient
~
K = z<X,v) = c(l- >.)/v. (2.48)
We are now prepared to show that the model can be reduced to a system of four
non-linear differential equations in the rate of employment, the wage share, the rate
of capacity utilization, and the actual capital coefficient. We state the equations en
bloc first and comment afterwards on their derivation.
~ = [IP(~) + f(X) - u(X) -n] ~
>. = [IP(~) + 4>1 (~) - u(X) - 4>2(6)] x
e= [\jI(X) + f(X) - z(X,v)] 6
V = [-f(X) + z<X,v)] v
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(2.49)
(2.50)
(2.51)
(2.52)
The differential equation for the rate of employment (2.49) follows from (2.37) by
successive substitutions from (2.39) - (2.41), and (2.13). Likewise, we obtain the
equation for the wage share (2.50) by replacing the elements of the right-hand side
of (2.38) by (2.40) - (2.44) and (2.13). As far as equation (2.51) is concerned, we start
from (2.45) and take into account (2.46) - (2.48) as well as (2.39). Finally, the equation
for the actual capital coefficient (2.52) follows from (2.47), (2.48), and (2.39).
In the general case, Le. operating with all modifications, the model cannot be reduced
further. This is due to the fact that capacity utilization influences price formation
and, by virtue of that, enters equation (2.50) as one of the variables governing the
movement of the wage share. Otherwise, (2.49) and (2.50) would form an independent
subsystem in the rate of employment and the wage share only.
Before considering the model in its most general version (see section 6), some
simplified cases shall be discussed in the next three sections.
3. A SIMPLIFIED GOODWIN-LIKE CASE
Under various simplified assumptions a result which is rather similar to that of
Goodwin's original model can be established. In this section we ignore the effect of
the rate of employment on work intensity:
IP(~) =0
Secondly, by assuming that
(3.1 )
(3.2)
we exclude all forms of technical progress except the neutral one at constant pace.
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This implies that
\jf (>-) =KIP =0 and (3.3)
(3.4)
Finally, we remove any influence of capacity utilization on distribution; Le. we
stipulate that
(3.5)
(3.5) can be assured by assuming, alternatively,
(3.6)
or
(3.7)
The latter assumption means that workers are able to defend themselves against price
increases by obtaining wage rises instantaneously at the same rate. The former
assumption implies that capacity utilization has no influence on price formation.
While both alternatives are restrictive, the reader may choose for himself the less
unrealistic one.6 ) We shall proceed by applying (3.6). Note that, if (3.7) was assumed
in addition, some of the formulae would become much simpler.
As may readily be checked, the system (2.40) - (2.52) is now transformed into
~ =[f(>-) - 11 1-nJ f3
~ =[~1 (f3) -111) >-
v = [-f(>-) + Z(>-,V)] V
B = l/(O'v) 0' = const.
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11 )
While equations (3.8) - (3.10) need no explanation, we should comment briefly on
(3.11). It is simply a consequence of equation (3.3). If the technical capital coefficient
is assumed to be constant, its inverse, the technical capital productivity 0', must also
be constant. Then, from (2.20) we get capacity utilization as a simple function of the
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actual capital coefficient.
The system (3.8) - (3.11) has a steady state solution. Moreover, it is decomposable
because (3.8) and (3.9) depend on 13 and X only. The equilibrium values are as follows:
Xe = [6 (g - sw) - ('111 + n)] /( 6 g)
13 e = ['11 1(1- a3 b3) + a1(1- b3) - b1(1- a3)] / [a2(1- b3)]
ve = [c(1 - Xe)] / [6g(1 - Xe) - sw]
Be = 1/(uve)·
(3.12)
(3.13 )
(3.14)
(3.15)
As to the dynamic behaviour of the present case, consider the Jacobian of the
independent subsystem (3.8) - (3.9), linearized around the equilibrium point, Le.,
where
(3.16)
(3.17)
This gives rise to a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues
(3.18 )
Thus we obtain a center-type solution, Le., the same qualitative result as in Goodwin's
model. The period of the cycle is given approximately by
(3.19)
Numerical examples show that with reasonable parameter choices the period becomes
considerably shorter than in Goodwin's case. Although Goodwin's model has been
criticized for producing cycles which are too long to explain business cycles7), our
modification may serve to demonstrate that a business cycle model with realistic
periods might be developed along Goodwinian lines. The parameters underlying
I
I
I
,I
I
II
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Figure 3, showing a closed solution curve in the X,13-space, produce cycles of
approximately 8.7 years. This curve has been calculated from (3.8) and (3.9) by means
of Runge-Kutta-methods.
{J
0.95
/
0.90
0.85
0.69 0.74 0.79
Parameters: 1J..1=O, 1J..2=I, vl=O.04, v2=O, 'Yl=O, 'Y2=O, 6=4,(7=0.55,
c=O.Ol, c=OA, n=O.OI, s11=0.24, sw=0.04, a1=0.9, a2=1, a3=0.99,
b1=1.9, b2=0, b3= 0.6
Equilibrium values: 13 e=0.8931, Xe=0.7375, 8 e=0.86580087, ve=2.1
Initial conditions: 13(0)=0.95, X(O)=X e, 8(0)=8 e, v(O)=ve
Number of iterations: 88, step size: 0.1, number of years: 8.8,
length of cycle: 8.8
Figure 3 Cyclical Behaviour in the Case of Production Adjustment Only
4. VARIABLE SPEED OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND CHANGES IN WORK
INTENSITY
In this section we reintroduce the variability of work intensity, Le., we apply
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equation (2.13). Moreover, we allow for a variable speed of neutral technical progress
by assuming
(4.1)
The latter assumption takes into account the impact of income distribution on
mechanization, without affecting technical capital productivity, however. The set of
assumptions (4.1) implies that
(4.2)
and
and we obtain the following system:
~ = [IP (13) + f (X) - v l -v2 h- n] 13
X=[IP (13) +~I(li)-vI-V2h]h
v=[-f (X) + z (X,v)] v
8 = 1/(ov) .
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
As in the case of section 3, the first two equations form an independent subsystem in
13 and X, and once again there exists a steady state solution. The equilibrium values
tum out to be
l3 e = [(1-a3b3) (Sg('Y l+v I) + V2[S(g-sw)-n])] / [a2(I-b 3)(v2+Sg) + 'Y2Sg(1-a3b3)] +
+ {[al (1-b3) - b l (1-a3)] (v2+S g») / [a2(1-b3)(v2+Sg) + 'Y 2Sg(1-a3b3)] (4.8)
Xe = [S(g- sw)-v I - n -'YI + 'Y213e] / (v2 + Sg)
ve =[cO - Xe)] / (S [g(l- Xe) -sw])
8 e =1/(0 v e) .
Evaluating the Jacobian at the equilibrium point yields
(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11 )
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where
A = lP'(Pe) Pe = 1'2Pe > 0
B = [f(>'e)- V2] Pe =-(6g + V2) Pe < 0
C = [ lP'(P e) + ~ l' ( l3e)] Ae = [1'2 + a2(1- b3) / (1- a3b3)] Ae > 0
(4.12)
(4.13)
(4.14)
(4.15)
Instead of zero entries in the main diagonal, we have a positive one (A) and a
negative one (D). The eigenvalues are given by
SI,2 = (A + D)/ 2 ± {[(A + D)/ 2] 2 + BC - AD}I/2. (4.16)
Let us consider the impact of both modifications in tum. If we assume a constant
intensity of work, A would be equal to zero. In this case, both eigenvalues are either
real and negative, or we have a complex pair with a negative real part. In either
subcase the linearized system is locally stable. The opposite happens if we neglect the
impact of distribution on mechanization. In this case we have D = 0 and the roots will
either be real and positive, or complex with a positive real part. In either subcase the
linearized system is locally unstable. In all cases IBCI needs to be sufficently large to
make the discriminant negative, and thus to produce cyclical solutions.
What will be the combined result of the stabilizing impact of a variable speed of
neutral technical progress, and the destabilizing effect of changes in work intensity?
We may expect that either one force dominates the other or that they just offset each
other. The latter would happen, for instance, if A + D = 0 and BC + A2 < 0, in which
case an oscillatory movement without trend would occur.
The results derived from the consideration of the linearized subsystem can be
sustained by numerical solutions to the non-linear system obtained, for various
parameter combinations, by applying a four-step Runge-Kutta algorithm. Figures 4a,
band c represent an unstable, a stable and a borderline situation respectively. While
the discriminant of (4.16) is negative for all cases, the real parts of the complex pairs
of the roots are positive, negative and (approximately) zero, respectively.
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0.11:::'
0.9-1
0.90
0.80
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(b)
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0."
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Parameters: \Ll=O' \L2= I, v 1=0.02. v2=0.03,
'Yl=0.05, 'Y2=0.06, 6=4,0=0.55, c=OA, n=O.OI,
s'TT=0.24, sw=O.04, a1=O·9, a2=I, a]=0.99, b1=1.9,
b2=O, b]=0.6
Equilibrium values: 13 e=0.89174993,
Xe=0.73916265, 8e=0.848 14058, ve=2.143727
Initial conditions: 13(0)=0.95, X(O)=X e, 8(0)=8 e,
v(O)=ve
Number of iterations: 134, step size: 0.25,
number of years: 33.5, length of cycle: 804
Parameters: \Ll=O, \L2= I, v 1=0.02, v2=0.04,
'Yl=O.OI, 'Y2=0.OI2, 6=4.2,0=0.55, c=0.38,
n=O.OI, s'TT=0.24, sw=O.04, a1=O·9, a2=1, a]=0.99,
b1=1.9, b2=O, b]=0.6
Equilibrium values: 13 e=0.9004840I,
Xe=0.70201735, 8e=0.9t965929, ve=1.9770167
Initial conditions: 13(0)=0.95, X(0)=X e,8(0)=8 e,
v(O)=ve
Number of iterations: 134, step size: 0.25.
number of years: 33.5, length of cycle: 8.9
0.95
0.00
0.85
(c)
0.68 0.73 0.78
Parameters: \L 1=0, \L 2= t, vI =0.02,
v2=0.03439163, 'Yl=0.025. 'Y2=0.028, 6=4,
0=0.55, c=OA. n=O.OI. s'TT=0.24, sw=O.04, a1=O.9,
a2=I, a]=O.99, b1=1.9, b2=0. b]=0.6
Equilibrium values: 13 e=0.89817498,
Xe=0.73 125002, 8e=0.93023232, ve= 1.954546
Initial conditions: 13(0)=0.95, X(O)=X e, 8(0)=8 e•
v(O)=ve
Number of iterations: 134, step size: 0.25.
number of years: 33.5, length of cycle: 8.5
Fi~ure 4 Cyclical Behaviour
(a) if Work Intensity Effect Dominates
(b) if Distribution-Induced Technical Change Dominates
(c) for a balanced case.
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The specific parameter combinations are reported together with the figures. Similar
graphs could be drawn for the pairs X, 8 and X,v.
5. NON-NEUTRAL lECHNICAL PROGRESS
In this section we allow for non-neutral technical progress, while at the
we apply the simplifying devices (3.1) and (3.5) again; Le., we neglect
work intensity and the influence of capacity utilization on price
Parameter restrictions regarding technical progress now become
1J..1 ~ 0 , 0 < 1J..2 < 1 , V 1 ~ 0 , v2 ~ O.
same time
changes in
formation.
(5.1 )
If IJ.. 1 = 0, then technical progress will always be capital-using. This corresponds to
Marx's assumption of a rising technical composition of capital. If IJ.. 1 > 0, however, an
equilibrium solution exhibiting neutral technical progress may exist, while off the
equilibrium path technical progress would be either capital saving or labour saving.
This corresponds to Kaldor's view. (5.1) implies that
~
u(X) = P/f = 1J..1 + 1J..2Vl + 1J..2V2X
~
1j(X) = KIP = V1-1J..1 -1!2vl(1-1J..2) X .
Under these restrictions we obtain the system
~ = [ f(>.) - u(>.) - n] 13
>. = [8 1(13)-u(>')] X
v= [-f(X) + z(X,v)] v
€I = [1j(>.) + f(>.) - z(X,v)] 8.
(5.2)
(5.3)
(5.4)
(5.5)
(5.6)
(5.7)
Obviously, this system of four equations is decomposable. Yet, in general, no steady
state solution will exist. To see this, consider first equations (5.6) and (5.7). A
stationary solution requires that 1j(X) vanishes. From (5.3) we can find the specific
value X... which would bring that about:
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(5.8)
Next, consider equations (5.4) and (5.5). This independent subsystem has an
equilibrium solution of its own, Le.,
Xe = [ 6 (g - sw) - n - IL I - IL ill I] / (6 g + IL ill 2)
~e = [al(1- b3)- bl (1- a3) + (1- a3b3)(1L1 + 1L2vI + 1L2V2Xe)] / [a2(1- b3)]·
(5.9)
(5.10)
Xe and X... will coincide by change only. Note that with the "Marxian" case, IL I = O.
There will be a negative X... , except if in addition v I = O. in which case we would have
X... = O. Without these particular restrictions, however, X... can be positive. In this
"Kaldorian" case, it can either be greater or smaller than Xe• while equality between
the two would be an exceptionally limiting case.
What kind of behaviour will this system show in the neighbourhood of the
equilibrium point? The linearized subsystem (5.4) and (5.5) has the following
Jacobian, evaluated at its equilibrium point:
where
B =[£f(>.e) - u'(Xe)] ~e =-(6g + IL I + 1L2V I + 1L2v2Xe) ~e < 0
C = 4> I'(~ e)X e = [ a2(1- b3)/(1 - a3b3)] Xe > 0
The eigenvalues are given by
sl,2 =0/2 ± [BC + (O/2l] 1/2.
(5.11 )
(5.12)
(5.13 )
(5.14)
For positive Xe the equilibrium is stable because 0< O. As B< 0 and C> O. we get BC < O.
Therefore. damped oscillations may occur.
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Now consider equation (5.6). Obviously there is a stationary value for the capital
coefficient, such that
(5.15)
If the wage share has closely approximated its equilibrium value the movement of the
capital coefficient can be approximated by
(5.16)
It follows that the capital coefficient approaches its equilibrium value. But then we
can conclude from (5.7) that
lim e = 1jf (X~.
t-+ 00
Recalling that 1jf '(X) > 0, we find
(5.17)
Thus, there is only one special case, X'" = Xe' in which capacity utilization will
approach a steady state value in the long run. For Xe > X... , and for the "Marxian" case
in particular, we obtain a long-term increase in capacity utilization. A downward
trend will be established in the opposite situation, i.e., for Xe < X.... Moreover, from
(3.16) we have
e = -v- o. (5.19)
As the capital coefficient approaches a steady state value, we obtain for the growth
rate of technical capital productivity
lim 0 = -lim e = - 1jf(Xe).
t-+oo t-+oo
(5.20)
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The economic interpretation is as follows: Whenever the equilibrium wage share
happens to be "too high" (that is, whenever >'e exceeds >'.) it causes a long run fall
of technical capital productivity growth by stimulating "too much" mechanization.
However, this fall will not induce a rise of the capital coefficient. Instead, the latter
approaches a steady state value, which is made possible by a compensatory increase
of capacity utilization. This somewhat strange result is the consequence of a missing
feedback from capacity utilization to the wage share, Le., of our simplifying
assumption (3.6). If, however, high capacity utilization rates gave rise to price
increases which could not be fully matched by wage rises. then the equilibrium wage
share might be pushed down to a level coinciding with >. •. We shall see that this may
happen in the general case. One could argue that this case does not make much
economic sense. Considering numerical examples, however. one finds that the trend
-component of capacity utilization is rather weak compared with its cyclical dynamics.
In the example visualized in Figures 5 and 6, it takes about 200 years to induce the rise
0.96
0.93
0.90
\ ,..- .,--- .,--- .,---__-+ A
0.70 0.74 0.78
Parameters: 1J.1=0.018, 1J.2=0.5, Vl=0.015, V2=0.03, 'Yl=O, 'Y2=O, 6=4,
n=O.OI, c=OA, sn=0.24, sw=O.04, al=0.9, ~=1, a3=1. b1=1.9, b2=0, b3=0.6
Equilibrium values: l3 e=0.93662577, >'e=0.74171779, ee=+ 00, ve=2.2157895
Initial conditions: 13 (0 )=0.9, >. (0 )=>'e' e(0 )=0.8, v(O)=ve
Number of iterations: 280, step size: 0.5, number of years: 140,
length of cycle: 804
Fi&ure 5 Non-neutral Technical Progress. The Movements of the Labour Share
and the Degree of Employment
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of capacity utilization from an initial value of 0.8 to 0.9. This does not seem to render
the model nonsensical for a medium-term analysis.
9
0.88
0.84
0.80
~------...,--------..,--------.,--------").
0.71 0.74 0.77
Figure 6 Non-neutral Technical Progess. The Movements of the Labour Share
and Capacity Utilization (parameters as in Figure 5)
6. TIIE GENERAL MODEL RECONSIDERED
After having analyzed a sequence of simplified cases, we shall now return to the
general model of section 2. While it is not decomposable, it has a stationary solution.
From (2.51) and (2.52) it follows that for a steady state solution to the system to exist,
'if (A) has to vanish in equilibrium. Therefore we have
(6.1 )
which, of course, is identical with A'" from (5.8). Next, we find from (2.49) that
(6.2)
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In equilibrium. the capital coefficient will be
Finally, we calculate from (2.50) that
(6.3)
(6.4)
This time we have to consider the full-scale model to obtain any definite results about
its motion off the equilibrium path. Linearized around the equilibrium point, the
system has the following Jacobian:
al2 0
a22 a23
an 0
a42 0
where
all =..p' (l3 e)l3 e
al2= [f(Xe)-u'O'e)] l3 e
a21 = [iP' (l3 e) + ~ 1'(l3e)] Xe
=Y213e> 0
=-(6g+ 1J.2 v2) l3 e < 0
= [Y2 + ~(l- b3)/(l- a3 b3)] Xe > 0
a23 = - ~2'(8e) Xe = - b2(l - a3) Xe/(l - a3b3) < 0
a32 = [1jr'(Xe) + f(X e)- oz/oX e] 8 e = [v2(1-1J.2)-6g + c/ve] 8 e
a34 =-(oz/ove) 8 e =[c(l-Xe)/v/]8e > 0
a42 = [- f(X e) + oz/oX e] ve = (6g- c/ve)ve
The characteristic equation reads
(6.5)
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where
c1 = -(all + a22 + a44)
c2 = all a22 + (all + a22)a44 - a12a21 - a23 a32
c3 = (a12a21 - all a22 +a23 a32)a44 + (all a32 - a34a42)a23
c4 = all a23(a34 a42 - a32a44)'
In general, we shall obtain four non-zero eigenvalues which can, in principle, be
calculated for numerial examples. If we only want to check whether a specific
example is locally stable or not, it is more convenient to apply the Lienard-Chipard
conditions. As numerical methods are available to solve the non-linear system, we
prefer this approach and again apply the Runge-Kutta-methods.
Consider, for example, the parameter constellation
ILl = 0.012 1L2 = 0.60
v 1 = 0.015 v2 = 0.02
1'1 = 0.09 1'2 = 0.10
S11 = 0.24 sw = 0.04
c = 0.40 6 =4 n = 0.01
a1 = 0.865 a2 = 1 a3 = 0.90
b 1 = 0.190 b 2 = 0.25 b 3 = 0.50
It gives rise to the following equilibrium values of our most important variables:
Ae = 0.75 Be = 0.80 ve = 2.50.
Along the steady state path, prices and money wages will rise by 5% and 8% p.a.,
respectively, while net output and the capital stock increase by 4% p.a.. The intensity
of work remains constant along the steady state path, while labour productivity rises
by 3%. Figures 7a, band c show the development of the most relevant variables over
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0.00
0.80
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0.65 0.75 085
(b)
~~" Parameters: 1J.1=0.012. 1J.2=0.6. v 1=0.015,( .. \ \~I ' v2=O·02. 'Yl=0.09. 'Y2=0.1. 6=4, c=O.4, n=O.OI,\~/y ! s1T=0.24. sw=0.04. a1=0.865. a2=1. a3=0.9,~--.:/ b j =0.19.b2=0.25, b3=0.5
0.70 1 Equilibrium values: ~e=0.9. "e=0.75, Be=O.8.
I ve=2.5< Initial values: ~(0)=O.93, 1I(0)="e' B(O)=B e,
4~·-----,--------,-----,--------. ,\ v(O)=Ve
0.65 075 OR5 Number of iterations: 144. step size: 0.25,
number of years: 36. length of cycle: 8.6
080
0.90
2.55
2.50
2.15
(c) I~---~I------'-I---,I---...... ,\
0.65 0.75 0.85
Figure 7 Movements of the Labour Share and
(a) the Degree of Employment in the General Case
(b) Capacity Utilization in the General Case
(c) the Capital Coefficient in the General Case
287
time, under the assumption of an initial displacement of the rate of employment of
+0.02 from its equilibrium value. Obviously, an explosive cyclical motion is obtained,
the length of the cycle being approximately 8.6 years.
Yet the explosive character of the cycles is not inevitable. For the pair y 1 = 0.0009
and y 2 = 0.001, the equilibrium values remain the same but the system turns out to be
mildly stable.
It should be noted that similar examples could be constructed assuming a small steady
state fall in work intensity (or working hours), which would reduce (net) labour
productivity growth (per head) accordingly.
Our calculations lead to the conclusion that Goodwin's growth cycle model is capable
of considerable extensions which may enrich its empirical flavour. On the other
hand, it must be recognized that these extensions spoil the characteristic feature of a
closed solution curve which made Goodwin's original model so attractive. It would be
more appealing to present a set of modifications which produced limit cycle solutions.
However, those known to us seem to rely too heavily on special assumptions.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed some modifications of Goodwin's growth cycle model. If only an
adjustment process of production with respect to demand is taken into account, the
oscillations of the wage share and the rate of employment will exhibit closed orbits in
the phase space. Therefore, an important characteristic of Goodwin's original model
is preserved. Moreover, it can be shown that the length of the cycle may become
much shorter than in the original model, thereby adding to its realism. Introducing
the variability of work intensity renders the model cyclically unstable, while
permitting a distribution-induced change in the speed of technical progress serves as
a stabilizing force. The net outcome of both impacts can work in either direction,
including the special case of balance between the two opposing forces.
The introduction of capital-augmenting technical progress, together with production
adjustment, precludes a steady state solution for the system as a whole. While the rate
of employment, the labour share and the capital coefficient approach positive
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equilibrium values (under reasonable parameter restrictions), capital utilization wil1
show a damped cyclical movement around a trend.
The ful1-scale model - including an additional feedback from capacity utilization to
price formation and real wage changes - is shown to be capable of a steady state
solution and cyclical movements of all variables in disequilibrium. Numerical
examples suggest that unstable cyclical motions may be expected, although
constellations exist which render the system stable.
Our modified model could be developed further. For the time being, not all
economically meaningful combinations amongst the present set of modifications
have been analysed separately. A more detailed investigation may enhance our
understanding. Moreover, the present modifications could be implemented
differently, for example, by using alternative types of functions. Also, one could take
into account the impact on productivity growth of changes in capacity utilization
which arise from the phenomenon of labour hoarding. This procyclical impact on
productivity could weaken or even reverse the countercyclical effect of changes in
work intensity. Another modification may be derived from the principle of "absolute
overaccumulation" (cf. Glombowski, Kruger 1985). This principle addresses the
problem of regime switches in capital accumulation: if profits fail to rise at a growth
rate acceptable to investors, the speed of capital accumulation drops sharply, thereby
serving as a kind of boundary to unstable motions. It might be fruitful to apply this
regime switch in a more general model of capital accumulation. Finally, we think it
worthwhile to substitute our nominal (augmented) wage equation by a bargaining-
theoretical approach. This might improve the behavioural foundation of our
approach to the theory of cyclical growth.
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NOTES
[1] See Goodwin (1972), Goodwin, Kruger, and Vercelli (1984), Glombowski, Kriiger
(1983a) and (1985).
[2] Goodwin states: "It has long seemed to me that Volterra's problem of the symbiosis
of two populations - partly complementary, partly hostile - is helpful in the
understanding of the dynamical contradictions of capitalism, especially when
stated in a more or less Marxian form." (Goodwin 1972, p. 445).
[3] This effect has been considered in another paper. See Glombowski, Kruger,
(l983b).
[4] As the net product need not necessarily be sold completely, profits may
partly exist in the form of inventories. Major theoretical problems are not
necessarily involved here if, on the average, inventory growth does not outstrip
product growth. Whether the latter condition is met depends, of course, on the
solution of the model.
[5] Underconsumptionists are invited to analyse the consequences of the opposite
assumption.
[6] In some European countries, e.g., Italy and the Netherlands, wage indexation has
been practised for considerable periods of time. This may render a1 = 1 a realistic
assumption.
[7] Cf. Atkinson (1969) .
.APPENDIX: LIST OF VARIABLES
f3 rate of employment
A wage share
e capacity utilization
v capital coefficient
p maximum output
y net product, income
II profits
K capital stock
S savings
A labour supply
r efficient labour requirements
L labour input
y labour productivity
h index of labour inefficiency
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w nominal wage rate
p price level
w real wage rate
(J technical capital productivity
'Y technical labour productivity
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Chapter 12
A Multisector Model of the Trade Cycle
A.MEDIO
1. The main purpose of this paper is to generalize to the multidimensional case
certain results established for aggregate multiplier-accelerator models. The starting
point of our investigation will be the well known dynamic input-output model:
x =Ax + Bx (1)
where x e Rn is a column vector indicating the levels of activity of the various
sectors; A e R nxn and B e Rnxn are matrices indicating, respectively, the flow and the
stock input-output relations.
For n = I, system (1) collapses into the aggregate multiplier-accelerator model, where
x is income, the scalars A and B are, respectively, the propensity to consume and the
acceleration coefficient. System (1) implicitly assumes that demand (desired supply)
and actual supply, as well as desired and actual investment, are always in equilibrium.
Moreover, since A and B are constant, the model is linear.
Subsequently, we shall drop the former assumption, allowing for discrepancies
between desired and actual quantities, and replace the equilibrium conditions with
adjustment-mechanisms of the tfttonnement type.
The linearity assumption will be removed partially, by considering variable
accelerator coefficients. Thus, equation (1) will be re-interpreted as a linearized
version of an underlying nonlinear model.
We shall then perform a stability analysis of the system, studying the dependence of
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its solutions on the parameters (input-output coefficients, lags). In particular, the
conditions for periodic solutions of the system, which correspond to persistent
oscillations of the levels of activity of the economy will be established. In so doing, we
shall make use of some techniques of analysis recently introduced into mathematical
economics, namely vector Lyapunov functions and bifurcation theory.
2. The first step in this direction will be a brief discussion of a simpler
two-dimensional model. Certain established results will be reviewed, and the existence
and stability of limit cycles will be proved by means of the Poincare' -Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation theorem in R2 [1].
If only one sector exists in the economy, and if we re-name the variables to make the
reference to the business cycles literature more familiar, the multiplier-accelerator
model can be written thus:
or
Y =C+I
C=cY
1= vY
Y=cY +vY
c = 1 - s
O<c<l
(2)
where Y, C and I indicate, respectively, global income, consumption and investment; c
is the propensity to consume, s the propensity to save and v the accelerator
coefficient.
Let us now introduce two simple exponential lags, one between demand and supply,
and the other between desired and actual investment.
If Ty and Ti, are the positive lengths of the lags and D = (d/dt) , t being time, we can
rewrite (2) as
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(T?+l)Y=C+I
C=cY
(TP + 1)1 = vY
whence
T T· Y+ (T +sT.-v)Y + sY = 0y I Y I
or, in a state space fonn, putting X = Y,
(3)
(4)
0,
(5)
System (5) has only one equilibrium point at which X Y = 0, Le. the origin of the
co-ordinates X = Y = 0). The characteristic roots of (5), I.l. 1- I.l. 2- are equal to
As -[TyTjrl s < 0, 1.l.11.l.2 > 0 and the equilibrium cannot be a saddle point. Re 1.l.1,2~O,
Le. the equilibrium will be stable or unstable, according to whether
This means that strong accelerators work for instability, whereas the greater the
propensity to save, and the longer the lags, the more likely it will be for the system to
be stable. The roots will be complex or real - Le. the motion will be oscillatory or not -
according to whether
3. Let us now consider a nonlinear version of (5). In particular, let us assume that
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v. the acceleration coefficient. is no longer constant but a function of the level of
income.
In economic terms. v can be interpreted as the (incremental) desired capital-output
ratio. so that we can write:
v(Y) [dK(Y)/dYj.
K being the capital stock.
(6)
Following the vast literature on the subject. we postulate that the function K(Y) is of a
"saturation" type, Le.: that the desired capital stock increases with income within a
certain range above or below the normal level of income. but flattens out at
exceptionally high or exceptionally low levels. If we expand the function K(Y) in a
Taylor series around Y=O.
K(Y) = K(O) + (dK/dY)Y + [(d2K/dy2)/2!jy2 + ...•
where the quantity
v = v(o) = (dK/dY) Iy = 0
measures the slope of the curve K(Y) at the origin of the coordinates. and can be
interpreted as the equilibrium or "normal" accelerator.
The "complete" nonlinear model can now be written thus:
0,
(7)
where f(Y) = O(Y2) is the nonlinear component of (7). The "complete" system (7) also
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has a unique equilibrium point at Y=Y=O and, in general, local stability may be
ascertained by considering the linear part only. We shall now consider the system as
depending on the parameter ;;, and shall study the system as its behaviour varies
qualitatively when ;; is changed.
Suppose we start with a weak "normal" accelerator - Le. V < (Ty+sT j ). In this case,
stability of equilibrium of the system (7) can be predicted by the fact that the
characteristic roots of its linear component have negative real parts. At the critical
point
however, the two characteristic roots, II. 1 and II. 2' will be purely imaginary with zero
real parts.
In this case, which corresponds to the equilibrium point being of a~ type, the
linear part of the system does not give us a qualitatively accurate picture of the
"complete" nonlinear system. In particular, it cannot be used to assess the stability of
the equilibrium point, and it fails to detect non-trivial periodic solutions Le. limit
cycles. Existence of the latter can be proved. however, using the Hopf bifurcation
theorem.
We omit a full statement of the theorem here [2] , and only retain the following
essential conditions for a system like (7), to have periodic solutions, depending on a
parameter ;;, namely:
(i) there exists an isolated stationary equilibrium point;
(ii) there exists a pair of complex conjugate characteristic roots, II. and jl of the
linear part of the system such that, for ;; = ;;0'
Re 11.=0
1m II.FO
(aRe lI.(v)/av) F 0;
(8)
296
(i ii) the remaining characteristic roots have strictly negative real parts.
In our case, at V = V 0' besides Re l.l. 0, we have
Im l.l. = {[TyTl1sl 1/2 =Q > 0
[aRe IJ. (v)/av] = (1/2)[TyTi ] -1>0
and the condition (iii) is irrelevant here. Therefore the conditions (8) exist, and we
can conclude that when the accelerator is increased yis-a-yis saving ratio and lags.
and the system loses its stability, self-oscillations will occur. Their amplitude will be
of order Iv - v 0 11 /2 and their period will be of order (21T / Q). These solutions will be
stable if the limit cycle exists for v > v0 but unstable in the opposite case.
4. To assess the uniqueness and stability of limit cycles ascertained by means of the
Hopf bifurcation is usually quite a formidable task, even in small dimension systems,
and we shall not attempt it here. For two-dimensional systems, on the other hand,
existence, uniqueness, and stability of limit cycles can be studied by means of simpler
and more efficient theorems [3]. Instead, our next step will be to extend our analysis
to the multidimensional case, and ascertain to what extent the results just obtained
may be generalized. For this purpose, the Hopf bifurcation is one of the few reliable
methods, so we shall make use of it.
Introducing production and investment lags of a simple exponential type into system
(1) in Rn we have:
n
XjC = L aij xi
i=1
n
(T.(i)D+l)x.= L b··~.) ) )1 1
i=l
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j=1.2•...•n;
where T/Y) and T/ i ) indicate. respectively. the lengths of the production and
. IDe I . d' d d .Investment ags; Xj • Xj • Xj' In Icate eman. consumptIOn
respectively. all with regard to commodity j; the meanings of the
the same as before.
and investment
other symbols are
For the entire system. in matrix form. we thus have the following equation
(9)
where T(Y) and TO) are (nxn) positive diagonal matrices whose elements are, T.(Y) and)
T /i). respectively, and of course I is the (nxn) identity matrix. By introducing two
vectors zl' Zz ERn such that
Zz = X.
our system can be written as:
z=Gz
where Z = (zl' zz) E R Zn; G E R ZnxZn can be partitioned thus:
where 0, I, G1, G z E Rnxn and
(10)
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Evidently, system (9)-(10) has only one equilibrium point, namely z = z = 0, the origin
of the co-ordinates. It is also readily found that, under reasonable assumptions,
det G > 0, independently of the accelerator matrix B. Indeed, by making use of the
partitioning of G and of a known theorem of matrix algebra [4] , we have
T(Y) and T(i) are diagonal matrices with positive elements, and so are their inverses.
Therefore det([T(Y)T(i)]-l) > O. On the other hand, if the flow input-output matrix A
possesses the usual viability properties, det (I-A) > 0, and this completes the proof.
Considering that G E R2nx2n, it follows that the characteristic roots with negative real
parts, as well as those with positive real parts, must be in even numbers. A most
important corollary of this proposition is that, in general, when the system moves
from stability to instability. there must be two complex conju&ate roots whose real
parts simultaneously cross the jma&inary axis.
5. We shall now try to generalize the perturbation analysis performed in the
introductory sections. We shall again choose the acceleration coefficient as the
controlling parameter. However, in the multi sector model we have n2 such
coefficients, and little hope of reaching meaningful conclusions unless some drastic
simplification is introduced. We shall therefore put
where Bo is a non-negative [5] constant matrix, and a. > 0 the scalar controlling
parameter. In other words, by varying a. we change the scale of the accelerators
without altering their structure.
It is now possible to show that when a. is small - Le. when the accelerators are weak
vis-a-vjs the saving coefficients (the numbers [l-aij]) and the lengths of the lags -
the system (10) will be stable, as was the case in the aggregate model.
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For this purpose, let C( =0 (and therefore 8=0) and let us define the matrices:
-[T(y)]-I [I-A] .. H
[T(i)r l iii T.
In this case we have
Consider now that the auxiliary equation of G
det (J..L I - G) = 0
(J..L being a characteristic root) can be written as
or
det(J..L 21 -J..L(H-T) -TH) = O.
Equation (11) can be easily factorized thus:
det (J..L-H) • det(J..L +T)=O.
Hence the 2n characteristic roots of G are as follows:
(11)
(i) n characteristic roots are equal to (_tj-l). the latter being an element of the
matrix -[T(O] -I, and therefore negative;
(ii) the remaining n characteristic roots are those of the matrix H .. -[T(y)]-l[I-A].
,.<y) is a positive diagonal matrix and, under the customary assumptions about the
matrix A, -[I-A] is D-stable [6]. Therefore, H is stable and all its characteristic
roots have negative real parts. Q.E.D.
6. We now tum to considering the case in which C( > 0 and therefore 8 ~ 0; i.e. some
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or all of the accelerators are positive.
The first question we want to answer is: what are the conditions under which, for
ex. > 0, G retains its stability? In so doing, we shall apply certain recent techniques of
analysis of large scale dynamic systems, in particular, the vector Lyanupov functions
method [7].
Let us call S the system described by equation (10). We can again partition the state
vector z E R 2n into vector components zl' z2 ERn, which yields the system in the
form
(12)
where now G2 = H + ex. rr(Y)T(i)]-l BO - T. This can be conveniently transformed into
(13)
where B* = [T(Y)T(i)]-lB O. Systems (12) and (13) have the same auxiliary equation
det(1J. 2I -IJ.[H + ex.B* -T] -TH) = 0
and therefore they have the same characteristic roots.
If we identify the state vectors zl' z2 with two subsystems Sl' and S2 E Rnxn we can
write:
[
ex.B*
-ex.B*
(14)
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where the first set of submatrices on the R.H...£. of (14) can. be taken to describe the
"free" dynamics of the two subsystems, when the feedbacks of each ~ubsystem on
itself (i.e. the matrix C( B"') as well as the interconnections between the two
subsystems (the matrices T and -C( B"') are ignored.
We already know that H and -T are stable matrices and so are the "free" dynamics of
Sl and S2'
To find stability conditions for the interconnected system S E R 2nx2n by means of the
Lyapunov vector functions method, we want to construct a system of differential
inequalitites
v~ Wv (15)
where v e R2 is a vector whose elements are Lyapunov functions and W e R2x2 is a
matrix to be defined.
To construct suitable functions v, consider again the "free" subsystem Sl and S2 and
the related equations
Zl = HZ1
z2 = -Tz2·
As H and -Tare stable matrices, we can write the following equations:
HTP1 + P1H = -Ql
(-T)P2 + P2(-T) = -Q2
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
where Pi' Qi e R nxn are symmetric positive definite (s.p.d.) matrices, and the
superscript T indicates transpose. A known theorem [8] states that if Hand (-T) are
stable. for any given s.p.d. matrix Qi (i=l,2) there exists one (and only one) [9J s.p.d.
matrix Pi which satisfies equations (18)-(19). We shall fix
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(from which, of course, Pz = I).
Let us now define the following Lyapunov functions vi: fxRD -+ R+ 0=1,2):
vI(ZI) = < PI zl' zl >
vZ(zZ) = < Pz zz' Zz >
where <. > indicates the scalar product operation. From (20) and (21) we have
grad vI = 2P1 zl
grad Vz = 2PZ zZ·
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
Let us now take the total time derivative of the functions vi along the solutions of the
interconnected subsystems (13) - (14),
VI = (grad VI)Tz1 = (grad vI)T{[H+cx.B·] zl + TzZ)
• T' T
v2 = (grad vZ) Zz =-(grad vZ) [cx.Bz1+TzZ]
whence, by making use of (22) and (23),
VI = 2[<P1z1, Hz1> + cx.<P1z1, B·zI> +<P1z1, TzZ>]
Vz =-2[cx.<zz,B·z1> + <zZ,TzZ>]'
(24)
(25)
(24.1 )
(25.1 )
Considering now that PI and Pz are symmetric matrices, and making use of the
Rayleigh quotient, we can write the following estimates:
(26)
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where, now and in what follows, Il. M(M) and Il. m(M) indicate. respectively, the largest
and the smallest characteristic root of the matrix M. and II xII ;;; <x, x> 1/2 is the
Euclidian norm of the vector x. As P2 = I, we immediately get
Moreover,
<P1Z1, Hz1> = -(1/2)<zl,Qlz1> = -(1/2) II zl ll2
~II z211 = Il. m(T)1I z2112;:; <z2' Tz2> ~ ILM(T) II z2"2 =tM II z2112,
(27)
(28)
where tm and tM are, respectively, the smallest and the largest element of T; and
finally,
(29)
(30)
From equations (24)-(30), and considering that II B*zl" ~ II B*II II zlll, we may now
write the desired system of differential inequalities (15)
v~Wv,
where the elements of the matrix Ware:
w ll =-Il.M-1(P1) + 2«Il.M(P1)ll. m-1(P 1) II B*II
w12 = 2Il.M(P1)tM II zlll II z2"-1
w21 = 2« Il.m-1(P 1) II B*II II z211 II zl"-l
w22 = -2tm·
The matrix W is stable if, and only if,
(31)
WI! +w22 < 0
det w > O.
From (31) we know that
w22 < 0
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(32)
(33)
Therefore condition (33) requires that w II < 0 and consequently it implies (32). On
the other hand, since W is a Metzler matrix condition (33),
detW> 0
implies that W is quasidominant diagonal,
dj' ( j = 1,2), and 'IT such that
d· Iw··1 -d· Iwool ~ 'IT1 11 J 1J
or, equivalently,
di IWjjl -dj IWjil > 'IT i ~ j.=
Le. that there exist positive numbers
We shall now show that the property of diagonal quasidominance of W implies
stability of the overall system S [10]. Let us choose the p.d. function
(35)
as a Lyapunov function for the overall system S. Taking the total time derivate of V(z)
along the solution of the equations (13)-(14), (and remembering that Wij <0 for i = j,
Wij > 0 for i 1= j) we have:
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VI =- lilYl + d2Y2
~ d l (wll V l + w12v2) + d2(w2l v l + w22v2)
~ - ( lw 1l 1 -dl - l d2W 2l) dlvl -(lw221 -d2-ldlw12)d2v2
~ - Ti (dlvl + d2v2)
~ - Ti V,
(where Ti = d j - l 1T > 0).
It follows that, along the solutions of our system V(z) > 0 and (-V) > 0, and therefore
the Lyapunov "direct method" [11] guarantees that the system S is indeed stable.
7. To see how stability depends on the parameters of the model, and in particular,
on the "acceleration factor" a., let us consider that det W > 0, wllw22> w12w21. If
we take the spectral norm of B·, IIB·II = (IJ. M) l/2(B·TB·), the stability condition can be
written thus:
~ {( 112)1J. M-l(p1) - a.1J. M(P l)lJ. m-l(p1)1J. Ml/2(B.TB·)}
> tM a.IJ.M(Pl)lJ. m-l(Pl)IJ.M l/2(B·TB·)
or, more simply
where, given a symmetric matrix M, k(M) =IJ.M(M)lJ. m-l(M).
Since PI and Tare s.p.d. matrices, k can be used as a "condition number"[l2].
(37)
It can readily be seen that, for sufficiently small a., i.e. for a sufficiently weak
"acceleration factor', condition (36) will be verified. How small a. may have to be
depends on the matrices Pl' B· and T.
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For a given Q1 = I, PI depends uniquely on H. Roughly speaking, we could take
I.l. M -1 (P 1) as an indicator of the "degree of stability" of H. Indeed if u eRn is an
eigenvector of H, we have
or,
Hu = I.l. (H) u (38)
(39)
Premultiplying by uT and postmultiplying by u equation (18), remembering that Q1=1
and normalizing u so that < u, u> = I, we have
(40)
Or, by making use of (38) and (39),
I.l.(H) = - [1/2 <u, P1u>] .
Taking into account that, < U, U > I, we have
From this we derive the following estimates for I.l. (H).
so that the smaller I.l. M(P 1)' the smaller the upper bound of I.l. (H), which may be taken
as some indicator of greater stability.
On the other hand, the "condition number" k can be taken as an indicator of the
"degree of reactiveness". to perturbation of the relevant matrix. Therefore, the
greater k(P1) and k(T) [=(tM/tm)] , the less likely our system is to remain stable for a
given ex. and a given matrix B·.
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8. It is more difficul! to be conclusive concerning the instabjlity conditions of the
system. Intuitively, this may be understood by considering that, in order to prove
stability. one tries to fix a negative upper bound for the real parts of the
characteristic roots. The symmetric proof of instability would be to fix a positive
lower bound, which is of course, redundant, and may never be true of a given system,
though this is unstable.
We do know, however, that - for a sufficiently high value of the perturbation factor
ct, and thus, for sufficiently strong acceleration - the system (12)-(14) will lose its
stability. Consider the fact that the trace of G contains elements like ct b *ii ~ O. where
b* ii is one of the elements of the main diagonal of B* ~ 0, not all of which are zero.
Those elements grow without limit as ct -+ + 00. Sooner or later the trace of G will
therefore become positive. and consequently one or more characteristic roots of G
will take a positive real part, leading to instability.
As we shall see below, TrG > 0 is an excessively strong sufficient condition for
instability. which may occur for lower values of ct.
9. Before discussing this point, however, we wish to emphasize some general results
of the analysis so far:
(i) Since the system (as described by the matrix G) is stable for small ct, and it is
unstable Jor large ct, there exists a critical value ct = ct c such that. for the matrix
G,ReILM(ctc) = 0, (ILM being of course the root with the largest real part).
(ii) Remembering that det G > 0 independently of ct. at ct = ct c there will be a pair of
purely imaginary roots ILM,iL M (except in the very special case in which two real
roots simultaneously become equal to zero).
Without loss of generality we can also assume that:
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(iv) The real parts of the characteristic roots other than IL M will remain negative.
(v) [aReILM(a.)/aa.l Ia.=«c" 0
(Le. the relevant roots will cross the imaginary axis with non-zero velocity).
Conditions (i)-(v) ensure that the "true" system - Le. the nonlinear system of which
the system (12) (or the equivalent (13)-(14» is a linearization around the equilibrium
point - will undergo a Hopf bifurcation. and that. besides the stationary solution z = 0,
for values of a. near a. c' there exists a family of periodic solutions. The amplitude of
the oscillations will be of order I a. - a.i /2 and their period of order 1[21T / 1m IL M (a. c)] I
Il3].
By analogy with what happens in the aggregate case, this means that. in a
multisector multiplier-accelerator model, loss of stability leads to cyclical oscillations.
Having stated this, however, we hasten to add that the proof of stability of the
periodic solutions, which is already quite difficult in R2• may be a formidable task in
R D • At any rate, it will not be attempted here [14].
10. We shall conclude our presentation with a simple numerical example in R4 ,
which will give the flavour of some of the problems discussed in general terms in the
preceding sections. For this purpose, let us put:
T(Y) = T(i) =I, (hence O} =H)
-1 0
o -1
°
2
, -2 0]
o -2
:1
II
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:]
Under these assumptions. we shall have
G=
o
o
-1
o
o
o
o
-1
with the auxiliary equation
det(IL-G)=O
or IL 0 -1 0
0 IL 0 -1
1 0 1L+2-a. -a. =0
0 1 -a. 1L+2-a.
whence
(41)
To find the critical value a. C' in this case we shall calculate the four Hurwitzian
determinants:
01 =1-2a.
02 = (1-2a.) (5-1a.)
°3 " (1-2a.)2 (1-1a.)
°4"~'
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We notice that, for e:t. sufficiently small, D j > 0, 'Vi , and the system is stable. As we
increase e:t. continuously, two determinants, D3 and D4 , vanish simultaneously at e:t. = 1,
whereas D l' D2 > O. At that value of e:t., there will be two characteristic roots, which
we shall call IJ. l' and IJ. 2' such that
RelJ.l = ReIJ.2 = 0
ImlJ.l = Im1J.2= 0 F O.
If we replace IJ. = jO (j= ..;:I) and e:t. 1 into equation (41), we have
whence, equating real and imaginary parts separately,
0 4_20 2 + 1=0
j 20 [1-02]=0
or
O=±l.
The two purely imaginary roots are therefore
1J.1 =+j; 1J.2 =-j.
To establish the direction of crossing of the imaginary axis, we can consider equation
(41) as an implicit function
F(IJ.,e:t.) = 0,
from which
(dlJ./de:t.) =-[3F/3e:t.) + (3F/31J.)] =
[(21J.3 + 41J.2 + 21J.)] 1[41J.3 + 3(4-2e:t.)1J. 2 + 2(6-4e:t.)1J. + (4-2e:t.»)
which, at IJ. = +j and e:t. I, gives
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(dlL/d«) = 1 > O.
(We may get an analogous result by putting IL =-j).
The crossing will therefore take place with non-zero velocity. We may then conclude
that the conditions for Hopf bifurcation, listed under § 9, are verified here.
11. CONCLUSION
Initially we presented an aggregate multiplier-accelerator model and showed that,
when stability is lost due to a strong accelerator, oscillations will ensue. Next, a
multisector version of the model was developed. Stability conditions were analyzed by
means of the vector Lyapunov functions method. In particular. the effect on stability
of changing parameters was investigated. Finally we showed that, for critical values
of the parameters, the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation and has self-excited
periodic solutions. A major result of the aggregate trade cycle theory of the
Keynesian type has therefore been generalized to the n-dimensional case.
NOlES
[1] An interesting discussion of the pnonty of this result in bifurcation theory can
be found in Arnold [1983], pp. 271-273. In this paper, however, we shall make use
of the more common denomination of "Hopf bifurcation". On this subject cf.
Marsden and Mc.Cracken [1976] and Hassard. Kazarinoff and Wan [1981] .
[2] Cf. Marsden-Mc. Cracken, ~, pp. 63-83
Hassard-Kazarinoff-Wan, Wl£iL., pp. 14-24
[3] For an extensive discussion of this point, cf Medio [1979] , Chapters II and V.
[4] Cf. Gantmacher. [1966], vol 1, pp. 46-47.
[5] We assume. in particular. that bjj > 0 for some i = 1. 2.....n.
[6] On the concept of D-stable matrices and related issues, see Magnani-Meriggi
[1981] , pp. 535-544.
[7] An excellent and thorough discussion of this method can be found in Siljak
[1978] , on which this author has drawn heavily.
[8] Cf. Gantmacher, op.cit.• vol. 2. pp. 182-183.
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[9] Uniqueness of solution requires that no characteristic root is equal to zero, and
that for no pair of characteristic values of IL i and IL j we have IL i = -IL j' (which
we assume here).
[10] Cf. Siljak, WL.tiL., pp. 39-40 and 96-99.
[11] On the Lyapunov direct method, cf La Salle and Lefschetz [1961] .
[12] On the concept of "condition numbers", see, for example, Stewart [1973], pp. 184-
192.
[13] A more rigorous statement of the conditions of the Hopf bifurcation may be
found in Marsden-Me. Cracken and Hassard-Kazarinoff-Wan, ~.
[14] The interested reader may consult Marsden-Me. Cracken, cit., pp. 104-131 on
this point, where an algorithm is provided for the determination of stability of
periodic solutions. Unfortunately, in the general case, this involves estimat-
ing the sign of derivates up to at least third order, which may not be possible
in an economic model on purely a priori grounds.
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Chapter 13
(M,R)-Systenls as a Franlework
Structural Change In a Global
J. CASTI
1. TIlE PROBLEM OF SlRUCfURAL CHANGE
for Modeling
Industry
With the arrival of rapid global communication facilities via satellites, and the
widespread availability of cheap worldwide transportation by air and sea, the
phenomenon of the transnational corporation (TNC) has emerged, carrying with it a
total and complete re-shaping of the structure and operation of major industrial
activities. Prior to the advent of the TNC, large industries were considered nationally;
now, for example, the automotive industry is scattered throughout the world with
firms engaging in design in one place. production in another. and marketing and
sales everywhere. The situation is further compounded and confused by a myriad of
interlocking joint ventures, co-production agreements, partial mergers and so forth.
What all of this amounts to is a discontinuous shift from one way of doing business to
another, and from one industrial paradigm, emphasizing national centralization and
domestic markets, to a global structure transcending national boundaries and, to a
great extent, local governmental control. The problem of industrial structural change
is basically how to account for this transition. how to understand its implications for
the future evolution and development of a given industry, and how to gain some
understanding of the way such changes can be directed. or managed, to avoid
unnecessary chaos, disorder and economic upheavals during the transition periods
from one structure to another.
To study the problem of structural change, a suitable conceptual framework is
needed, within which the various firms comprising the industry can play out their
roles in interaction with their environment. Whatever framework is used, it must
314
account for the way in which finns execute their design, production and marketing
functions, and incorporate mechanisms whereby the firms can expand, merge, or
even cease to exist. The conceptual scheme must also allow for the mutual interactions
of the firms of the industry, both with each other, and with their external
environment. The outside environment includes the suppliers of the raw materials
and resourses needed for the finn's activities, the consumers of the finn's product
and the various environmental influences exerted by government regulators acting
by the setting of the economic climate (through taxes, interest rates, exchange
restrictions, etc.), and the business climate (through tariffs, quotas, import
restrictions and the like).
The foregoing requirements for a conceptual framework for the study of industrial
structural change have a strongly biological overtone, suggesting that the view of a
global industry as a living multicelled organism may serve as a foundational
metaphor for the framework we seek. The balance of this paper is devoted to the
exploration of this idea. More specifically, the notion of an (M,R)-system
(metabolism-repair system) is examined as a candidate for the type of theoretical
construct needed to capture the main features of industrial structural change.
Originally, (M,R)-systems were introduced into biology by Rosen (1958a, 1958b) as a
means to study cellular development of organisms by breaking away from the
traditional bio-chemical types of analyses, and employing a purely relational
analysis emphasizing the functional rather than structural organization of the
system. This approach leads to the study of classes of abstract biologies and a means
for their comparison rather than to detailed material analysis of a single organism.
This is exactly the type of scheme needed to investigate industrial structural change,
although as we go along it will become clear that certain biological aspects of the
(M,R)-systems will require modifications in the industrial context. Nonetheless, the
(M,R)-framework that follows, does, in our opinion, provide a suitable mathematical
skeleton upon which to build an operational theory of industrial structural change.
2. PRODUCTION AND SALES AS AN INPUT/OUTPUT PROCESS
Our underlying basic hypothesis is that an industry such as the world auto industry,
is composed of a collection of interacting firms receiving inputs from an external
environment, processing these inputs into the products of the finn, which are in
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tum discharged back into the environment for which the firms receive additional
resources (money, usually) to continue their activity. For a variety of reasons which
will become clear later, it is most natural and convenient to regard the firms' outputs
as the money they receive from their products rather than the products, themselves.
In short, the real mission of a firm is to make money, not products, and the products
are thought of as only a vehicle to facilitate this higher-level goal.
For the moment, let us concentrate upon the description of a single firm F as an
(M,R)-system. We will return later to the case of several firms (an industry). Let Q
denote the set of environmental inputs received by F . In general, the elements of Q
are both physical inputs - such as raw materials, labor, machinery and so forth, and
the external operatine inputs - such as the economic, political and technological
constraints of the general environment. The firm accepts an input OJ t; Q an d
processes it via some internal production and marketing procedures to produce a
marketable product which is then sold, thereby generating an output y t; r, measured
in monetary units. Here, due to the assumption that the observed output is money. we
could take r = R , the real numbers. To maintain uniformity of scale between inputs
and outputs, we can introduce prices for all environmental inputs, thereby
converting all inputs into monetary equivalents. We shall omit this mathematically
trivial, but possibly economically important step in the remainder of the paper. Thus,
abstractly, the behaviour of F is represented by a metabolic map
/:Q-r.
(Note: in the economics literature. it is common to can / a production function. To
preserve our biological metaphor, we shall depart from this convention in this
paper). Schematically. we can represent the production and sales component of F as
Q~r.
The foregoing picture is very familiar in the mathematical system theory literature,
where it is termed an external or input/output description of the behavior of F (see
Casti 1987. Kalman 1969). If we want to focus attention on the manner in which the
inputs from Q are translated into revenue by means of specific products of the firm.
then we must look at the internal behavior of F . Abstractly, what this means is that
we must "factor" the metabolic map / through a state space X , using two maps 9 and h
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such that
g:Q-+X, h:X--+r.
In other words, we must find a space X and maps 9 and h such that the diagram
:I
Q ---+ r
g'\. /h
X
commutes.
In our industrial setting, the space X and the maps 9 and h have a very interesting
interpretation: X represents the actual products which the firm produces (cars, TVs,
lamps, drugs or whatever), while the map 9 specifies how inputs are transformed into
products (a production map). The map h represents the manner in which the firm
translates products into revenue, (i.e., h is a marketing/sales map).
For a variety of practical as well as mathematical reasons, it is customary to impose
the additional requirements that the map 9 be.c.n.1Q., while the map h is one-to-one.
Such a factorization of :I is called canonical, and is essentially unique. These
conditions have a very direct interpretation in the business setting: the production
map being onto, means that any level of production can be achieved if F is supplied
with suitable inputs, Le. there are no intrinsic limitations on the firm's ability to
produce products given adequate raw materials and other resources. The requirement
that the marketing/sales map be one-to-one just means that different levels of
production generate different amounts of revenue. Or, put another way, two distinct
levels of production cannot generate the same revenue for F . Producers for
generating such canonical factorizations of a metabolic map :I are well-known in the
system theory literature and will not be discussed further here (cf. Casti 1987, 1985;
Kalman 1969).
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3. INNOVATION, REPAIR AND REPLICATION
The standard system-theoretic framework presented above for describing the
metabolic behavior of a firm as an input/output map .I (or, by its equivalent
factorization through the production and marketing/sales maps g and h) would be
perfectly adequate for the characterization of F if the finn were operating in a
totally stable environment with no competition. However, the intrusion of real-world
considerations into the firm's activities results in the need for the finn to continually
engage in changes of its product, introduction of new production techniques and
development of alternate marketing strategies if it is to remain a viable enterprise.
In biological terms, the finn must repair damages a.lli1. adapt or else enter a senescent
phase ultimately resulting in its extinction. In biological organisms, the adaption and
repair is carried out by genetic programs which re-process the system output to
renew the metabolic behaviour of the organism. In the context of an auto firm, such
a restoration of the metabolic activity can only result from the repair of different
production and/or marketing procedures, Le. renewal of the maps g and h. This can
come about only through technological improvements. better managerial procedures
and/or incorporation of new knowledge, i.e. through innovation. Our basic question
here is: how can the modeling framework introduced earlier be extended in a natural
fashion to account for the firm's need to "innovate or die?"
The key to answering this 'l.uestion is to note that the only way the firm can renew its
metabolic activity, is to utilize some part of its revenues to regenerate either its
production processes, or its marketing approach, or both. Thus, the firm's "repair"
mechanism must ultimately be a map which transforms the firm's output (revenues)
into the desired metabolic structure. If we let H (o.r) denote the set of all possible
metabolic processes, and if ~ I denotes the repair map, we have
Note that we explicitly indicate the dependence of the repair map upon the
metabolism .I, since the objective of the repair procedure is to reproduce .I which is
an activity of the firm and, as such, is affected by the metabolic activity. We now have
the following abstract diagram for a firm F as a metabolism-repair (M.R)-system.
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As already noted, :I represents the firm's procedures for operating upon the
environment to produce or "metabolize" revenues, while .. f corresponds to the firm's
"genetic" capacity to repair disturbances in metabolism arising from environmental
fluctuations.
To complete the metaphor of the firm as a biological organism, we must address the
issue of how to repair the repairers. The repair mechanisms were introduced to
account for the fact that during the course of time, the firm's metabolic machinery
will erode and decay, thereby requiring some sort of rejuvenation if the firm is to
avoid extinction. Precisely the same argument applies to the repair mechanism. but it
is of no particular help to introduce repairers for the repairers and so forth, ending
up in a useless infinite regress. The way out of this loop is to make the repair
components self-replicating. In this way, new copies of the repair mechanism are
continually being produced. and it is unnecessary to assume the repair functions are
immortal or to fall into an infinite regress of repairers to insure survivability of the
firm. Let us see how to introduce the idea of replication into the foregoing
framework.
Since the replication operation involves reproducing the genetic component .. f
from the metabolic activity of the firm, it follows that the replication map, call it 13 y
must be such that
l3y : H (O,r)-+ H(f'J{(O,r»,
if it exists at all. The question is: how can such a map 13 y be constructed from the basic
metabolic components o.r, and H (0 ,r) of the firm? To see how this is done, it is
easiest to consider a somewhat more general situation.
Let X and Y be arbitrary sets. Then for each % & X , we can define a map
%:H (X, Y) -. Y
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by the rule
xV) ='/(X),
for all ,/ G H (X, Y). Thus, we have an embedding of X into the set H (H (X , Y ) Y ).
Now, assume that the map .i: has a left inverse .i: - 1, so that
X-I: Y _ H (X , Y).
Then, we clearly have
for all ,/ G H (X , Y ).
Returning now to our replication situation, we set
X =r, Y=H(Q,n.
and apply the foregoing general argument to obtain for each 'Y G r, a map ~ 'Y = .y - 1
with the property that
~y : H (Q,r> -+ H (r ,If (Q,r»
for all .y possessing a left inverse. In short, the metabolic aCtivity of the firm can be
used to reproduce its repair component, if the technical condition on the invertibility
of the map .y is satisfied. The economic interpretation of this condition is that .y is
invertible if different innovations and R&D activities (Le. different genetics
mechanisms ~ 11 * ~ 12) give rise to different production and marketing functions(i.e.
different metabolic processes ,/ 1 *,/ 2)' In the industrial context we are examining,
this seems to be a reasonably defensible assumption which will be accepted for the
remainder of the paper.
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Before entering into a more thorough discussion of the implications of the
(M,R)-system as a paradigm for industrial structuring and operation, it is of interest
to consider the actual meaning of the replication process described by the map 13 y .
We have seen that the repair mechanism +f basically provides the prescription by
which revenues are used to support and renew the production-marketing process .I.
By the same token, the replication process 13 y gives the instructions by which the
genetic process +f is duplicated. Thus, since +f corresponds to innovation/R&D, we
can only conclude that 13 y corresponds to the diffusion of innovation/R&D. In short,
13 y is a prescription for growth of the firm by development of new divisions.
Alternately, it could represent the start-up procedure of new firms that spin-off from
the parent corporation. In either case, the innovation and "know-how" of the parent
firm is transferred to a new organization, and is then used as part of the metabolic
operation .I to produce revenue from environmental inputs in the usual way.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF TIIE (M,R)-FRAMEWORK FOR A SINGLE FIRM
The minimal structure introduced thus far to define an (M,R)-system is already
sufficient to shed light on a variety of interesting questions surrounding the way a
firm can respond to changes in its operating environment, the possibility for
innovation to occur through environmental effect, the circumstances under which
environmental changes can be reversed, feedback, and so on. In this section we
sketch the way in which these issues appear within the (M,R)-framework, and
consider the conclusions that can be drawn about firm behavior from this structure.
A. Stable Metabolic Operations in Changing Enyironments - imagine the situation in
which the firm's "usual" input w of raw materials, labor, etc. is disturbed to a new
input 00. The condition for stable operation of the firm is for the environment Ul to be
such that
(*)
Le. the metabolic structure .I is stable in the environment Ul in the sense that the
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repair mechanism ~./ always regenerates .I when the environmental input is w. We
would say that all w l; Q satisfying (*) form a stable environment for the firm.
Now suppose that the new environment iii ~ w. Then (*) will only hold if either
.I(w) = .I(iii) or ~./(.f(iii» =.1.
The first case is trivial in the sense that the observed revenues of the firm are
invariant to the change of environmental inputs. If .I (w) ~ .I (iii) then the firm's
revenues are not stable with respect to the change of environment and we must
consider the repair mechanism to see whether or not the environmental alterations
can be compensated for in the sense that
with .I ( ib) = .I (w ), Le. will the genetic mechanism produce a new metabolism.l which
will duplicate the revenues of .I, but with the input tv rather than w? In this case, the
entire metabolic activity of the firm would be permanently altered if we had
~./(.f(iii» = .I.
On the other hand, if we had .I(iii) .I (w) or, more generally,
then the firm's metabolism would only undergo periodic changes in time.
Finally, we could have the situation in which
~./(.f(iii» =) ~.I,.1
and, iterating this process, we see that an environmental change may cause the firm
to wander about in the set H (Q ,r), changing its production-marketing procedures
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through a sequence of metabolic processes .I ( 1) , .I ( 2 ) , .I ( 3 ), ... . This "hunting" process
will terminate if either
(i) there exists an N such that
~1'(.f(N)(w»=.I(N)
or
(ii) there exists an N such that
~1'(.f(N)(w» =.I(N -k) , ,,= 1,2,...,N-1.
In case (i) the firm becomes stable in the new environment W, while in case (ii) the
firm undergoes periodic changes in its metabolic structure. If no such N exists, the
firm is unstable and aperiodic. (Note: This last possibility can occur only if the set
H (Q ,r) of possible production-marketing procedures is infinite.
B. "Lamarckian" Chanies in the Repair Process - the above discussion of metabolic
change was undertaken subject to the tacit assumption that the repair map ~ I'
remains unchanged. It is of interest to inquire as to whether or not an
environmental change to ~ W can generate a "Lamarckian" type of genetic change
in ~ I' through the replication process described in the last section. If such a change
were indeed possible, then it would imply that the actual innovationlR&D process,
which regenerates the metabolic activity .I, could be affected by environmental
changes alone.
To examine this question, suppose we have the environmental change OJ ~ w. Then
the replication map 13 y associated with the input OJ and the output y =.1 (OJ) is changed
to 13 y where 'Y = .I (w). Recalling that
(,l =~-1 (,l._~-1t'y , ,t'y -, ,
and
after applying 13 y ,13 .y, respectively to the last two relations, we fmd that
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showing that the new replication map 13 y replicates the existing repair component
4> :I exactly. Thus, an environmental change alone can have no effect upon the repair
map 4> :I.
Now we ask whether it is possible for a change in the metabolic production-
marketing procedures to result in a change of the firm's "genotype". Suppose we
replace the metabolic activity I by some other production-marketing process
b [; H (O,r>. By definition
Assumin& b (1Il) is invertible, we apply b- 1 (1Il) to both sides of the above relation to
obtain
Thus, the induced replication map reproduces the original repair component of the
firm under all conditions. In short, no Lamarckian changes in the metabolic
component, either in the environment 0 or in the metabolic set H (O,r), can result in
changes in the firm's repair mechanism. Such "genetic" changes can only come
about through a direct intervention in the genetic code itself (mutation), and not via
indirect metabolic alterations.
c. Feedback as an Environmental Re&ulator - the environmental changes discussed
thus far have been assumed to be generated by actions external to the firm; however,
it may often be the case that the firm's output of revenue is employed as one of the
environmental inputs, Le. 1Il is a function of y, 1Il = 1Il (y ). In this event, the firm
actually creates part of its own environment and, as a consequence, can partially
regulate its own structural alterations. An important aspect of this general process is
to understand as to what degree adverse environmental disturbances can be
"neutralized" by suitably chosen feedback policies. This question is a special case of
the more general problem of "reachability", in which we ask about the possibility of
attammg any pre-defined metabolic
environmental changes. This is a topic
discussing the dynamical aspects of the
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structure by means of a sequence of
we shall return to later in connection with
firm's morphology.
5. GLOBAL INDUSTRY AS A NElWORK OF (M,R)-SYSTEMS
So far we have only considered a single firm F as an (M,R)-system. If we connect
several firms together, with the outputs of some firms serving as inputs to others, and
the repair mechanisms of each firm requiring the output from at least one firm, then
we have the structural basis for characterization of an entire industry. Such a
network of interdependent firms gives rise to a number of significant questions
involving the birth, growth and death of an industry and of the individual firms
comprising the industry. In this section, we consider how these issues arise naturally
within the context of an (M,R)-network. and the way in which our earlier
(M,R)-formalism for a single firm can be extended to form a basis for modeling an
entire industry.
In order to fix ideas, consider the specific (M,R)-network depicted in Figure 1. The
square blocks labeled F l' F 2' ...• F 6 represent the metabolic processes of the individual
firms. while the ovals, denoted R 1' R 2' ... , R 6' represent the respective firms' repair
mechanisms. The requirements that we impose for any such network are modest:
i) each firm must receive at least one input, either from the external world or from
the output of another firm;
ii) each firm produces at least one output;
iii) each repair mechanism receives the output of at least one firm in the network.
We have stated the requirements for an (M,R)-network in quite general terms. In a
typical industry, such as the automotive industry, it is likely that each firm will
receive its input from the outside world and discharge at least part of its output of
revenues back to the external world in the form of payment for goods and services
and returns to shareholders. Also, the repair mechanisms will, for the most part,
receive only the output from their corresponding firm. since the case of one firm
devoting its resources toward supporting another (as with the firm F 4 of Figure 1)
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seems rather improbable under most circumstances, although certainly not
impossible.
The first general issue to consider for an (M,R)-network is the dependency structure.
We are concerned with the question of how the removal of a given firm from the
network affects the existence and operation of other firms in the industry. For
instance, referring to Figure 1 we see that the failure of F 5 results in the failure of
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finn F 6 ' as well, since F 6 receives its only input from F 5' Furthennore, the failure of
F 5~ influence the operation ofF 3 ' as F 3 receives part of its input from F 5 . Thus, in
this case we would consider finn F 3 and F 6 to comprise the dependency set of finn F 5-
Any finn whose failure affects either the existence or operation of ill finns in the
industry will be called a central finn, Le. the dependency set of a central finn is the
entire industry.
Since we know that in the absence of the repair mechanism any finn will go out of
existence after some finite lifetime, it is clear that other finns in the dependency set
of a given finn will also go out of existence when that finn does. However, with the
repair mechanism in operation, it is quite possible that a given finn could "come back
to life" even after its initial demise. For example, finn F 6 in Figure 1 may cease
metabolic operation and be removed from the network; however, the repair
mechanism R 6 receives its necessary inputs from finns F 4 and F 5 indicating that
whatever "shock" caused the extinction of F 6' the finn will be re-inserted into the
network after some characteristic delay time depending upon the repair mechanism
R 6' In other words. copies of F 6 will continue to be manufactured even after the
removal of F 6 from the network. Finns like F 6 will be called re-establishable, while
all other finns are tenned non-reestablishable (e.g. F I' F 5' ....). There is an important
relationship between the notion of re-establishability and the concept of a central
component expressed by the following result.
Theorem Eyery (M.R)-network must contain at least one non-reestablishable firm.
Corollary. If an (M.R)-network contains only one non-reestablishable firm. then
that finn is a central component. The proofs of these results can be found in the
papers cited in the references.
The significance of this result is twofold:
i) every industry must contain at least one finn whose metabolic failure cannot
be repaired. This conclusion follows only from the connective structure of the
(M,R)-network and is completely independent of the specific industry, the
procedures of the firms, their products or marketing strategies. It is solely a
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consequence of the meaning of the metabolism-repair functions and the replication
process.
ii) in order to be "resilient" to unforeseen disturbances, one would desire an
industry to consist of a large number of re-establishable firms. On the other hand,
the above results show that if only a small number of firms are non-reestablishable,
then there is a high likelihood that one of them will be a central component whose
failure will destroy the entire industry. Thus, an industry with a large number of
re-establishable firms will be able to survive many types of shocks and surprises, but
there will be certain types of disturbances which will effectively cripple the whole
industry. Consequently, it may be better to have an industry with a relatively large
number of non-reestablishable firms if it is desirable to protect the industry from
complete breakdown.
6. TIME-LAGS AND DYNAMICS
Up to this point, it has been assumed that the metabolic and repair functions of the
firm take place instantaneously, Le. inputs are transformed into revenues
immediately, and there is no delay in either repairing the metabolic process itself or
in the replication of the repair mechanism. Needless to say, these assumptions are
pure fiction; production of revenue and repair/replication takes time and the delays
involved often spell the difference between success or failure for a firm.
While there is no space here to enter into a detailed discussion of the matter, let us
simplify the situation by assuming only two types of delays. The first we term the
production delay, corresponding to the time required to transform a given input of
materials, manpower and knowledge into an observable amount of revenue, or the
time required for a repair function to restore a metabolic operation. The second type
of delay we shall call the transport delay. It corresponds to the time needed to
transport the output of a firm to where it can be utilized as the input to either
another firm or a repair mechanism (or to the external world).
As an illustration of how time-lags can influence the behavior of an (M,R)-model of a
firm, consider the case of the single firm F depicted in Figure 2. The firm is clearly
non-reestablishable in the sense discussed earlier. If the combined delay time of the
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Fi~re 2 A Single Finn
production delay of R and the transport delay from F to R is T units, and if at time
t =0, F produces an output and is then removed from the network, T units later R will
produce a copy of F and F will be built back into the network even though F is
graph-theoretically non-reestablishable. However, if F is not just removed from the
industrial network, but is suppressed for an amount of time t ~ T , then irreversible
damage will have occurred and F will be removed from the network forever. The
interplay between the various time-lags involved when several finns are coupled
together into an industry is a delicate matter and will be taken up in a later paper.
Closely related to the time-lag problem is the matter of system dynamics. There are
several issues surrounding this topic, not all of them mutually consistent. For
simplicity, let us consider here only the case of a single firm F modeled as an
(M,R)-system. Abstractly, the diagram for F is
f ~f liy
Q -+ r -+ -+ H (Q,r) -+ H (rJ/ (Q,r»
U'-? h
X
and ask in what manner F can be regarded as a dynamical system. If it were not for
the repair and replication maps ~ f and 13y this would be a straightforward question
addressable via nonnal system-theoretic realization theory procedures; Le. we would
have the problem of constructing a canonical internal model of the finn
.%: = p(x ,u)
y =h(x),
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whose input/output behavior duplicates that of the given metabolic map ./.
Techniques for handling this question are readily available in the mathematical
system theory literature (Casti 1987, 1985; Kalman 1969).
Let us ignore for the moment the factorization of the firm's metabolism ./ through
the production-marketing maps g and h. and consider the (M.R)-system
:I +:1
o --+ r --+ H (o.r)
where ./ 6 H (Qr), ~:I tH (r,li (Or». We wish to show how this abstract model of a
firm can be considered as a sequential machine. i.e. as a discrete-time dynamical
input/output system.
Let us recall that a sequential machine M is a composite M '" (A, B. 8. 6, X). where A,
B. and 8 are sets (possibly infinite). while 6 : A )( 8 .... 8 ,X :8 )( A --+ B are maps. We
interpret A as the input alphabet of M • B as the output set. 8 as the set of states, with
6 and X the state- transitions and output maps of the machine. respectively. At each
discrete instant of time t '" 0.1.2..... M receives an input symbol from A • emits an
output in B • and the state is changed according to the rule 6. and the process
continues from the time t + 1. Further details on the properties of sequential
machines can be found for example in (Kalman 1969; Eilenberg 1974).
In order to characterize the firm F
identifications
A'" 0, B ",r, 8 ",H(Qr).
6(00.'/) '" ~:1('/(00», X<.f.oo} '" '/(00).
as a sequential machine. we make the
Thus, in general any firm can be regarded as a sequential machine in which the set
of "states" of the machine correspond to the set of possible "phenotypes" of the firm.
while the input and output sets of the machine are the inputs and revenues of the
firm. respectively.
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Putting the above ideas together, we arrive at the following scheme for
characterizing the dynamics of the firm:
i) regarding the firm as a sequential machine formed from the elements
F =(0, r, H (0, r), ~ I' T), we compute the metabolic process T at the time t = 0;
ii) using T, 0 , r, we employ realization theory to form a canonical model for the
state space X and the production/marketing maps 9 and h;
iii) Let t - > t + I and use the sequential machine to calculate the new metabolism
T. It is the same as at the previous time-step. Then continue to use the earlier X ,g
and h; if T changes, calculate a new canonical production/marketing model and
continue the process with the new model until the next time period.
It is of interest to note that in the above scheme, a change of metabolism implies that
the production process, the marketing procedure and/or the actual product has been
changed. This can come about only if the repair map ~ 1 fails to reproduce T. We have
already seen that this may come about only by means of environmental changes, in
general, unless the replication map fails to exist. But this last situation depends
entirely upon the size of the set H (0 ,H (0 ,r )), the space of all possible repair maps. If
it is either too large or too small, then no replication is possible. It would take us too
far afield to enter into the details of this argument here, but the implications are that
it is only in a highly restricted class of categories that replicating (M,R)-systems
exist. and it is within this class that we must search for viable models of industrial
growth and decline.
7. ATfAINABLE PRODUCTION-MARKETING PROCESSES
The arguments given earlier show that the metabolic component of a firm can be
altered by changes in its environmental inputs, while such changes leave the firm's
repair mechanism unaffected. By turning these arguments around, we can
investigate the degree to which environmental changes can be used in order to bring
the firm's production and marketing processes to some pre - as s i in ed state. An
important special case of this "reachability" question is to ask if a metabolic structure
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reached by some sequence of environmental changes can be reversed by another
appropriate sequence of changes in the environment. Questions of the above type
strike to the heart of many important industrial issues having to do with the way in
which changes in materials. men, and machines can be employed to affect the overall
productive capabilities of the firm.
In terms of machines, the reachability problem can be stated as: given a machine in a
specified initial state, does there exist a sequence of inputs which will bring the
machine to some preassigned state (perhaps also at a preassigned time)? In general,
the answer to this question is no. Machines having this "complete reachability"
property are called strongly connected. and we can ask whether or not machines
which correspond to (M,R)-systems are strongly connected.
Generally speaking, machines corresponding to (M.R)-systems may fail to be
strongly connected; hence, there may exist abstract "firms" which may be
unreachable from any initial configuration by any sequence of environmental
alterations. In the usual theory of sequential machines, this difficulty can be
formally by-passed by enlarging the set of inputs and by appropriately extending the
maps 6 and X. For (M,R)-systems this is a much more subtle business for the following
reasons:
(a) the input set 0 and the state set S =H (0 , r) are related in the (M.R)-systems
and we cannot enlarge 0 without also enlarging S ;
(b) by extending the maps • I and:l in the (M,R)-systems, we move the
mappings from the sets H (Q. r) and H (r,lf (0. r» to new sets H (0', r)Jl (r,lf (O',r»,
respectively. But this last set must possess certain properties in order for replication
to be possible and this property is by no means implied by the replicability of the
original system.
8. PROSPECfS AND CONCLUSIONS
The development of (M,R)-systems as a theoretical framework for the study of
industrial growth and re-structuring has only been tentatively sketched in the
preceding pages to the degree necessary to demonstrate feasibility of the idea. To
transform the basic idea into a working tool to study, for instance, the evolution and
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development of the world automotive industry, requires a substantial research effort
on both the theoretical, as well as applied fronts. It will be necessary to give concrete
meaning and structure to the various abstract components composing the
(M.R)-network (the elements Q, r , H (Q ,r ) ,+ ;f' etc.), as well as working out the
various connectivity structures which link the individual firms comprising an
industry. Such activities form the basis of the applied component of any
implementation of the (M,R)-framework for a specific industry. Some complementary
evolutionary ideas are given for the auto industry by Businaro (1982) and their
connection with (M,R)-systems merit much further study. See also the general
evolutionary ideas in Nelson and Winter (1982) and Businaro (1983).
But there are also a number of purely theoretical aspects of the (M,R)-formalism
which need further study if the overall structure is to bear the weight of providing
the foundation for such an investigation of individual dynamics. We have already
touched upon some of these issues in passing, but it is worthwhile to re-examine them
again as the basis for a future research agenda.
i) Lamarckian Changes - we have seen that changes in the firm's repair
mechanism +;f cannot come about by environmental alterations alone, as long as
certain invertibility assumptions on the replication procedure hold. This assumption,
and its resultant conclusion, are quite acceptable in the biological context but rest
upon much shakier ground in our industrial setting. It certainly seems plausible that
at least certain types of environmental changes could give rise to a change of the
firm's "genotype". At this stage it is unclear exactly how to modify the mathematical
setting given above to accommodate such "Lamarckian" changes.
ii) Networks and Time-Lags - the manner in which time-lags, in both firm
operations and in transport from one firm to another, affect the overall behavior of
an industry is critical for determination of the long-term growth or decline of given
firms within the industry. We have already seen simple examples in which time-lags
can result in either the permanent extinction of a firm or, conversely. in its
"resurrection" after being theoretically "dead". The interdependencies of lags of
different types and lengths is a topic that cannot be ignored if the (M,R)-framework
is to be used to gain insight into the behavior of real industries.
iii) Dynamics - the procedure outlined in the text for regarding an (M,R)-system
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as a sequential machine is one way to introduce dynamical considerations into the
overall formalism. There may be many other non-equivalent approaches. each
leading to a different view of the dynamical behavior of a firm. Even accepting the
approach given here for a single firm. there still arises the question of what will be
the dynamical behavior of a collection of such firms. i.e. an industry. Obviously, the
answer to such a question depends upon the connective and dependency structure of
the network. which in tum takes us back to some of the time-lag considerations
discussed earlier.
iv) Adaptation and Selection - if an (M.R)-network is to provide a mathematical
metaphor for the evolution of an industry. then it must possess some means to
accommodate the concepts of genetic variability and adaptive selections. We have
already spoken of the need to be able to incorporate genetic changes in the repair
map ~ f into the mathematical machinery of (M.R)-systems. A natural candidate for
the selection mechanisms is to impose some sort of optimality criterion upon the
possible abstract firms which may result from genetic "mutations". Production
efficiency. profitability. survivability are logical possibilities, but so also are less
economic-oriented criteria like degree of re-establishability and level of centrality,
criteria suggested more by the functional role of a firm in a network than by its
economic performance as an isolated unit.
v) Categories and the Comparison of Industrial Structures - a basic question in
the study of industrial evolution and change is to ask if the processes at work
modifying one industry can be used in any way to infer information about the forces
influencing another; if we understand the dynamics that shape. say. the chemical
industry. can that knowledge be used to understand. for instance. the evolution of the
automotive industry? In order to answer such a question. we must have a systematic
procedure for comparing the industries and a means for deciding whether they are
abstractly equivalent. The (M.R)-system framework provides a means for making
such comparisons through the mathematical apparatus termed "category theory"
(Eilenberg and MacLane 1945. MacLane 1972). Briefly. any collection of sets A.B, C •... ,
such that to each ordered pair (A. B ) we have another set H (A, B ), the mappings
from A to B. is called a c ate go ry, provided certain primitive assumptions are satisfied
for the set of mappings H (A.B ). We will defer any technical discussion of these
matters to another paper. but it is important here to observe that every (M,R)-system
is a category, in which the objects Q ,r are the sets and the metabolic maps H (Q ,r) are
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the mappings of the category. Thus, every firm can be regarded as a category, and by
extending the sets and the mappings, so can every industry. If we change the sets Q ,r
and/or the mappings H (Q ,r) obtaining a different firm, then we have a new
category, and the machinery of category theory allows us to compare the structures
of the two categories by means of mappings called functors. Roughly speaking, a
functor is a sort of dictionary allowing us to translate the structure of one category
into that of another, and conversely. This is exactly the type of tool which is needed to
compare one firm or one industry with another. The systematic exploitation of this
idea in the context of industrial structural change within the above (M,R)-framework
offers the promise of unlocking many key features responsible for the dynamics
underlying the evolution and development of modern global industries.
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PART C: LOCATION AND SPATIAL DYNAMICS

Chapter 14
Continuous Models of Spatial Dynamics
MJ. BECKMANN
1. The dynamics of physical phenomena is based on the principle that interaction
takes place only in small neighbourhoods. In spatial economics. a much weaker
principle applies: interaction decreases with distance. In a system of interdependent
cities - as in a Central Place System - buying and selling, spending and investing
occur in one place although the agents responsible may be located in some other
place at a considerable distance.
Let Cij be the propensity of a resident at location j to spend in location i. All distances'
effects are assumed to be represented in terms of these cif a large distance between i
and j implies a low value of Cij'
Let income at i be Yi, and assume permanent autonomous expenditure by outside
agents, e.g. government, to be Ai' Then the incomes generated by these autonomous
expenditures satisfy the condition
y. = A·+" c.. y·
I I ~ IJ J
J
or using a vector and matrix notation
y =a+Cy
y = (I - C)-I a .
(1)
(2)
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An equilibrium solution exists provided that eigenvalues of the non-negative matrix
e are absolutely less than unity. A sufficient condition for this is that the propensity
of any location to spend in all other locations is less than 1:
(3)
The dynamics of the system may be assumed to be determined by the simple linear
relationships that apply to small deviations from equilibrium
or
Y (t) = a(t) + e y (t-1)
which by successive substitution yields
t
Y = 2:: en a (t-n)
n=O
where we have set
CJ = I.
(4)
(5)
This (essentially) non-spatial model is stable in view of the condition on the
aggregate propensity to spend (3).
To capture the spatial side of the dynamic processes, one must either introduce
distance explicity, or reintroduce the principle that interaction occurs only at close
distances. We give examples of both.
2. A dynamic trade model between spatially separated markets may be set up as
follows:
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Let qi (Pi) be an excess demand function describing local consumption minus
production in market i. We assume that
q: < O.
1
Let xij denote shipments from i to j, and let kij be the transportation cost between i
and j. At first we assume that shipments are fixed through long term contracts. These
imply that net imports are given as
-e· ""1 = L.j
x -x..ij IJ. (6)
In equilibrium net imports equal local excess demand. The margin of excess demand
over net imports is then
qi (p) - 2: (xij - Xij)'
j
Walrasian price adjustment means that for small deviations from equilibrium price
increases are proportional to excess demand:
(7)
where
~>O
measures the speed of adjustment. Assume that the excess demand function has the
special form
(8)
Then
(9)
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Thus each market has its own price adjustment process described by
P·,=c'-13bp.,1 1 1
where
(10)
Notice that in this model, all markets have the same effective speed of adjustment 13.
Alternatively, suppose that prices are adjusted according to the deviation of local
inventories from desired levels Sj' Then
Pj =- ~ (Sj -Sj)
Pj = - ~ Sj = ~ [qj (Pj) + ejl
Pj = ~ [ ~ - bPj + ej 1 . (11)
The equilibrium solution is given by
or
(12)
b
Define
to be the deviation from the equilibrium price. In terms of P j one has the
homogeneous equation
(13)
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which is solved by
Pi = cos~. t
and Pi = sin -I"""ii'b. t .
The general solution is
Pi (t) = A cos (00 t + (1)
with
oo=~.
(14)
(15)
(16)
This spatial market system exhibits undamped oscillations in the fonn of sine waves.
Depending on the phase differences between locations, these oscillations, although in
principle unrelated, may still show a pattern of apparent "price waves" as proposed
by August Losch (1954, p. 267).
To study the possibility of non-accidental price waves one must resort to a description
of spatial markets in continuous tenns.
3. A continuous spatial market is described by prices as a function of two spatial
coordinates xl' x2'
and by a vector field ~ (x l' x2) of commodity flow, whose direction is the direction of
the flow and whose strength is the quantity of the commodity that passes through an
orthogonal unit cross section per unit of time.
In equilibrium, excess supply (i.e. negative excess demand) equals the yield or
"divergence" of this flow field
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(17)
This constitutes a commodity balance condition.
Secondly. in equilibrium. profits from trade must be zero for trades that actually take
place, and negative for "inefficient" trades Le. those in unprofitable directions. This
may be written as
~
grad P = k - (18)
I~I
where k = k (xl' x2) represents the cost of transporting a unit of the commodity over
a unit distance. regardless of the direction. (Beckmann and Puu 1985).
Let p be the derivation from equilibrium price and assume that the adjustment of flow
is proportional to its profitability. So,
a~
- = a grad p.
at
The adjustment of price is proportional to excess demand:
ap
-= b[q + div ~!] .
at
Differentiating (20) with respect to time
a 2p aq ap a~
--= b - • - + b div
at2 ap at at.
(19)
(20)
Now substitute for a~ I at from (19) and use the dot notation for derivatives with
respect to time. so that
p= bq'p + ab 6. p (21)
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where
In particular, if excess demand is independent of price (as in the simple continuous
transportation model)
p= ab 6p
and this is the wave equation in its simplest form.
(22)
We will not discuss the resulting price waves since their space and time profile
depends crucially on the shape of the region. We will merely demonstrate the
persistence of fluctuations. Multiplying (21) by 2p one has
Now
Pdiv grad p = div (p grad p) - grad p grad p.
Integrating (24) over the region A and applying the Gauss integral theorem
JJ A Pdiv grad p dXl dX2 = JJ A div (p grad p) - grad p grad p dXldX2
=J p(grad p)n dt - JJ A grad pgrad p dXl dX2 .
(23)
(24)
Assume that the boundary conditions grad Pn = 0 on aA remain satisfied so that cross
flows do not change. Then, using (19)
Therefore, the line integral vanishes and we have
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f f Pdiv grad p dXl dX2 = -f f grad p grad p dXl dX2
1 d
= - - - f f (grad p)2 dXl dX2'
2 dt
Integrating (23) over the region A and substituting (25)
d/dt f f p2 + ab Igrad pl2 dXl dX2 =0
or
(25)
constant. (26)
If the system was not initially in equilibrium, then the constant is positive. If the
system ever passes through equilibrium so that Igrad pl2 = 0 then
f f p2 dXl dX2 = constant > 0
so that the motion continues. The system can never settle down to equilibrium. It is
unstable.
In the case where excess demand
q = q(p)
is a strictly decreasing function of price, the same argument leads to
d/dt f f P+ ab Igrad pl2 dXl dX2 = f f aq' p2 dX 1dX2 < 0
since q' < 0 everywhere.
(27)
Thus price dependent demand acts as a damping factor in regard to the fluctuations of
p in time and space. Prices converge to equilibrium.
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Various modifications of this simple model may be explored. Essentially, price and
flow adjustment through interaction with the immediate neighbourhood always leads
to partial differential equations of the wave equation type, damped or undamped.
In the next section we return to the expenditure type of interaction now restricted to
expenditures within the immediate neighbourhood.
4. Let y(xI,x2,t) represent wealth in terms of liquid assets in locations xl ,x2 at time
1. Assume that spending units tend to spend this money at their own and in adjacent
locations xi ± 8xi at time t + I::;. 1. In discrete terms
y(xI,x2,t + I::;.t) =coy(xl,x2,t) + cI[y(x I -l::;. x I,x2,t) + y(xI +l::;. x I,x2,t)
+ y(xI ,x2 - I::;. x,t) + y(x I ,x2 + I::;. x,t)]
(28)
where Co is the propensity to spend at home and cI is the propensity to spend in any
of the adjacent locations. Rewriting the bracket
[y(xI + I::;.x,x2) -y(xI,x2)] - [y(xI,x2) -y[xI-l::;.x,x2]
+[y(x I ,x2 + I::;. x) - y(xI ,x2)] - [y(xI,x2) - y(xI ,x2 -I::;. x)] + 4y(xI,x2)
one observes
I::;.x2 cI
+- . - [------
I::;.t I::;. x
I::;.ly(xI,x2)
----]
I::;. 2y(xI ,x2)
----].
Now assume that the total propensity to spend equals unity:
Co + 4c1 =1.
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(29)
Then the first tenn cancels. Let the ratio of the time change to the space change be
fixed at
(30)
Going to the limit we obtain
iJyliJt= mAy
or
(31)
the well-known diffusion equation.
This equation may be given the following interpretation. Introduce the gradient field
grad y. We observe that money flow in the region is then described by
~=-grady (32)
and the change in liquid wealth is the divergence of this flow field. Thus liquid
wealth can change only through the net yield of money flows
y= -div ~ = -m div(-grad y) = mAy.
Add now boundary condition ~ n = 0 on iJ A. Then it follows at once from the Gauss
integral theorem
o=f ~nds=ffdiv~ dXl dX2=-(l/md/dt)ffydxl dX2'
Total liquid wealth or money stock must remain unchanged.
Consider now an equal distribution of liquid wealth throughout the region
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We show that this is the only stable equilibrium. Consider
1/2 d/dtf f(y -y)2dx l dX2 = f f(y -y) . y dXldx2
= mf f (y -Y)l:.y dXl dx = mf f (y -y)div grad y dXl dX2'
Now
(y - y) div grad y = div[(y - y) grad y] - grad y grad y.
Also by the Gauss integral theorem
f f div[(y -y)grad y] dXldx2 = -f(y -Y)~n ds = 0
by the boundary condition, using (32).
Substituting
proves the assertion.
(33)
(34)
Suppose now that spending by residents of a location is not financed entirely by net
receipts from trade, but by outside earnings as well. Let z(xl' x2) be the density of
these net earnings which may be negative. In that case, residents of this location pay
wages to outsiders. presumably out of earnings from trade. Let the expenditure or
money flow equation be as follows:
ay/ at = Z - m div(-grad y).
Constancy of aggregate disposible wealth or aggregate liquid assets implies
(35)
0= f f (ay/at) dXldx2 =f f z dXl dX2 + m f (grad y)n ds =f f z dXl dX2' (36)
Thus aggregate net earnings z from outside locations must add up to zero.
348
Now let y* be the stationary solution of that system
z + m div grad y* = O.
Consider
(1/2 d/dt) J J (y - y*)2 dXt dX2 =
J J (y - y*) (dy/dt) dXt dX2 = J J (y - y*)(z + m div grad y)dxt dX2
= mJ J (y - y*) div grad(y - y*)dXt dX2
using (35) and (37)
(37)
= mJ J div[(y - y*)grad(y-y*)] dXt dX2- mJ J Igrad(y-y*)12 dXt dX2 < 0 (38)
since the first integral vanishes by the Gauss integral theorem and the boundary
condition. This shows the stability of the equilibrium solution y* of (37).
This paper has presented some examples of economic processes in space, whose
dynamics are described by the well known wave and diffusion equations. These do not
by any means exhaust the existing possibilities. In particular, we have not attempted
to investigate the emergence of singularities or "catastrophies" which are often
associated with spatial growth processes, as in the phenomenon of growth poles.
These interesting topics are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Chapter 15
The Onset of Turbulence In Discrete Relative
Multiple Spatial Dynamics
D. S. DENDRINOS AND M. SONIS
TIIE RELATNE FlXED POINT PROCESS
The iterative algorithm (mapping) of relative discrete dynamics to be discussed here
was first presented in a paper by Sonis and Dendrinos (1984). where the two- location.
one-stock problem was addressed. Its connections with fundamental socio-spatial
dynamics are expanded in Dendrinos and Sonis (1987). where the full gamut of
I-location. I-stock models are presented together with some empirical evidence.
Multiple-location. one-stock discrete dynamics of the form:
x·(t+1) = (A- F.) / (I A- F.)
1 1 1 • J J
J
Ai> 0; i=I.2•...•1
i=I.2•...•1 (1)
(2)
i=I.2•...•I] > 0 i=I.2•...•1 (3 )
0< xi(t) • xi(t+l) < 1 : i=I.2•...•1 ; 0;:; t ;:; T . (4)
are discussed in this paper; in particular. we present results obtained when 1=2. and
1=3. For higher dimensional problems. and for cases with more than one iteration
(time period) lags. e.g.
xi(t+n) = Ai Fi I ~ Aj Fj
J
n> 1
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(5)
see Dendrinos and Sonis (1987). In particular. the following log-linear specifications
of the F-functions are analysed:
i.k=I.2•....I.
(6)
(7)
Exponential formulations of the F-functions:
I c:x.
F i = exp IT xk(t) ik
k=1
(8)
are also discussed in Dendrinos and Sonis (1987) where it is demonstrated that
regardless of the values of the bifurcation parameters. Ai' and the exponents. c:x. ik' the
results are always fixed points in the case of the exponential formulation; for any
dimension I > O. These results are obtained analytically.
Since the pioneering work by Lorenz (1963). and the subsequent landmark findings
by May (1976) and Feigenbaum (1978) on simple discrete iterative processes. a great
deal of interest has been attracted to the field of bifurcation theory (see. for instance.
Raken. 1983). Developments in this field have been either analytical or
computational. relying increasingly on numerical simulations as the forms examined
become more complex. The numerical simulations are creating a new subdiscipline
within the field. known as experimental mathematics; see S. Ulam (1985).
Two of the central issues in this emerging field are the questions of "faithfulness"
and "completeness" . "Faithfulness" questions whether the results obtained by the
numerical simulations are due to the intrinsic processes of the map. the peculiarities
of the algorithms employed. or the computer's accuracy. "Completeness" questions
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whether the numerical experiments, no matter how extensive, can always provide
the full richness of the mappings under examination.
This paper presents a few unexpected, interesting results, previously unidentified in
the mathematical literature (to our knowledge). They contain significant implica-
tions for the evolution of general (abstract) socio-spatial systems, which are
elaborated in Dendrinos and Sonis (1987). However, a few examples of the use of the
stock-location universal algorithm are also outlined here.
One area where this discrete map may be of direct application is that of regional
population dynamics expressed in relative terms. Interdependencies among
population stocks, over space and time, can be driven by comparative advantages
enjoyed by the various locations competing for population(depicted by the model's
parameters). Fast adjustments in population stocks are dictated by the current values
of these parameters and their (slow) changes.
Another area of possible application is that where capital stocks and population
(labor) stocks interact: inter-stock, inter-spatial, inter-temporal, interdependencies
and competition can be incorporated through the use of the universal map. Different
speeds of change in these stocks can be accounted for by introducing different time
lags.
Finally, one could extend this analysis by treating distance similarly to time (Le., as
an iterative process where temporal iLn..d.. spatial ticking occurs) where both are
(simultaneous) determinants of stock dynamics. Clearly, research along these lines
holds considerable future promise.
THE FUNDAMENTAL BIFURCATION IN DISCRETE DYNAMICS: THE lWO-
LOCATION, ONE-STOCK CASE
In proceeding to demonstrate the fundamental bifurcation in discrete (iterative)
dynamics - the equivalent of Hopfs bifurcation in continuous dynamics - we make
use of the following specifications from (6,7):
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x1(t+l) = F 1 /(F 1 + AF2) = 1/(1 + AF)
x2(t+l) = 1 -x1(t+l) = AF/(1 + AF)
F = xl (t)(( X2(t)13 > 0
o < xl (t) , x2(t) < 1
A>O,
so that at any time period t:
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Formulating the corresponding slopes, one obtains:
Sl1(t+l) =c3x 1(t+l)/ c3x 1(t) = - x1(t+l)2 A[c3F/c3x 1(t)]
= -Xl (t+ 1)2 A[a. F/x 1(t) - 13F/x2(t)]
= - [a.x2(t)-13x1(t)] x1(t+l)x2(t+l)/x1(t)x2(t)
which at equilibrium (xi ,xi) yields
Similarly:
S12(t+1) = c3x1(t+l)/c3x2(t) =-x 1(t+l)2 A[c3F/c3x 2(t)]
= -x 1(t+l)2 A[13F/x2(t) - a. F/x 1(t)]
= -[13 x 1(t)-a. x 2(t)] x1(t+l)x2(t+l)/x 1(t)x2(t)
=-sl1(t+l)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
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s21(t+l) = h 2(t+l)/h1(t) = xl(t+l)x2(t+l)[aF/h 1(t)]
= [ct.x2(t)-13x1(t)] xl(t+l)x2(t+l)/xl(t)x2(t) =- sl1(t+l) = sI2(t+l) (19)
S22(t+l) = h 2(t+l)/h2(t) = xl(t+l)x2(t+l)[aF/h 2(t)]
= -[ct.x2(t)-13x1(t)] xl(t+l)x2(t+l)/xl(t)x2(t) =-s21(t+l) = sl1(t+l) (21)
S22 =-[ct.x; -13x~] .
In the matrix of slopes at equilibrium, the Jacobi matrix J* is given by:
r * * 1 r * -13x~ 1Sl1 S12 -ct. X2
J* = I I = I I
L * * J l * 13x~ JS21 S22 ct. X2
(22)
(23)
We note that: det J* = O. or:
(23.1)
and that its trace TrJ* is:
(23.2)
Forming the characteristic polynomial of the matrix J* one obtains the real
eigenvalue X from:
(24)
According to the well-known von Neumann theorem for difference equations, (see
Saaty 1967. p. 168) the equilibrium state (x i. x;) will be stable if IX I < 1. When the
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eigenvalue IAI = 1, then bifurcations of three different types occur. They shall be
discussed next making use of numerical simulations.
Two thresholds determine the nature of these bifurcations: 11 + 1 = (a. + 1) / (a. + ~)
associated with the value A = 1, and the threshold 11-1 = (a. - 1) / (a. +~) associated with
the value A = -1. In the parameter space where a. + 13 < 0, the three bifurcations
manifest themselves as follows: if 0 ~ 11.1 ~ 1 and 11 +1 < 0 then as A moves from zero
to + 00 only one type of bifurcation occurs in which x* switches from a fixed point
into a stable two-period cycle. It takes place in the area - 1 ~ 13, - 1 ~ a. ~ 1. The
second type of bifurcation occurs, transforming x* from an unstable equilibrium to
an attractor, as A moves from zero to + 00 when 0 ~ 11+1 ;:ii 1 and 11-1 > 1; it occurs in
the area -1 ~ 13 ~ 1, a. ~ -1. Finally, the third type of bifurcation occurs when 0 ~
11 ± 1 ~ 1; now as A moves from zero to +00 the equilibrium is transformed from
unstable, to stable, to period doubling cycles, and to chaos. This phenomenon occurs
in the parameter space a. < 1, 13 < 1.
Bifurcation type one is the discrete dynamics equivalent of the Hopf bifurcation in
continuous maps. Bifurcation type two transforms a competitive exclusion (unstable
equilibrium) through a one-sided stable fixed point, to two equilibria, one stable and
the other unstable (competitive exclusion) - the final result depending on the
starting value for x. Bifurcation type three is the one widely studied in reference to
the discrete logistic model.
When a. + 13 > 0 then the first type of bifurcation transforming a fixed point to a
stable two-period cycle, as A moves from + 00 to zero, occurs when 0 ~ 11-1 ~ 1 and
11 + 1> 1 . It takes place in the mirror image (in reference to the a. + ~ = 0 axis), part of
the parameter space where this bifurcation occurs under the previous case (a. + 13
< 0); specifically, it is found where a. ~ 1 and -1 ~ ~ ~ 1. The second type of
bifurcation transforming an unstable equilibrium into a fixed point (attractor),
occurs when 0 ~ 11+ 1~ 1 and 11-1 < 0 corresponding to the parameter space -1 ~ a. ~ 1
and 13 ~ 1. The third type of bifurcation occurs when 0 < 11± 1 ~ 1 corresponding to
the parameter space a. ~ I, ~ ~ 1.
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If the bifurcation points are found in the value A = A"'. in the 0'. + f3 < 0 space. then
the corresponding bifurcations in the 0'. + f3 > 0 are found in A = A** = 1/A"'.
Specifically, the type one or type two bifurcations occur at points:
1/A"''''. (25)
A more detailed presentation of the above is found in Sonis and Dendrinos (1984) and
Dendrinos and Sonis (1987).
In summary, there are three fundamental bifurcation types: (a) The fundamental
bifurcation which is equivalent to the Hopf bifurcation in continuous dynamics. and
transfonns a stable attractor (fixed point). through a center, to a stable two-period
cycle in discrete relative mappings; (b) the fundamental bifurcation transforming
competitive exclusion to an attractor, through a one-sided stable equilibrium; (c) the
fundamental bifurcation which is equivalent to the May bifurcation of the map
y(t+ 1) = ay(t) [l-y(t)] • and in discrete relative mappings transforms an unstable
equilibrium, to an attractor, to period doubling cycles, and then to chaos. The
necessary condition for the presence of the May type bifurcation is the collapse of
the two thresholds 11+ 1 and 11 -1 into the space (0.+ 1); in other words. the
simultaneous presence of type one and type two bifurcations.
For the value of A* obtained from (25), at which the above holds precisely, the
iterative process is at an orbital motion: given any starting value. there is a
two-period cycle which involves the two starting values. At values different than A"',
the iterative process converges to a fixed point (xi. x;) so that for todd:
lim xl (t) = xi
t-+ 00
lim X2(t) = x;
t-+ 00
lim XI(t+1) = xi
t-+ 00
lim X2(t+1) = x;
t-+ 00
(26.1)
(26.2)
or it converges to a stable two-period cycle:
lim xl (t) = xi (1)
t-+ 00
lim Xl (t+1) = xi (2)
t-+ 00
(27.1)
•lim x2(t) = x2(1)
t-+ 00
so that
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*lim x2(H 1) x2(2)
t-+ 00
(27.2)
x I (t) + x2(t) = 1
x I(H1) + x2(H 1) = 1
x; + x~ =1
.. ..
x I(1) + x2(1) = 1
x;(2) + x;(2) = 1.
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31 )
(32)
In the case where A = A* and (t + 13 < 0 , so that s;\ = -1, the fixed point undergoes a
transition: at this critical value any staning point (xl (0), x2(0) so that xl (0) + x2(0)
= I} is a pan of an unstable two-period cycle. This is equivalent to the center type
dynamic equilibrium in the continuous case. Thus, a fixed point is transformed
through an orbit to a stable limit cycle in the form of a stable two-period cycle; see
Figure 1. The iterative behavior is shown in Figure 2. For a staning value outside the
ranges of x~ (1), x; (2) the process converges toward these limits from the outside;
whereas, for starting values within these thresholds the process converges toward
these limits from the inside.
A numerical example is given below for the case where (t = 1.5, 13 =-.4, as in Figure 2
and Table 1. The cases of odd and even iteractions are exposed, when 500 iterations are
carried out. For values of A up to the bifurcation point A*, found somewhere in the
range 3.05 < A* < 3.10, xl (t) declines and xl (H1) increases - both converging toward
x*l as approaches + 00. Beyond this critical value xI(t) increases and xl(t+I)
declines as xl (t) converges to x; (1), whereas xl (HI) converges toward x; (2). This
allows one to detect, given any number of iterations - and not neccessarily when
T> > 0 - whether A lies before or after the critical value A*. Up till A* and for
ranges close to this threshold, pseudo-cycles are formed, which are eliminated as
T .... + co. Note also that up till A* the mean value equation Xl (t) = [xl (t) + Xl (HI)] / 2 is
decreasing, whereas it increases afterward for odd iterates.
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In A
100
1.75.25o
3
2
5
10 \
-+-----....£------......-~---'-----_+----- xi
.1
Figure 1 The fundamental discrete dynamics bifurcation, splitting a fixed point into a
stable two-period cycle. Here «=1.5, ~=-4. Bifurcation occurs when 3.05 < A <
3.10 where x· = .4545....
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xi (2)+-+-+---+--.,.--+-lr----++---B;-------f.r-.---
Figure 2 The stable two-period cycle: the discrete dynamics equivalent to the stable
limit cycle
values, both
inside (-----)
of continuous dynamics. Points xl (0) identify two starting
cases converging to the limits x; (1) and xi(2) either from the
or the outside (--).
Table Numerical experiments for the log-linear specification of the two-locations,
one-stock iterative dynamics. The parameters generating these results are:
(l = 1.5, 13 = -.4; results are based on 500 iterations. A'" identifies the critical
value where the Hopf-like discrete dynamics bifurcation occurs.
•A xl (1)
1.00 .5993
2.00 .5089
2.25 .4938
2.50 .4804
2.75 .4684
2.90 .4610
2.95 .4573
3.00 .4501
3.05 .4337
A'"
3.10 .4021
3.25 .3164
3.75 .2111
4.00 .1821
.4624
.4620
.4650
.4777
.5074
.5975
.7144
.7480
same as
in xi< 1)
.9234
.9193
.9151
.9114
.9095
.9139
.9255
.9301
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2. LOCAL AND PARTIAL TURBULENCE: THE THREE-LOCATION, ONE-STOCK
CASE
This event, depicted in Figure 3, identifies a fixed point in one variable and a stable
two-period cycle in the other two. It is referred to as "local" because only two
variables out of the three in this case are in an oscillatory motion. It is called
"partial" because the cycles are periodic. The full gamut of turbulence, as found in
other circumstances (in this and other discrete dynamic processes), is not replicated
during this event.
Formulating the three-location, one-stock problem of the universal discrete relative
dynamics model one has:
Xj(t+I) = AjFj I L. Alj
J
i=I,2,3 (33)
where F is specified in a log-linear manner:
i,k=I,2,3. (34)
Without loss of generality one may assume: A1 = 1, C( 1j = 0 for i=1,2,3. Then the above
becomes:
X1(t+I) = II (l+K)
xz(t+ I) = Fz I (I+K)
x3(t+I) = F3 I (l+K)
C( C(
where K = AZ II xh Zh + A3 II xh3h.
h h
Formulating the Jacobian sj/t+l) = aXj(t+l) I axp) when i,j=1,2,3 one obtains:
(35)
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Figure 3 The local and partial turbulen
ce phenomenon; the parameter values
responsible for this simulation are:
A1=1, A2=1O-4, A3=1; ((11 =Ct12=((13=0; ((21=((22=((
23=-1.5;
((31=((32=0, ((33=-1.0.
M= [ Sl1(t+l)s21 (t+l)
S31 (t+l)
S12(t+l)
s22(t+l)
s32(t+l)
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(36)
wi th entries:
s1/t+l) = -x(t+l)2(oK/oxj<t)) j=I,2,3;
shi(t+1) = x1(t+l) [(oFh/hP))- x1(t+l) Fh(oK/hj(t))] h=2,3 , j=I,2,3.
3
L: g..(t+l) = 0 , i=I,2,3.
. 1 IJ
J=
In the log-linear case, one obtains:
oFh/hj(t) = a. hi Fh / xP)
oK/3xP) = (A2 a.2j + A3 a.3j) Fj / x/t),
so that the entries of the Jacobian become:
(37.1)
(37.2)
(37.3)
(38)
(39)
Si/t+l) =-x1(t+l)2(A2 a.2j +A3 a.3j) Fj/x/t) ; j=I,2,3 (40)
shi(t+l) = xl (t+l) (Fh/xj(t)) [a. hj - x1(t+l) (A2 a.2j + A3 ct3j) Fj] (41)
h=2.3 j=I,2,3.
..Again. the properties of the dynamics depend upon the relative size of sii' i=I,2,3. At
equilibrium:
* .. 2 (Asl1 =-xl 2 a.21 + A3 a.31) (42)
• .... .. 11-. ..
s22 = Xl (F2/x2) [a.22- x1(A2 a.22 = A3 a.32) F2] (43)
.. * * *.. ...
s33 = Xl (F3/x3) [a.22 -xl (A2 a.23 + A3 a.32) F3] . (44)
For any combination of A2 • A3 , given appropriate exponents a. ij' the following
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conditions may result in the entries of the Jacobian: Is'-l l < I, Sjj = -I, j=2.3. At this
point a state of three fixed points is transformed into a state of partial and local
turbulence, where one location's abundance,
whereas the other two locations' abundance
cycle as in Figure 3.
say xi. is a fixed point (attractor).
xi and x3 are in a stable two-period
The case of local turbulence, where one location exhibits fixed point behavior. the
other two sharing the stock in a stable two-period cycle, is another special case of the
fundamental bifurcation in discrete dynamics. Under special conditions it could be
• If. .. If.
shown that: x2(l) = x3(2) and x2(2) = x3(l), the socio-spatial system exhibiting local
role reversal.
Numerical experimentation in the four-location. one-stock case indicates that we
could observe one or two locations at a fixed point, the rest exhibiting a stable
two-period cycle. Further, these results are also replicated in the two-stock,
two-location case, where one stock could be at a fixed point in both locations, whereas
the other exhibits a stable two-period cycle (at times involving role reversal,
implying that x;(l) = xi(2), xi (2) = xi(l), whereas the second stock shows fixed point
(y i, y;) behavior). Finally, numerical experimentation in the two-stock, two- location
case indicates that for fixed exponents, as one of the bifurcation parameters varies
smoothly, switching may occur, whereby the stocks' behavior is reversed: the stock
showing fixed point behavior reverses to a stable two-period cycle, whereas the
opposite happens to the second stock.
3. STRANGE CONTAINERS: TIIE THREE-LOCATION, ONE-STOCK CASE
For socio-spatial systems the chaotic behavior of dynamic processess may be of
paramount interest, since that is where, in all likelihood, socio-spatial systems are
found given the relative abundance of chaotic behavior in iterative discrete
dynamics. In the three-dimensional case of the three-location, one-stock problem,
the nature of the chaotic regime is not the same at all points in the parameter space
where chaos prevails. Chaos, in fact, is not only deterministic in its intra-chaotic
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behavior at each point, but furthermore, it is changing in a deterministic manner
during its inter-chaotic transformations.
There are regimes of chaos where the intra-chaotic motion spans almost the whole
spectrum inside the triangle of behavior, giving rise to "global strange containers";
see Figure 4., Points in the parameter space also exist in this three-dimensional case
where the chaotic motion is confined to "local strange containers" of various sizes.
They range from large areas inside the triangle, shown in Figure 5, to relatively
medium portions of the space, as in Figure 6. A "mini strange container" is shown in
Figure 7. Although the numerical aspects of the transitions in the chaotic regimes
have been partly unravelled, the analytical properties still remain intractable.
The term "container" has been used here to designate the opposite phenomenon of
that implied by the notion of "attractor". Strange attractors are limits toward which
dynamic paths converge; they outline areas in a envelope-type manner. Cases where
"strange attractors" occur in the universal discrete dynamics model of three-
location, one-stock case are shown in Figure 8. A "hybrid" case, where a combination
of a strange container and a strange attractor occurs, is shown in Figure 9. All of the
results shown are independent of the initial values of the mapping.
It is highly unlikely that these are the only unexpected and innovative events
present in the universal discrete dynamics parameter space. Numerical experimenta-
tion may indeed reveal other phenomena present in this vast space, shedding much
insight on the discrete spatial dynamics of social systems.



367
CONQ..USIONS
An overview of a few interesting new events in the simulation runs involving
relative discrete two- and three-location, one-stock dynamics have been presented in
this paper. It is still unknown if these are the only events of innovative qualitative
properties in the various regions of this universal relative dynamics algorithm's
parameter space. As in astrophysics. developments in the theoretical front coupled
with developments in researchers' observational capability (through improvements
in computing processes and capacity) guarantee the discovery of new phenomena to
improve our understanding of iterative spatial dynamics.
Particular emphasis was placed on the fundamental discrete dynamics bifurcation,
equivalent to Hopfs bifurcation in continuous dynamics. Above all, the accent must
be on the chaotic behavior of these dynamics. as socio-spatial systems are likely to be
found in such states.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Funding from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Professor
Dendrinos would like to thank his research assisant, Richard Desko, for the computer
work.
REFERENCFS
Dendrinos, D.S. and Sonis, M., Turbulence and Socio-Spatial Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Theor.y of Social Systems Eyolution, 1987.
Feigenbaum, M.J., "Quantitative Universality for a Class of Nonlinear Transforma-
tions", Journal of Statistical Physics, Vol. 19, 1978, pp. 25-52.
Haken, H., Syner~etics, 3rd ed., Springer-Verlag, New York-Heidelberg, 1983.
Lorenz, E.N., "Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow", Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences,
Vol. 20, 1963, pp. 130-141.
May, R.M., "Simple Mathematical Models with very Complicated Dynamics", ~,
Vol. 261, 1976, pp. 259-467.
Saaty, T.L., Modem Nonlinear EQuations, McGraw Hill, New York, 1967.
Sonis, M. and Dendrinos, D.S., 1984, "A Discrete Relative Growth Model: Switching, Role
Reversal and Turbulence", Paper presented at the Sixth Advanced Summer
Institute in Regional Science, University of Bamberg. FRG, August, 1984. Forth-
coming in Conference Proceedings.
Ulam, S.M., "Experimental Mathematics: the Role of Computation in Nonlinear
Science", Communications of the ACM, Special Section on Computing in Theoretical
Physics, Vol. 28, No.4, 1985, pp. 374-384.
Chapter 16
Adoption and Diffusion of Innovations
and the Evolution of Spatial Systems
H. BLOMMESTEIN and P. NUKAMP
1. IN1RODUcnON
Technology and economic dynamics are closely intertwined phenomena, and
therefore it is no surprise that current economic stagnation has led to an increased
interest in innovation as one of the driving forces for structural change (see, for
instance, Kleinknecht, 1986). The role of innovation has become central to current
economic research; witness the great number of debates on the validity of concepts
like 'depression trigger', 'demand pull', and 'technology push'. In this context,
Stoneman (1983) has divided this research area into the following parts: the
generation of new technology, the diffusion pattern of new technology (including
the adoption of innovations), and the socio-economic impacts of these processes.
These three elements will be discussed briefly.
First, the way in which new technologies and innovations are induced has been
studied quite extensively in the recent literature, in the context of both the 'long
waves' discussion, and product cycle theory. Also, the spatial framework of
technological innovation has received at great deal of attention, inter alia, in the
field of the 'urban incubator' hypothesis (for an extensive review, see Davelaar and
Nijkamp, 1986).
The second element, viz. the dispersion of technological innovations, has also
received much attention in the past years (see, for example, Brown, 1981), following
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earlier studies made by Hagerstrand (1967) among others. Despite path-breaking
work in this field, the behavioural and quantitative background of many
contributions to innovation diffusion has not always been impressive, one of the
main reasons being that in several cases a behavioural (especially a micro-economic
based) choice theory was lacking. An interesting exception in this field is recent
work by Sonis (1986 and Chapter 8) on the relationship between innovation diffusion
and spatial change in the framework of ecological dynamics.
Our paper will make a modest attempt to review and extend some essential elements of
structural spatial changes caused by technology diffusion and adoption. The focus of
this paper will mainly be on the spatial aspects of the diffusion of technological
innovations (interpreted here as the design, construction and successful introduction
of new - or improved - commodities, services, production processes or distribution
processes; see Dieperink and Nijkamp, 1986). In a broader and more comprehensive
context, such innovations may occur as clusters, coined 'technological regimes' by
Winter (1984). An attempt will be made here to specify a stochastic model for the
adoption of innovations and the associated spatial developments.
The third component of technology research, the socio-economic impacts, will be
dealt with in a less elaborate manner here. For a more elaborate treatment of this
subject, especially concerning relationships between technological change, employ-
ment and spatial dynamics, the reader is referred to Nijkamp (1986).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the initial version of a stochastic
model for the acceptance of innovations in different sectors and different cities,
based on the technological potential for adopting innovations. In the subsequent
section, an introductory exposition of non-linear dynamic models of the Verhulst
type is given. This is followed by an application of the Verhulst type of model, in
which the impacts of new activities on the urban economies (in different sectors) are
related to competition (in terms of differential attractiveness factors) between cities
and sectors in a spatial system. Section 4 provides a link between the acceptance of
innovations and their impact on the spatial evolution of the multi-sector, multi-city
system. The paper concludes with some reflections on the operational mechanism of
such a dynamic model.
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2. A STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR ADOPTING INNOVATIONS
The model developed in this paper will be based on a stochastic theory of spatial
evolution. An attempt will be made to construct a simple multi-sector, multi-region
(or multi-city) model, which is able to describe the impacts of technological
innovations in one or more specific sectors of the spatial system concerned. Thus the
main focus of this paper will be on the interaction between the evolution of a spatial
system and the diffusion of innovation.
Let us assume the following stochastic binary choice model for the adoption of a
certain technological innovation (or a technological regime):
where
P(Xi,k,t) = probability that a city
sector k at time t
(2.1)
with size xi will adopt the innovation in
Xi = size of city i (e.g. measured in terms of population)
rk it = volume of activities of sector k in the city of size xi_ which are able to
generate and implement a certain innovation in period t
h kit = volume of (remaining) activities of sector k which - for technical
reasons - are unable to create and implement a certain innovation.
Clearly, (~it + hkit ) represents the total volume of activities of sector k in a city of
size xi at time t. It is assumed here that hk it is independent of city size i, as this
limitation is caused by technical reasons, specific for sector k; hence:
hk - hkit - t·
Here it is assumed that the volume of activities ~ it can
(2.2)
be decomposed into 2
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elements, viz. the city size xi and an innovation acceptance coefficient gk t • Le.,
(2.3)
where gk t reflects the fraction of activities of sector k in city i which can
technically implement the innovation at hand in this city in period t. The foregoing
model is assumed to have the following properties:
(2.4)
(2) Technical progress implies the following conditions:
where Ie kt (Ie kt ~ 0) is defined as follows:
v k _ hk Igk~ t - t t·
(2.5)
(2.6)
In this paper it is assumed that long-run technological progress (Le. when
t -+ 00) implies that lim Ie kt = O. A reasonable specification fulfilling this con-
l-+ 00
dition for the time trajectory of Ie kt • may be an exponential function:
Clearly. alternative specifications are also possible.
(3) lim p (xi' k, t) = 1.
(2.7)
(2.8)
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This condition is in agreement with a hierarchical (rank-size) system. It is
easily seen that condition (2.8) also holds if hkt = O.
(4) lim P(xi' k, t) = 0
xi -+0
It is also easy to verify that condition (2.9) holds if gkt = O.
(2.9)
The foregoing properties imply that p(.) satisfies the additivity condition and hence
may be interpreted as a choice probability, as it is easily seen from the binary choice
model (2.1) that:
p(.) + [I-p(.)] = l. (2.10)
Furthermore, it is also worth noting that permanent long-term technological
progress implies:
lim p(.) = l.
t-+ 00
(2. II)
For further expositions on the shape of the adoption curve of innovations the reader
is referred to Allen et al (1978).
Clearly, the degree of acceptance of innovations in a specific city depends both on
city size and technological progress. In the light of these observations, it is
interesting to question how the dynamics of the spatial system affect innovation
diffusion and vice versa. Therefore, in the next section a simple model for spatial
dynamics based on a Verhulst dynamic model will be developed. Despite its simplicity,
the qualitative properties of our model will be shown to be fairly intricate. Only
simulation experiments on a computer are then able to reveal the fil.ll flavour of such
a space-time model. Nevertheless, some h..a..&.k qualitative properties shall be outlined
in section 4.
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3. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR SPATIAL DYNAMICS
In recent years, a wide variety of dynamic (often non-linear) models has been
developed in order to describe the impact of a significant exogenous stimulus (e.g. an
innovation) on the equilibrium pattern of a dynamic system. A usual specification of
general dynamic non-linear models is the Verhulst equation of logistic growth (see
Maynard-Smith, 1974):
i =«x (N-x) -13x, (3.1)
where « and 13 are constant parameters, and where N is related to a capacity level (or
saturation level) for the systems variable x. The variable x may represent, for
instance, the economic performance of the existing system.
Now consider the introduction of a significant technological innovation (occurring
in a clustered manner, e.g.: see Mensch, 1979). This new set of activities may be
denoted by y; it has an impact on the existing economy as follows (see Batten, 1982):
i = «x (N-x-'YY) - 13x, (3.2)
where y may exhibit the same dynamic pattern as x, so that a nested dynamic process
may emerge. This variation through innovations (see Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977)
evokes the problem of steady-state solutions (see also Allen, 1976). In recent years
this problem has been studied quite extensively in the literature, and further
contributions to the field of such multi-actor Volterra-Loth and predator-prey type
models can be found, among others, in Brouwer and Nijkamp (1985), Casti (1982),
Dendrinos and Mullally (1984), Dendrinos and Sonis (1984), Pimm (1982), Ralston
(1977), and Samuelson (1971).
The strength of those models is that they are able to generate a great diversity of
complex dynamic behaviour while retaining simplicity in model structure, although
it is still an apparent drawback that most of the models are lacking a testable
micro-based behavioural foundation. In this context, an interesting neoclassical
approach to the choice process underlying innovation diffusion can be found in
Soete and Turner (1984), who used Nelson and Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory of
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economic growth to analyze the micro-economic level of the adoption and diffusion
of new technologies. Their analysis is, however, based on a deterministic approach in
which spatial llynamics is not explicitly taken into account; new advances based on
stochastic (disaggregate) utility theory can be found in Haag and Weidlich (1984),
who tried to develop a probabilistic evolutionary spatial model. A review of such
non-linear dynamic modeling efforts can be found in Barentsen and Nijkamp (1986).
In summary, it can be concluded that there is an increasing tendency toward
constructing discrete choice models based on a stochastic acceptance (and diffusion)
of innovations.
In the present section an illustrative model based on a
used as a framework for treating urban dynamics
fundamental growth equation for city i is supposed to be:
Xi =Ol.X j(N + I t k Vkj -Xj) -I!Xj'
k
Verhulst specification will be
in a spatial system. The
(3.3)
where Ol. is the birth rate of urban activities, I! the death rate of existing activities, N
the initial carrying capacity for economic activities of the city, vk j the volume of
new activities in sector k generated in city (measured in appropriate units), and
t k the impact of new activities in sector k on the growth of city i.
Thus the expression I t k Vkj indicates the capacity expansion augmenting N, due to
k
the introduction and implementation of new activities k.
Next, the growth of these new activities in sector k in city
follows (see also Allen et aI., 1978):
may be represented as
(3.4)
where 11 is the growth rate of these new activities, ekj the volume of employment (or,
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in general terms, production factors) which might potentially be generated in sector
k (Le., a ceiling for new urban activities), and 6 k a market threshold coefficient in
sector k.
In addition, one may assume:
(3.5)
where dki is the demand for the products generated by sector k in city i, and IJ. k a
(constant) parameter linking the effective demand for k to their potential employ-
ment opportunities (usually, IJ.k ~ o.
Besides, the total demand in city i generated by residents of other cities j, in the
absence of spatial competition is equal to:
(3.6)
where pk ij is the c.i.f. price of a unit of products from sector k, produced in i
and shipped to residents in j; >. k and t> are normal reaction parameters.
Now the price pk ij is supposed to depend on communication costs between cities and
j as follows:
where pk i is the Lo.b. price, dij the distance between
communication cost.
(3.7)
and j, and ~ k the unit
Next, one may introduce spatial competition between cities on the basis of an attracti-
veness indicator akij' for sector k, which incorporates urban facilities and
price levels of sector k
ak.. = p n· / (pk .. )~ (3.8)1J 1 1J
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where akij is the relative attractiveness of city for residents of city j, ni the share
of facilities in city i, while ~ and p are the standardization parameters.
Consequently, the demand inside city i, generated by households outside city i, is
co-determined by the relative attractiveness of city i, so that equation (3.6) may be
adjusted as follows:
It can easily be seen that the total sectoral demand is calculated directly from (3.9),
while (dis)economies of scale may also be incorporated. By substituting (3.9) into
(3.5), followed by a substitution of (3.5) into (3.4), equations (3.3) and (3.4) now
describe a highly non-linear dynamic evolution of a spatial system composed of
competing regions, which might lead to competitive exclusion (see also Johansson
and Nijkamp, 1986). Thus, various types of dynamic behaviour may emerge,
depending on the initial conditions and the various parameters of the system. As the
analytical properties of this model are hard to trace, simulation experiments usually
have to be carried out in order to study the stability and equilibrium properties of
such a model.
Having now presented a model for spatial competitive dynamics, in the next section
we shall integrate the elements of the innovation diffusion model discussed in section
2.
4. INNOVATION DIFFUSION AND SPATIAL DYNAMICS
As mentioned in section 2, technological progress implies that the ratio of activities
which cannot technically implement a certain innovation with respect to those
which are actually able to do so, is declining (see conditions (2.5) and (2.6)). Clearly,
an innovation will only be successfully introduced if it creates a decrease in
d . k" fpro uctlOn costs c it ; I.e., I
Ok Ok
Il:: ij < 0 .... c it < 0
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(4.1)
Clearly, cost savings will lead to a reduction in the f.o.b. price pk i in equation (3.7),
so that then sector k in city
Ok _ °
P i - f(cit)·
improves its competitive position, Le.
(4.2)
Consequently, once condition (4.1) is fulfilled, the basic model linking acceptance of
innovations to spatial dynamics is composed of equations (2.1), (3.3) and (3.4) (after
substitution of the relevant equations).
Now the mechanism of this model and its features may be explained as follows.
Suppose a major technological innovation takes place in a cluster-wise manner and
penetrates the majority of all sectors k (informatics for example). The spatial-
economic spread effects of such an information wave can then be traced as follows.
First, there is an initial diffusion of innovation according to equation (2.1). If city i is
large, it will probably incorporate a large share of the innovation directly (reflected
by a high value of p(.)), while the (hierarchical) spatial diffusion of the innovation
concerned will depend on the size of cities in the spatial system.
Next, the~ path (Le., the adoption rate over time) of the innovation depends on the
value of Il:: kit and its impact on production costs. Clearly, the combination of
both processes may lead to well-known space-time processes in dynamic
geographical systems (see Griffith and Lea, 1984). The way these combined processes
affect the spatial system can now be described in a stepwise way.
(1) Define the existing spatial system with cities and sector k by means of the
above-mentioned state variables and related parameters.
(2) Identify the rate of potential technology acceptance parameters Il:: kit for
the successive time periods, and calculate the corresponding probabilities p(.)
for each city i and each sector k.
(3) If condition (4.1) is fulfilled, one must use (4.2) (as well as the remaining equa-
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tions) to analyze the impact of a major innovation (accepted in many sectors) on
the dynamic evolution of a competitive spatial system. If, for instance, city size
xi increases (see (3.3», then p(.) will increase (see (2.1»; a higher adoption
rate of innovation will decrease production costs, and hence, the competitive
position of city i. Employment growth will take place, leading to a growth in i,
and so on.
The dynamic development of such a spatial system might be explored by means of
simulation experiments. To some extent, the diffusion mechanism of this model is
aligned to the Christaller framework, because city size plays a major role in the
adoption rate of innovations. However, because of the distance decay function for
communication costs, the model also exhibits a distance-related diffusion pattern.
Clearly, technologcial innovation might also lead to a reduction in communication
costs. Given the positive impact of large cities on the acceptance rates of innovation,
there is some reason to expect that large cities will become larger in our dynamic
system. Consequently, beyond a certain threshold level of city size, it might be
important to include a negative externalities factor in order to allow the model to
generate a broad spectrum of different spatial behaviour (cf. Day, 1982).
5. CONQ..USION
The approach presented in the previous sections was essentially based on the
competitive aspects of spatial dynamics. A proper choice and implementation of new
technology in a certain place enhances its efficiency, and hence its relative growth
chances in a spatial system. This growth was assumed to be caused by a simultaneous
occurrence of both producer behavior and consumer behaviour in the adoption of
technological innovations.
It should be added that this model, as such, is not fully operational (in terms of
empirically based quantitative models). By means of simulation experiments, it may
reveal a diversity of space-time patterns, emanating from the interplay of economic
and technological key forces (for example, by means of an evolutionary event
history analysis).
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Our approach emphasizes the impact of technology on production processes and,
hence, on the growth of cities through multiplier processes emerging from
innovations and related agglomeration forces. In an analogous manner, our model
might be used to trace the impacts of new technology on city size in a
technology-driven spatial system, through an analysis of agglomeration forces
associated with different kinds of technology. Altogether, the potential of this model
can be explored further under different economic-technological regimes.
Finally, it is worth noting that a space-time model (like the one considered in this
paper), is fairly complex in the sense that it is not possible to represent the content of
the model in terms of a few easily tractable qualitative (or quantitative) properties.
This is the trade off to be faced if one wants to model the interplay of economic and
technical forces in an evolutionary context, whereby a diversity of space-time
patterns can be addressed.
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